Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
1-8-2021 12:00 PM

Autonomy, Paternalism, and the Moral Foundations of the
Fiduciary Relationship
Austin Horn, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: McLeod, Carolyn, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Philosophy
© Austin Horn 2021

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Applied Ethics Commons

Recommended Citation
Horn, Austin, "Autonomy, Paternalism, and the Moral Foundations of the Fiduciary Relationship" (2021).
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 7621.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/7621

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Abstract
The fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship that describes those interactions in which one
party is entrusted to exercise discretionary power on behalf of another’s significant practical
interests. Over the past several decades, as bioethicists have begun to use the fiduciary
relationship in their ethical analyses, it has proven to be a powerful tool for providing clarity
to complex ethical issues. But the exciting promise of the fiduciary relationship as a framework
for bioethical analysis is threatened by at least two major conceptual problems: moral-legal
equivocation and paternalism. Legal-moral equivocation refers to the problem of assuming the
normative demands of a legal relationship are also normatively demanding in a moral
relationship. Put simply, it assumes the legal “ought” is also a moral “ought.” The cogent use
of the fiduciary relationship in ethical analysis therefore requires some justification as to why
the fiduciary obligation should be considered a moral obligation. Paternalism refers to the
worry that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and therefore an inappropriate model for
the healthcare professional-patient relationship, with its ethos centred on promoting patient
autonomy. Chapter 1 addresses the problem of equivocation by arguing that the fiduciary
relationship is a moral relationship. By tracing the history of the fiduciary obligation, I argue
that it is a moral obligation that fosters social harmony by enabling individuals to trust or
depend on one another in those interactions where one undertakes to act on another’s behalf.
Chapter 2 addresses the problem of paternalism, arguing that the fiduciary relationship is
essential to promoting autonomy. I adopt Matthew Harding’s analysis of Equity’s role in
promoting autonomy (by maintaining socially important institutions) and apply it to the
fiduciary relationship. However, I also go beyond Harding’s analysis, adopting a relational
theory of autonomy I argue that fiduciary power is “relational capacity” that makes certain
autonomous ends possible. Finally, in Chapter 3, I illustrate the practical utility of the fiduciary
relationship by using it as framework for conceptualizing and addressing the ethical issues in
a recent controversy about a complex clinical trial involving preterm infants, called the
SUPPORT

trial.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship that describes those interactions in which
one party is entrusted to exercise discretionary power on behalf of another’s interests. In
recent years, the fiduciary relationship proven to be a powerful tool for providing clarity to
complex bioethical issues. But the exciting promise of the fiduciary relationship for
bioethical analysis is threatened by at least two conceptual problems: moral-legal
equivocation and paternalism. Legal-moral equivocation refers to the problem of assuming
that the normative demands of a legal relationship are also morally normative. The cogent
use of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis requires some justification as to why
the fiduciary obligation is a moral obligation. Paternalism refers to the worry that the
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and thus an inappropriate model for the healthcare
professional-patient relationship, with its ethos of promoting patient autonomy. Chapter 1
addresses the problem of equivocation by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is a moral
relationship, fostering social harmony by enabling individuals to trust or depend on one
another in those interactions where one undertakes to act on another’s behalf. Chapter 2
addresses the problem of paternalism, arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially
autonomy promoting; adopting a relational theory of autonomy, I argue that fiduciary power
is “relational capacity” that makes certain autonomous ends possible. In Chapter 3, I
illustrate the practical utility of the fiduciary relationship by using it as framework for
conceptualizing and addressing the ethical issues in a controversial clinical trial, known as
the SUPPORT trial.
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Introduction
The divorce between legal concepts and their philosophical foundations renders the
former susceptible to manipulation and misuse as they lose their connection to their
philosophical and doctrinal foundations and subsequently become more and more
unintelligible.2
—Leonard I. Rotman
In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle famously states that human flourishing (eudaimonia)
requires “self-sufficiency.” Nevertheless, Aristotle recognized that self-sufficiency
requires more than the philosopher’s solitary exercise of reason. 3 He clarifies that by selfsufficient “we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man [sic] by himself.”4 Selfsufficiency, in other words, does not mean complete independence from the support,
guidance, or influence of others. Rather, self-sufficiency, and thus human flourishing, also
requires various external goods. The most important of these external goods are human
relationships, such as those with family, friends, and even various professionals. As
Aristotle himself poignantly puts it:
[N]o one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is
a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the
happy man lives with others; for he has the things that are by nature good […]
Therefore the happy man needs friends.5

2

Rotman, “Understanding Fiduciary Duties and Relationship Fiduciarity,” McGill Law Journal/Revue de
droit de McGill 62, no. 4 (2017): 975-1042.
3

Aristotle, The Complete Aristotle, Apple Books, published by eBooks@Adelaide, 3041
(http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/),
4

Aristotle, The Complete Aristotle, 3031 (emphasis added). Please assume a “sic” throughout, wherever
the inappropriate use of gendered (particularly male) pronouns are used within quotations. In my own
writing, I will make mixed use of gendered (he/she) and nongendered (they/them) pronouns throughout.
5

Ibid., 3292–94.
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Aristotle recognized 2500 years earlier the essential role that our relationships play in the
quest for self-sufficiency—or rather, for “self-governance” or autonomy.6 Put simply,
relationships, on the Aristotelian account, are essential for autonomy.
Aristotle’s insights about the relational requirements of human autonomy and human
flourishing (eudaimonia) are as true today as they were then. We depend upon others in
myriad different ways. Members of human societies have always depended on certain
foundational social relationships, such as those between parents and children, spouses and
families, friends and allies, healers and the sick, leaders and followers. However, as our
societies become more complex and technologically advanced, various forms of
knowledge, skill, and expertise have become increasingly compartmentalized. Obtaining
even the most basic goods depends on a complex web of human interactions, each stage
involving a specialized set of knowledge or skills. To be sure, there is unlikely that any
facet of our lives is left untouched by the support, care, and guidance—or lack thereof—of
others. It is upon this elaborate system of social and economic cooperation, and
corresponding mutual dependence, that complex modern societies are built.
Arguably, among the most important of these social and economic relationships are those
that have been characterized as “fiduciary.” A fiduciary relationship is a legal relationship
defined broadly as those interactions in which one party (the fiduciary) is entrusted or
undertakes to exercise discretionary power on behalf of another’s (the beneficiary’s) best
interests.7 The fiduciary relationship is characterized by a “structural inequality” between
the power of the fiduciary to affect the beneficiaries interests and the dependence of the
beneficiary on that power.8 The inequality inherent to the fiduciary relationship renders the
beneficiary vulnerable to the fiduciary’s potential misuse, abuse, or neglect of her

6

The etymology of “autonomy” is derived from the Greek “autonomia”—“auto” and “nomos”—which
literally means “self-law.” In other words, to be self-ruling, to be one’s own lawmaker, or to “self-govern.”
7

Paul B. Miller, “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability,” McGill Law Journal 56, no. 2 (November 30, 2010):
235–288, https://doi.org/10.7202/1002367ar.
8

Miller, “A Theory of Fiduciary Liability.”
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discretionary powers. Hence, as a “prophylactic” against any potential exploitation, the law
demands of the fiduciary a strict duty of loyalty to promote her beneficiary’s best
interests—among other duties such as confidentiality, candor, and care.9 The legal
fiduciary obligation of loyalty is quite exacting. For instance, it prohibits the fiduciary from
entering into even potentially conflicting relationships or from profiting from their
privileged capacity qua fiduciary.10 Legal remedies for the violation of this duty are also
comparatively unforgiving.11 The demanding nature of the fiduciary obligation, along with
the severe penalties for its violation, speaks to the importance the law places in the
continued integrity, or viability, of this important legal relationship. Examples of fiduciary
relationships include those between parent and child, physician and patient, lawyer and
client, chief executive officer and shareholder (or stakeholder), and many others.12 Some
have even argued that the state is a fiduciary to its citizenry.13
The fiduciary relationship has enjoyed increased philosophical and jurisprudential
attention over the past several decades. As the legal contours of this relationship have
become more well-defined through fiduciary jurisprudence and academic debate, a greater
number of persons and entities have been found by both legal scholarship and the courts to
owe fiduciary obligations. The courts have thus had to consider whether all of these

9

Although the exact number and type of fiduciary duties is contested.

10

It is standard practice in jurisprudence to use the term “law” to refer specifically to the common law, as
distinct from Equity. However, unless other stated, I will use “law” more broadly to refer to legal
institutions generally, as contrasted with morality. Where I specifically mean the common law, as distinct
from Equity, I will use the phrase “common law.”
11

For example, the disgorgement of ill-gotten profits and the creation of a constructive Trust, among
others. Note that I will capitalize “Trust” when referring to the legal relationship, or institution, created by
(at least in the common law tradition) English Equity. I will reserve lower case “trust” for broad moral and
philosophical ideas about a particular way in which individuals relate to one another (i.e., in trust
relationships).
12

Not all common law jurisdictions recognize the same relationships as fiduciary. Australia, in particular,
is quite restrictive and does not consider the physician-patient relationship to be fiduciary.
13

Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011).
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relationships are in fact “fiduciary.”14 In recent decades, questions about the nature and
application of the fiduciary relationship have given rise to a rich debate among jurists,
philosophers, and other legal scholars in the growing jurisprudence on fiduciary law. These
questions include those about the meaning, scope, obligations, and legal taxonomy (e.g.,
its relation to other areas of the law, such contract or tort) of the fiduciary relationship, to
name just a few.
Concurrent with the rise of fiduciary jurisprudence in the law has been the increased
interest in, and application of, the fiduciary relationship to the ethical problems of research
and medical ethics. Many bioethicists have taken seriously the finding by (most) common
law courts that the physician-patient relationship, in particular, is fiduciary. In other words,
an increasing number of bioethicists have found in the fiduciary relationship a useful
framework for conceptualizing the kinds of ethical issues that arise between healthcare
professionals and their patients. By “framework” here I simply mean that the fiduciary
relationship denotes a unique mode of human interaction whose express purpose is to
enable one individual to trust or depend on another to act on behalf of their interests, and
to remain loyal to those interests in doing so.15 This mode of interaction, or relationship,
has a certain structure (i.e., inequality between power and dependence), which gives rise
to other features (e.g., a vulnerability to exploitation), and ultimately to various rules and
obligations (e.g., loyalty, candor, care, etc.) which function to protect or maintain the
viability of the fiduciary relationship itself. As a framework, the fiduciary relationship has
proven promising for clarifying a number of seemingly intractable ethical debates, such as
those about commercial surrogacy, conscientious objection, and the ethical conduct of
innovative research methodologies.16

14

In the law, such considerations usually involve whether there are any overriding “policy” considerations
(i.e., beyond mere application of legal theory or tests) for recognizing a particular relationship as fiduciary.
For example, in recognizing a strict fiduciary obligation of the state to the general citizenry would likely
overwhelm the courts with legal actions claiming breach of the state’s duty of loyalty.
15
16

I will flesh this idea out in more detail in Chapter 1.

See Carolyn McLeod, Conscience in Reproductive Healthcare, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, May
2020); Emma A. Ryman, “Fiduciary Duties and Commercial Surrogacy,” (Doctoral Dissertation, Western

5

For example, Charles Fried (a jurist) was among the first to recognize and apply the
fiduciary relationship to the interaction between physician and patient, from which he drew
important legal as well as ethical implications for conducting research with patient
populations.17 In particular, Fried reconceptualized the perennial problem of
randomization in clinical trials through a fiduciary lens. Using a fiduciary framework, Fried
argued that the ethical problem posed by randomization, an essential component of a subset
of clinical trial design, is that it conflicts with a physician’s fiduciary obligation to use their
discretionary judgment in pursuit of patients’ best interests. Reframing and reclarifying the
problem posed by randomization in this way also paved the way for an ethical resolution
to this problem that is still influential today: namely, the suggestion that enrolling patients
in a randomized clinical trial is consistent with a physician’s fiduciary obligation to
promote the patient’s best interests, so long as the therapeutic merits of all arms of the trial
are in a state of “clinical equipoise,” or uncertainty.18 In other words, so long as the body
of professional knowledge from which physicians’ (qua professionals) discretionary
judgment is derived is in a state of uncertainty as to the preferred treatment, the physician
does not violate her fiduciary obligation by recommending the patient enroll in the trial.19
Since Fried’s seminal analysis, many bioethicists have found in the fiduciary relationship
a useful ethical framework that provides much-needed clarity to a wide array of bioethical
conundrums, such as those previously mentioned. The application of the fiduciary
relationship to these and other ethical issues implies that it is also a moral and not simply
legal relationship.

University, 2017), Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 4728, https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4728,
respectively; and Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
17

Charles Fried, Medical Experimentation: Personal Integrity and Social Policy: New Edition, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016).
18

The history and contemporary application of equipoise will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of
this dissertation. For more on the history, nature, and contemporary application of clinical equipoise see
Austin R. Horn and Charles Weijer, “Clinical Equipoise,” Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics 1 (2015): 1–
11.
19

Assuming there are no other contraindications that would disqualify the patient from enrollment in the
trial.
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This dissertation is motivated by the promise of the fiduciary relationship to address
complex bioethical issues, particularly in the realms of medical and research ethics.
However, in order to provide a firm conceptual foundation for the widespread application
of the fiduciary relationship as a tool of bioethical analysis, I explore and address reasons
why bioethicists might be skeptical about fully embracing the fiduciary relationship as an
ethical framework for the physician-patient relationship. The reasons I identify are twofold.
The first problem is what I call the problem legal-moral equivocation. Generally speaking,
“equivocation” refers to the misleading exploitation of the ambiguity of a concept to draw
certain conclusions (which are, as a result, often invalid). A classic example involves
equivocation between legal “laws” and the so-called “laws” of nature, which can be found
in the following fallacious argument: “[L]aws imply lawgivers. There are laws in nature.
Therefore, there must be a cosmic lawgiver.”20 The conclusion is invalid because it turns
on two different meanings of “law” in this case. The equivocation to which I am referring
vis-à-vis the fiduciary relationship turns on the ambiguity between the different meanings
of “normative”—or perhaps more accurately, the two different domains in which the
concept “normative” operates. On the one hand, the law normatively prescribes certain
behaviour for legal reasons (e.g., the threat of punishment). Morality, on the other hand,
also normatively prescribes certain behaviour, based on moral reasons (such as the desire
to do, or be, “good”). Legal-moral equivocation, then, turns on the ambiguity of
“normative” insofar as it assumes—without argument or justification—that the sense of
“normative” in the legal sphere can be straightforwardly applied to, or has implications for
the “normative” of the moral or ethical sphere. Put simply, it supposes that the normative
prescriptions derived from a legal relationship are also normatively prescriptive for a
moral relationship.
Yet surely just because one has, as a matter of legal fact, a certain obligation in law, one
does not (necessarily) also have a moral obligation as well. As an example, I may have a

20

“Equivocation,” Texas State Department of Philosophy, accessed August 31, 2020,
https://www.txstate.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/Equivocation.html.
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legal obligation to do my taxes, but it does not necessarily follow that I also have a moral
obligation to do so. At the very least, more needs to be said to motivate the specifically
moral “ought” in this case, such as having a moral obligation to contribute to the common
good that is served by paying my taxes. Accordingly, more needs to be said to motivate the
claim that the normative prescriptions of the fiduciary relationship, at least qua legal
relationship, ought also to apply to and guide ethical practice. Indeed, Miller (a legal
scholar) is careful to define the fiduciary relationship as “a distinctive type of legal
relationship.”21 Clearly aware of this type fallacious reasoning, Miller couches his
arguments concerning fiduciary duties and remedies purely in “juridical” terms, explicitly
disavowing moral or ethical justifications.22
The question therefore arises, if the fiduciary relationship is purely a construct of the law,
why think that its prescriptions ought to have any bearing whatsoever on the ethical
problems of bioethics? Why think that the fiduciary relationship, qua legal institution, is
(also) a moral relationship? Indeed, the law has a number of “legal fictions,” so called as
they are created to solve technical or policy problems in law. For example, treating
corporations as legal “persons,” is a legal fiction.23 The fiction involves that idea that the
corporation exists separately from those of its individual members. Granting corporations
many of the legal rights and duties of human persons is (ostensibly) practical and expedient
in commercial transactions (e.g., by enabling corporations to enter into contacts) and also
protects its individual members from some legal and financial liabilities. However,
corporations are clearly not real persons. The worry, then, is that the fiduciary relationship
is simply a creation of the law, like a legal fiction, and its application (without justification)
to the ethical problems of bioethics is therefore unfounded.

21

Miller, “Fiduciary Liability,” 235 (emphasis added).

22

Paul B. Miller, “Justifying Fiduciary Duties.” McGill Law Journal/Revue de droit de McGill 58, no. 4
(2013): 969-1023.
23

Lon Luvois Fuller, “Legal fictions,” Illinois Law Reveiew 25 (1930): 363.
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Some bioethicists do indeed appear hesitant to explicitly name the fiduciary relationship in
their ethical analyses, preferring instead to use related or overlapping ethical concepts such
as trust, loyalty, and promise. There are of course different possible reasons for this
apparent reluctancy to use the language of “fiduciaries,” beyond worries about
equivocation. Perhaps, these bioethicists simply do not want to presume knowledge of a
technical legal term among their readers, for instance. Still, their hesitancy could—and
perhaps ought—to be owing, in part or in whole, to worries about legal-moral equivocation.
To illustrate, consider that it is not uncommon in some bioethical analyses to conflate the
trust relationship with the fiduciary relationship, when it is clearly the latter that is being
invoked. The reason for mentioning trust may be that the fiduciary relationship often
involves trust, and the trust relationship is one that falls squarely within the ethical domain.
The following is a salient example of this type of trust-fiduciary conflation:
[T]he truster (in this case, the patient) trusts the trustee (the physician) to protect
and promote a significant practical interest (the patient’s health). The truster cedes
control of the significant practical interest, and as a result, the trustee has
discretionary power over the interest at stake.24
Here the authors unmistakably describe a fiduciary relationship—yet they use the language
of “trust.” In fact, this definition that purports to be of a trust relationship is taken almost
verbatim from Paul Miller’s own influential definition of the fiduciary relationship, albeit
with the words “truster” and “trustee” in place of beneficiary and fiduciary, respectively.25
As Miller defines it, the fiduciary relationship is “one in which one party (the fiduciary)
enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another (the
beneficiary).”26 And yet the authors of the above quotation—who include Miller
himself!—profess to describe a trust relationship. Why? One plausible answer is concerns
about legal-moral equivocation (of which Miller himself is clearly cognizant).

24

Charles Weijer, Paul B. Miller, and Mackenzie Graham, “Duty of Care and Equipoise in Randomized
Controlled Trials,” in The Routledge Companion to Bioethics, ed. John D. Arras, Elizabeth Mary Fenton,
and Rebecca Kukla, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 201.
25

Miller, “Justifying Fiduciary Duties,” 1016.

26

Miller, “Fiduciary Liability,” 262.
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Conflating the fiduciary relationship with other moral relationships does not alleviate the
problem of legal-moral equivocation, it merely obfuscates it. The trust relationship, for
one, is clearly not synonymous with the fiduciary relationship, as the following three
reasons make plain. First, a trust relationship need not involve an imbalance (structural or
otherwise) of power between the truster and the trustee. Trust can doubtless occur (and
may even be easier) in positions of relative equality. Second, trust relationships do not
require the truster to entrust a “significant practical interest” to the trusted. While trust can
involve important interests of this kind, trust can clearly involve more trivial interests as
well. For example, I might trust my partner to pick up a (nonessential!) ingredient for our
dinner on the way home from work. Finally, and relatedly, nor does trust necessarily
involve substantial “discretionary power.” While Annette Baier, in her seminal paper on
trust, argues that trust does require discretionary power, other philosophers have since
questioned how meaningfully “discretionary” many forms of trust actually are.27 This
insight is perhaps most relevant to relationships that are entirely agentive. For example, I
might entrust you to mail a letter for me according to clearly specified parameters, leaving
you no room for meaningful “discretionary power,” and thus merely trusting that you will
do so (while not forcing you to do it or knowing that you are somehow forced). The latitude
for judgement or discretion in such cases is severely curtailed, rendering any remaining
discretion somewhat trivial. Of course, trust will often be present in healthy fiduciary
relationships, and many, if not most, trust relationships will involve a significant degree of
authorized discretionary power. But this does not imply that the two relationships are
synonymous or, for that matter, interchangeable. In the case above where they are used
interchangeably, there is in fact a conflation going on, one that could be motivated by a
worry about legal-moral equivocation. At any rate, equivocation ought to be a worry among
bioethicists and others who intend to use the fiduciary relationship as an ethical framework,
since it is, as Miller notes, “a distinctive type of legal relationship.” Extra-legal application
of the fiduciary relationship requires justification and therefore remains a conceptual hurdle
to its widespread use.

27

See Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” Ethics 107, no. 1 (October, 1996), 8 note 3.
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The second problem is about paternalism. Specifically, the worry that the fiduciary
relationship is paternalistic. Like the fiduciary relationship, paternalism involves acting on
behalf, and in the presumed interests, of another. Medical paternalism, for example, is
based on the rationale that the physician “knows best” because of his or her professional
knowledge or expertise. On this model, the physician holds all the power and is justified in
making unilateral decisions concerning the patient’s medical interests, even contrary to the
patient’s expressed wishes. The history of professional medical ethics describes a series of
troubling (and often tragic) abuses of patient welfare and autonomy based on this “doctor
knows best” rationale. The infamous Tuskegee Syphilis is just one of many such
examples.28 In response to the abuses perpetrated against patients based on the paternalistic
model of the physician-patient relationship, contemporary bioethics has since moved
toward a “patient-centred” model to healthcare decision-making. This alternative is
intended to empower patients to take an active role in the pursuit of their healthcare
interests and thereby promote patient autonomy.
The worry, in short, is that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and therefore is an
inappropriate model for the physician-patient interaction. Indeed, the fiduciary relationship
does appear to share many of the hallmarks of paternalism. Fiduciaries use their
knowledge, skill, or expertise to act in the interests, and on behalf of, their beneficiaries.
The fiduciary relationship is characterized by a structural inequality between the power of
the fiduciary to affect the beneficiary’s interests and the dependence of the beneficiary on
that power. Hence, insofar as the fiduciary relationship shares these fundamental
characteristics with paternalism, its use as an ethical framework for the relationship

28

Allan M. Brandt, “Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” The Hastings
Center Report 8, no. 6 (December 1, 1978): 21–29. Subjects were taken from a socially and economically
vulnerable (viz., poor and uneducated) community in Macon County, Alabama. The U.S. Public Health
Service (USPHS) followed the 400 syphilitic men, and 200 non-syphilitic controls, for almost 40 years
(1936 to 1972). During routine data collection subjects were told (falsely) that they were receiving
treatment for their syphilis. When penicillin became widely available in the 1950s as the preferred
treatment for syphilis, the men did not receive—and, in fact, researchers actively withheld—treatment.
Only after public outrage, following coverage of the study in the national press, was the study finally put to
an end, in 1972. By then only 74 subjects were still alive and likely more than 100 died as direct result of
syphilitic lesions.

11

between healthcare professionals and their patients would—rightly—appear wrongheaded
to contemporary bioethicists concerned to protect patient autonomy. At the very least, these
characteristics ought to give bioethicists pause when considering the fiduciary relationship
as a candidate ethical model, or framework, for conceptualizing ethical issues arising in
medical or research ethics.
As of yet no one, to my knowledge, has effectively addressed these two conceptual hurdles
to applying the fiduciary framework to ethical problems of bioethics.29 While some
bioethicists have argued (along with many common law courts) that the physician-patient
relationship is in fact fiduciary, none have provided sustained theoretical and specifically
moral justification for applying this apparently legal relationship to the ethical domain.30
Similarly, while some bioethicists have argued that the fiduciary relationship is not
paternalistic,31 none have made the stronger claim that the fiduciary relationship is
essential to promoting autonomy. This stronger stance, which I take in this dissertation,
responds to the threat of paternalism most effectively by saying that the fiduciary
relationship is essentially the opposite of a paternalistic relationship: it is critical to
autonomy.
This dissertation aims to alleviate these concerns about equivocation and paternalism by
first uncovering the moral history of the fiduciary relationship (antecedent to its status as
a legal institution) and second, by providing a theoretical moral grounding for the fiduciary
relationship in its role in promoting autonomy. In this way, I hope to remove two
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conceptual hurdles to the widespread application of the fiduciary relationship to the ethical
problems of bioethics, and thereby foster greater clarity to ethical issues that arise in the
context of the healthcare professional-patient relationship.
There are three chapters to this dissertation all of which are loosely related to the others
and together comprise an overarching narrative. Chapters 1 and 2 provide mutually
reinforcing arguments and therefore can be considered companion pieces. As explained
below, Chapter 1 addresses the problem of equivocation through a historical lens, while
Chapter 2 builds upon and reinforces the argument of Chapter 1, though concerns itself
primarily with the problem of paternalism by locating the moral purpose of the fiduciary
relationship in promoting autonomy. Chapter 3 applies the theory laid out in the preceding
two chapters to an important contemporary problem in research ethics. Nevertheless, each
of the three chapters can be read independently of the others, as each encompasses its own
self-contained argument.
Chapter 1 takes up the problem of equivocation. It provides a moral ground for the fiduciary
relationship by tracing its historical origins to a moral obligation; namely, the obligation
that when one undertakes to act on behalf of another’s interests, one must do so with utmost
fidelity, or loyalty, to that other’s interests. I illustrate how this moral obligation has
enjoyed a roughly 3000-year history, existing across both time and cultures as (variously)
a moral norm, religious command, and legal rule. I suggest that, in each historical instance,
the fiduciary obligation effectively enables individuals to trust or depend on one another in
the context of socially and economically important relationships in which one undertakes
to act on behalf of another, thereby fostering greater cooperation and social harmony. I
then describe how the fiduciary obligation entered English medieval law through the courts
of Equity. In doing so I suggest that English Equity’s interest in, and institutionalization
of, the fiduciary relationship is merely the latest instance of more or less continuous
attempts by diverse societies throughout history to protect this important moral
relationship.32 This historical analysis of the fiduciary relationship mitigates concerns
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about legal-moral equivocation by suggesting that the fiduciary relationship is in fact a
moral relationship.
Chapter 2 takes of the problem of paternalism by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is
essentially autonomy promoting. I begin by drawing from Matthew Harding’s account of
Equity’s interest in governing and maintaining “institutions,” or what he calls frameworks
for human action. Harding argues that Equity is “normatively justified” in maintaining
socially and economically important institutions insofar as doing so is consistent with the
law’s liberal “facilitative project” aimed at promoting autonomy. Harding argues that
Equity promotes autonomy by individuating and maintaining institutions as distinct
“options” from which individuals can choose in the process of self-determination. I apply
Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship, arguing that the fiduciary relationship is
one such institution that Equity has taken an interest in governing and maintaining,
providing further theoretical support to the historical analysis provided in Chapter 1.
However, I argue that Harding’s (Razian) conception of autonomy does not account for the
ways in which autonomy is fundamentally relational; that is, how relationships with others
both foster and impede our ability to self-govern and thus to be autonomous. I therefore go
beyond Harding’s account by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially
autonomy promoting; that is, beyond its mere role as a distinct “option” from which
individuals can choose in the pursuit of their self-directed plans. I argue that when we adopt
a relational theory of autonomy, it becomes clear that the fiduciary relationship is critical
to both the development of “autonomy skills” (as in the parent-child relationship) as well
as to the ongoing exercise of autonomy. Finally, I employ Paul Miller’s influential account
of the fiduciary relationship to argue that “fiduciary power” is a relational capacity through
which individuals are able to exercise their will. Moreover, that this relational capacity is
often essential to meaningful self-governance. In this way, I respond to the problem of
paternalism by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essential to the promotion of
autonomy and, thereby, not paternalistic. Moreover, building on the thesis of Chapter 1, I

so, I intend to disambiguate this legal jurisdiction from lower case “equity,” which I reserve for broad
moral and philosophical ideas about equality and fairness (and which the courts of Equity ostensibly took
as their subject matter).
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argue that way in which the fiduciary relationship fosters social harmony in coextensive
with the way in which it promotes autonomy, which becomes clear when we adopt a
relational theory of autonomy. To the extent that the fiduciary relationship is often
essential to autonomy, worries about paternalism ought to be alleviated.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I illustrate the utility of the fiduciary relationship for providing ethical
clarity to a recent controversy in research ethics. The SUPPORT trial was a pragmatic
comparative effectiveness randomized clinical trial (ceRCT), an innovative research
methodology designed to be conducted under real-world clinical conditions. The
SUPPORT trial compared two “standard of care” oxygen saturation ranges on preterm
infants on outcomes of blindness and death. Infants were randomized to either “low” or
“high” saturation ranges, both of which (purportedly) fell within the full standard of care
range. The outcome of the trial showed that for every case of blindness prevented (for
infants in the low oxygen arm) there were two infant deaths. Controversy erupted when it
was discovered that neither blindness nor death—the primary study outcomes—were
disclosed as “research risks” to the study participants. Debate about the SUPPORT trial
was highly polarized, yet (as I point out) largely ad hoc. I demonstrate how applying a
fiduciary analysis can be powerful tool for systematically identifying and appropriately
conceptualizing the ethical issues that arise in the SUPPORT trial, and perhaps in
pragmatic trials generally, offering much-need clarity to a difficult and emotionally
charged debate.
In summary, in this dissertation I identify and aim to mitigate two important conceptual
hurdles to the widespread application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis:
viz., equivocation and paternalism. I do so, first, by uncovering the moral history of the
fiduciary obligation prior to its legal instantiation, suggesting that concerns about legalmoral equivocation are misplaced. Secondly, I respond to the problem of paternalism by
arguing that the fiduciary relationship is often essential to promoting autonomy. Moreover,
I suggest that the essential role the fiduciary relationship plays in promoting autonomy
provides it with a firm foundation in morality. Finally, by applying a fiduciary analysis to
a complex and controversial contemporary bioethical case study, I illustrate the utility of
the fiduciary relationship as a framework for thinking clearly and systematically about the
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relevant ethical issues that may arise between healthcare professionals and their patients.
However, insofar as there are other philosophical issues with applying a fiduciary analysis
to bioethical problems (beyond equivocation and paternalism) this dissertation does not
address every obstacle to its ethical application. Nevertheless, by addressing two such
major issues, proposing a foundation for the fiduciary relationship in morality, and
demonstrating its utility for ethical analysis, I hope to aid in laying the theoretical
foundation for future work in this exciting new area of bioethics.
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Chapter 1

1

A Moral and Legal History of the Fiduciary Relationship

In this chapter, my aim is to address the problem of legal-moral equivocation. I do so by
tracing the history of the fiduciary relationship from its origins in ancient moral, religious,
and legal thought to its adoption by the Medieval English courts of Chancery, and later
English Equity—from which we gain our modern understanding of the fiduciary
relationship qua legal relationship.33 I suggest that the fiduciary relationship is defined by
an underlying fiduciary obligation: namely, the normative demand that when undertakes
to act on behalf of another’s significant practical interests, one must do so with utmost
fidelity, or loyalty, to that other’s interests. Moreover, I argue that the fiduciary obligation
arose and developed alongside increasingly complex human civilizations, responding to a
problem “etched in human nature”:34 viz., how to trust, or at least reliably depend upon,
others who undertake to act on behalf of our interests? By way of this historical analysis,
I intend to argue that the fiduciary relationship is, first and foremost, a moral relationship.
By “moral” here I simply mean that widespread social adherence to the normative demands
of the fiduciary obligation is essential to human cooperation and, ultimately, social
harmony. Uncovering the history of the fiduciary relationship reveals the important moral
role the fiduciary obligation, and thus the fiduciary relationship, has played in fostering
social harmony since the emergence of complex human societies. Insofar as the fiduciary
relationship is in fact a moral relationship (indeed, one that grounds the legal relationship)
worries about legal-moral equivocation simply dissolve. Applying the fiduciary
relationship to the ethical problems of bioethics therefore need not raise concerns about the
illicit or unjustified importation of normative obligations from the legal into the moral
domain. The fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship and thus its application to ethical
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issues that arise between healthcare professionals and their patients, in particular, is
justified.
I am not the first to recognize the moral dimension of the fiduciary relationship. A number
of other scholars have identified various moral corollaries of the fiduciary obligation
throughout the course of human civilizations. In section 1.1, I briefly outline some of these
views and suggest a unifying theme among them. As just alluded to above, I suggest that
in each historical instance in which evidence of the fiduciary obligation can be found, it is
invoked in an effort to address a specific problem inherent to human action: again, how
can one trust or at least reliably depend upon another to act on behalf of one’s interests?
By synthesizing these disparate accounts, I suggest that the fiduciary relationship, and
specifically its defining obligation, functions as a moral obligation insofar as it fosters
broadscale human cooperation, greater social harmony and, ultimately, individual human
flourishing. In other words, without the kinds of social and economic cooperation that the
fiduciary relationship makes possible, individuals would be simply incapable of engaging
in many kinds of human interactions that make a worthwhile life possible.35
In section 1.2, I illustrate how the fiduciary obligation has been present throughout the
course of human civilizations, from the Code of Hammurabi to its eventual birth in
Medieval English law, to which we owe our contemporary understanding. The historical
account provided in section 1.2 is broken into two subsections: sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2.
Section 1.2.1 traces the fiduciary obligation from Ancient Mesopotamia to the age of the
Roman Empire. I highlight evidence of the fiduciary obligation in moral, religious, and
legal thought, including in: the Ancient Babylonian laws of agency, bailment, and
negligence; Ancient Chinese law and philosophy; the religious edicts of the Old and New
Testaments; provisions in Islamic and Jewish law; and, finally, in Roman law. Against this
background, section 1.2.2 illustrates how the fiduciary obligation became an equitable
principle of the courts of Chancery, an early court of English Equity. In this section, I
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provide a brief historical account of how Equity arose in tandem with the legal Trust, out
of which evolved our modern understanding of the fiduciary relationship (i.e., as an
institution of Equity). I describe how Chancery came to view itself as serving an equitable
jurisdiction in supplement (and superior) to the Common Law. This history is intended to
suggest that the fiduciary obligation’s eventual entry into English law through the courts
of Equity is merely contemporary Western society’s latest attempt to protect and enforce
this important moral obligation, which has existed across cultures for millennia, always
with the aim of promoting greater social and economic cooperation and thus social
harmony. I also suggest that it is perhaps unsurprising that the fiduciary obligation should
gain a foothold in the law—qua equitable principle—through Chancery. Given the moral
purpose the fiduciary relationship serves, it seems appropriate that a jurisdiction, which
came to view itself as responsible for exercising principles of fairness and equality, became
the eventual vehicle by which the fiduciary obligation entered our modern legal system.
Finally, in section 1.3 I raise and respond to two objections. The first objection concerns
the nature of the historical narrative I will have provided. It is a matter of debate among
jurists and legal philosophers as to whether the courts of Equity in fact occupy a unique
jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Common Law, whether procedurally or substantively. To the
extent that my argument depends on the claim that Equity plays a unique role as an
equitable supplement to the Common Law, I am vulnerable to the criticisms of those who
claim otherwise. Accordingly, I outline one such view and discuss its implications for my
thesis. Second, I respond to a criticism that might be put forward by bioethicists, in
particular. Bioethicists critical of the fiduciary relationship as a framework for the
healthcare professional-patient interaction might ask the following: if the fiduciary
relationship is as important as I make it out to be, morally speaking, then why has it not
received more attention by moral philosophers? The critique suggests that if the fiduciary
obligation were in fact an important moral obligation, then moral philosophers would have
paid more attention to it. I respond to this objection by pointing out that the fiduciary
obligation has received more attention from moral philosophers than might immediately
be evident. Finally, I conclude this chapter by summarizing the implications of the history
and arguments I have presented for the problem of legal-moral equivocation.
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1.1

A Problem “Etched in Human Nature”

As defined in the Introduction, the fiduciary relationship refers to those interactions in
which one party (the fiduciary) is entrusted to exercise discretionary power on behalf of
another’s (the beneficiary’s) best interests.36 The fiduciary interaction is defined by the
fiduciary’s obligation to use the discretionary power with which she has been entrusted
with utmost fidelity, or loyalty, to the beneficiary’s interests. As also mentioned in the
Introduction, both common and civil law jurisdictions recognize numerous relationships as
fiduciary. These include relationships between parent and child, physician and patient,
lawyer and client, financial advisor and advisee, chief executive officer and shareholder,
among many others.37 The fiduciary relationship is characterized by the “structural
inequality” between the power of the fiduciary to affect the beneficiaries interests and the
dependence of the beneficiary on that power.38 This structural inequality renders the
beneficiary vulnerable to exploitation through the fiduciary’s misuse, abuse, neglect, or
exploitation of her discretionary power.39 Many jurists and legal philosophers agree that it
is in response to the beneficiary’s inherent vulnerability that fiduciary duties arise.40
Fiduciary duties, along with the corresponding remedies for their violation, are sometimes
said to serve a “prophylactic” function.41 Fiduciary duties and liabilities guide and deter
fiduciaries from taking advantage of their privileged capacity qua fiduciary, or from simply
failing to perform their fiduciary mandate, through the imposition of certain obligations
(together with the threat of harsh punishments for failing to live up to the demands of those
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obligations). Among the most important of these obligations is the fiduciary’s duty of strict
loyalty to promote her beneficiary’s interests. Indeed, some jurists and legal philosophers
argue that the duty of loyalty is constitutive of, or synonymous with, the fiduciary
relationship itself.42
Today the fiduciary relationship is largely understood to be a legal relationship, which is
to say, a creature of English Equity, or of legal systems descended therefrom.43 As such,
its duties and liabilities are thought to be correspondingly legal in nature. The fiduciary
obligation of loyalty has been quite exacting, requiring of fiduciaries an unusual degree of
selflessness in the pursuit of their beneficiaries’ best interests. But the norms and values
inherent to the fiduciary relationship—selflessness, loyalty, trust, and others—have
obvious moral connotations. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, a growing minority of jurists and
philosophers have argued that we ought to consider the moral dimensions and corollaries
of the fiduciary obligation. Accordingly, in this section I provide a brief survey of some of
these views. I argue that a unifying thread can be found in the way the fiduciary obligation
appears serve an important moral function in each; namely, by enabling individuals to trust
or depend on one another, promoting mutual cooperation and fostering greater social
harmony.
Among the first to recognize the broader applicability of the fiduciary relationship, beyond
the law of Trusts (from which the contemporary fiduciary relationship has its roots), was
jurist Austin Scott.44 Scott defined a “fiduciary” as “a person who undertakes to act in the
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interests of another person.”45 Employing this broad definition, Scott identified numerous
fiduciary relationships, some of which were atypical at the time of his writing.46 However,
beyond simply expanding the legal scope of the fiduciary relationship, Scott went further
by recognizing the fiduciary obligation in certain moral relationships as well. For instance,
Scott identifies the fiduciary obligation in a moral-religious context in his analysis of the
New Testament’s sixteenth chapter of the Gospel according to Saint Luke, known
colloquially as the “Unjust Steward”:
There was a certain rich man, which had a steward; and the same was accused unto
him that he had wasted his goods.
And he called him, and said unto him, How is it that I hear this of thee? give an
account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest be no longer steward.
Then the steward said within himself, What shall I do? for my lord taketh away
from me the stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed.
I am resolved what to do, that, when I am put out of the stewardship, they may
receive me into their houses.
So he called every one of his lord's debtors unto him, and said unto the first, How
much owest thou unto my lord?
And he said, An hundred measures of oil. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and
sit down quickly, and write fifty.
Then said he to another, And how much owest thou? And he said, An hundred
measures of wheat.
And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and write fourscore. And the lord commended
the unjust steward, because he had done wisely: for the children of this world are
in their generation wiser than the children of light.47
Upon learning of his master’s intention to fire him (apparently owing to an earlier failing)
the titular Unjust Steward exploits his capacity as his master’s steward to confer a favour
upon himself with his master’s debtors by relieving them of large portions of their debts.
Scott argues that the Steward is a fiduciary to his master: he undertakes to act on behalf of
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his master’s interests. As Scott says, “it was his duty in dealing with this master’s affairs
to act solely in the interest of his master.”48 Accordingly, the Steward owes a duty of loyalty
to his master’s interests in discharging his role as fiduciary, in this case, in securing debts
owed to his master. Instead, the Steward uses his privileged capacity as his master’s
fiduciary, or steward, to secure his own interests. It is precisely the violation of his fiduciary
obligation to his master that renders the Steward “unjust” in this case. The “injustice” in
this case is clearly not (or at least not only) the violation of a legal law, but as the context
of this biblical passage suggests, it is (also) a violation of a moral-religious law. Hence,
Scott suggests that in contravening the normative demands of the fiduciary obligation, the
Steward also violates a moral obligation.
Scott is not the only one to identify the moral dimensions of the fiduciary relationship. As
briefly mentioned, Frankel begins by noting the striking parallels between the Ancient
corollaries of the fiduciary obligation, along with various norms and rules that give life to
it, with those of today’s fiduciary duties and rules.49 Frankel says that these parallels are
unsurprising, given that the fiduciary obligation was, and remains, an important moral
obligation that guides a critical mode of human interaction: namely, where one undertakes
to act on behalf of another’s interests.
[O]verlaying all [fiduciary] rules is a theme of morality and fairness—protection
of entrustors from serious injury from the relationship. And while law may have
been rigid, strict and specific, the roots of ancient and religious laws have
permeated fiduciary law, and have not relinquished their hold even today.50
Frankel suggests that the fiduciary obligation serves a moral function by enabling
individuals to engage in a certain type of relationship of trust and dependence, which
underpins ancient and modern fiduciary laws alike, while also accounting for the
remarkable similarity between the two. The similarity exists because the moral problem,
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in response to which the fiduciary obligation arises, is as relevant today as it was 3000
years ago. The problem, again, concerns how to trust or depend on another who undertakes
to act on our behalf. Our manifest interdependence leaves us vulnerable to exploitation at
the hands of others in whom we have placed our trust, or upon whom we depend. Given
that countless important social and economic interactions require entrusting others to act
on our behalf, how can we reliably trust or depend on those others to act in our interests?
As Frankel points out, this problem is not unique to modern societies; rather, “it seems that
throughout the centuries the problems that these [fiduciary] laws were designed to solve
are eternal, etched in human nature, derived from human needs, and built into human
activities.”51 The fiduciary obligation mitigates this problem by prescribing a strict duty of
loyalty to the beneficiary’s interests. The societal importance of adhering to this obligation
is reflected, as we will see, in moral, religious, and legal thought throughout the history of
human civilizations.
It is worth noting here that the fiduciary duty of loyalty does not imply that a fiduciary
must act entirely selflessly vis-à-vis all of her beneficiary’s interests. In Chapter 2, I discuss
in detail the unique nature of fiduciary power which, according to Miller’s influential
account, is (among other things) specific. Specificity implies that the fiduciary exercise her
powers of discretion on behalf of her beneficiary’s significant practical interests, which
includes matters of personality, welfare, and right. Without belaboring the point too much
here, the fiduciary’s obligation to her beneficiary is delimited to a specific subset of
interests. For example, a parent (qua legal and, as I argue, moral fiduciary) would not be
in violation of her fiduciary duty to act on behalf of her child’s “best interests,” should she
decide to coach her child’s opposing hockey team. While coaching the opposing team is
clearly not in her child’s “best interests,” broadly construed, it is nevertheless compatible
with the parent’s specific fiduciary mandate to act on behalf of her child’s significant
practical interests. In this case, the child’s welfare interests include basic physical
necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter, as well as psychological needs like a sense
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of security, love, and emotional support. Personality interests might include fostering the
relevant cognitive and emotional skills necessary for a sense of agency or self-actualization
in adulthood, such as self-awareness, confidence, and empathy. Indeed, one can imagine,
for the sake of argument, that in coaching the opposing hockey team, the parent-fiduciary
both remains involved in and supportive of her child’s welfare and personality interests,
say, by providing space for her child to gain a sense of independence and perhaps empathy
as well (i.e., let us suppose, by humanizing—as opposed to “othering”—the opposing
team).52 Nevertheless, even circumscribed in this way, the fiduciary obligation is quite
demanding. But it is precisely the exacting nature of the fiduciary obligation that makes it
possible for individuals to trust or reliably depend on one another in the context of this
unique mode of human interaction and commensurate with it immense social and economic
importance.
Legal scholar, Leonard Rotman, agrees.53 Rotman argues that the purpose of the fiduciary
obligation is to protect “important social and economic interactions of high trust and
confidence that create an implicit dependency and peculiar vulnerability of beneficiaries to
their fiduciaries.”54 Societies characterized by a high degree of specialization of
knowledge, skill, and expertise require involved systems of cooperation, and thus make
interdependence foundational to its structure and functioning. According to Rotman,
[f]iduciary interactions rank among the most valuable in society by enhancing
productivity and knowledge, facilitating specialization, and creating fiscal and
informational wealth. To protect them, fiduciary law subordinates individual
interests to its broader social and economic goals. Relationships, rather than
individuals, are the primary concern of the fiduciary concept.55
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According to Rotman, the fiduciary obligation therefore prescribes “other-regarding
behaviour [and thereby] allows certain individuals to trust that their interests will be cared
for by others in various forms of fiduciary associations.”56 Rotman therefore echoes the
view that the fiduciary obligation enables individuals to trust and depend on one another
when one undertakes to act on behalf of another.
Taken together, Scott, Frankel, and Rotman suggest that the moral dimension, or purpose,
of the fiduciary obligation is to enable individuals to reliably trust or depend upon one
another in those modes of interaction that we have come to call “fiduciary.” In the next
section, I provide historical support this theoretical claim. By tracing the fiduciary
obligation throughout history, I suggest that for thousands of years, it has served to bolster
trust and preserve the integrity of a mode of human interaction that today we recognize as
the fiduciary relationship. The obligation thus mitigates that problem “etched in human
nature” by allowing for greater cooperation and social harmony.

1.2
The Fiduciary Obligation from Ancient Thought to
English Equity
A brief history of the fiduciary obligation provides some support for the contention that it
existed first as a moral principle. Again, the idea of “moral” I have in mind here is the
extent to which adherence to the normative demands of the fiduciary relationship is critical
to fostering social harmony. The fiduciary relationship promotes social harmony by
making trust, cooperation, and mutual dependence possible in that important subset of
human interactions: namely, those relationships in which one undertakes to act on behalf
of another’s interests.57 The history that follows therefore attempts to illustrate that in each
historical instance in which evidence of the fiduciary relationship can be found, it is

protection of fiduciary relationships” (988). As we will see in chapter two, Matthew Harding adopts a
similar view.
56
57

Ibid., 987.

Moreover, as I argue in Chapter 2, such relationships are essential to individual self-governance or
autonomy and, thereby, human flourishing.

26

employed to achieve these manifestly moral ends: to foster trust and dependence in this
unique and essential mode of human interaction and, thereby, foster greater social
cooperation, harmony and, ultimately, individual human flourishing.
Since Scott’s preliminary analysis, other scholars across a range of disciplines have
identified evidence of the fiduciary obligation dating back millennia. What follows is a
cursory glance at a few of the many historical examples of the fiduciary obligation (and its
corollaries) throughout history, from its presence in Ancient thought to its eventual
adoption into English law.58 Through this whirlwind tour through history, I hope merely
to illustrate that long before the fiduciary relationship became the legal institution that we
recognize today, it enjoyed a prior life over thousands of years as a moral principle
underlying and informing moral, religious, and legal thought. In doing so, I hope to provide
historical support to my thesis that the fiduciary obligation is a moral principle that predates
its genesis in English law.

1.2.1

The Fiduciary Obligation from Hammurabi’s Code to Roman
Law

Some of the earliest known examples of the fiduciary obligation are evident in the
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (c. 1700 BCE). Hammurabi, the sixth king of Babylon
and the first king of the Babylonian empire, was responsible for the Code, which is among
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the earliest known examples of formal (written) law.59 At the end of Hammurabi’s reign
(c. 1750 BCE) the 282 laws were collected and inscribed on a diorite stela (a stone slab) in
the temple of Marduk, the national god of Babylon.60 The Code of Hammurabi was used
to settle matters of crime (assault, theft), family (marriage and divorce), and economic
matters (property, tariffs, trade and commerce) in the Babylonian courts.61 The laws
themselves have a clear moral-religious basis. Derived from the commandments of the
Babylonian deities, they prescribe appropriate conduct within various social and economic
interactions, with an aim to fostering social harmony. As Frankel explains:
Hammurabi’s Code’s introduction or preamble refers to the Gods in the Babylonian
pantheon and recognizes the notions of good and evil; right and wrong. The Code
reflects a desire to protect the weak and the oppressed, and the mission “to further
the welfare of the people.”62
The Babylonian legal code was derived directly from moral-religious doctrines about how
individuals ought to behave, understood in terms of good and bad, right and wrong—that
is, morally. Frankel explains that moral “themes of fairness, prohibition of corruption,
ethical behavior, and consideration of the common good reverberate in this ancient
fiduciary law.”63
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Hammurabi’s laws governing the behaviour of agents entrusted with property provide the
first clear evidence of the fiduciary obligation.64 The agency laws of the Code of
Hammurabi evolved in tandem with growing trade and commerce in Ancient
Mesopotamia.65 With increasingly complex social and economic relationships came
normative principles governing correct behaviour in the context of those relationships. For
instance, a tamarkum, or principal merchant, would entrust goods or money for trading
with a samallum, or agent. The vital economic importance of trade made the integrity of
such relationships worth protecting. The tamarkum’s vulnerability to exploitation was
therefore mitigated by the Code’s imposition of heavy responsibilities on the agent, akin
to those of fiduciaries.
Also embodying the fiduciary obligation was the Code’s inclusion of laws regulating
bailment, or “when an owner of personal property (the bailor) temporarily transfers the
property to another person (bailee).”66 Hammurabi’s laws placed strict liabilities, similar
to today’s fiduciary liabilities, on bailees in cases of fault or negligence. For example, a
bailee who negligently caused the death of the bailor’s animal was required to replace it;
or in the event that the animal was injured the bailee would be required to pay (often harsh)
damages.67 Moreover, Hammurabi’s Code contains negligence rules similar to modern
negligence laws. If a sailor, for example, entrusted with sailing a boat full of goods to a
destination was to negligently damage the boat or the goods, he would be required to
compensate for the lost or damaged goods.68
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The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty has ancient origins as well, evident in early Trust law.
Indeed, Hammurabi’s laws imposed draconian punishments for the violation of a Trustee’s
duty of loyalty:
[Hammurabi’s laws] provided that a man’s hand will be cut off if the man was hired
to manage another person’s farm and stole seed grain or fodder. […] If a herdsman,
hired to take care of cattle or sheep, falsely accounted for the natural growth of the
herd or fraudulently sold the newborn cattle or sheep, the herdsman had to pay the
owner ten times the owner’s loss of the newborns.69
Again, these seemingly harsh liabilities and their remedies resemble (at least in force or
intent) those of contemporary fiduciaries, such as disgorgement and constructive trust
remedies. The onerous nature of fiduciary liabilities appears to be commensurate with the
societal importance placed on these types of interactions—namely, where one undertakes
to act on behalf of another’s significant practical interests. It would therefore seem that
even in ancient Mesopotamia, as today, harsh penalties serve a “prophylactic” function,
disincentivizing the violation of fiduciary duties and thus protecting the integrity of the
fiduciary interaction.70
This narrative is given further support by the contemporaneous and (likely) independent
evolution of the fiduciary obligation in the Ancient East. Evidence of the fiduciary
principle can be seen, for example, in the Ancient Chinese law of the Qing Dynasty (1644–
1911 BCE). Chinese rulers were deemed to have a moral fiduciary responsibility to
maintain harmony between the human and natural worlds. Moreover, in the Ancient
Chinese teachings of Confucius (500 BCE) one of the three basic questions of selfexamination asks whether one has lived up to the moral demands of the fiduciary
obligation: “In acting on behalf of others, have I always been loyal to their interests?”71
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The fiduciary obligation is still recognized in Chinese law today.72 Although the fiduciary
relationship is today thought to be derived from English law, evidence of the fiduciary
obligation outside of Western thought, and the Western legal tradition in particular,
provides further support for the idea that the interpersonal and societal problems it serves
to mitigate are truly pancultural, perhaps lending it a semblance of the universality
traditionally associated with other moral rules or principles. As Rotman argues, the raison
d’etre or purpose of the fiduciary obligation is to enable individuals to engage in
relationships of “high trust and confidence”—and the need to do so is clearly not one
required only by Western societies.73
As we saw above in Scott’s New Testament analysis of the Unjust steward, traces of the
fiduciary obligation can also be found in the moral-religious commands present in biblical
writings. Beginning with the Old Testament, “the Lord told Moses that it is a sin not to
restore that which is delivered unto a man to keep safely, and penalties must be paid for
the violation (Leviticus 6: 2–5).”74 In other words, it is a moral-religious violation (i.e., a
sin), with corresponding penalties, to fail to appropriately care for another’s property. This
divine command has clear similarities with the obligations of Trustees, and thus fiduciaries,
as well; namely, that when a fiduciary-Trustee undertakes to hold, manage, or dispense
Trust assets (such as property), she must do so with strict loyalty to the beneficiary’s
significant practical interests with respect to those assets.
The New Testament has other illustrations of the fiduciary obligation as well. St. Luke, for
instance, refers to it most clearly in the following decree: “No servant can serve two
masters” (Luke 16:13).75 Indeed, the commandment that “no man can serve two masters”
has often been cited as the moral-religious underpinnings of the fiduciary obligation by the
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English courts of law since the seventeenth century.76 As Joseph Johnson notes, this
biblical precept has been invoked by English courts particularly when one of those two
masters is oneself, stressing the importance of the selfless, other-regarding demands of the
fiduciary obligation.77 Moreover, Frankel goes as far as to suggest that the moral-religious
roots of the fiduciary obligation are illustrated in the broad Judeo-Christian mission to serve
as fiduciary to God, or as steward to God. The moral agent is seen as acting on behalf of
God and (presumably) in God’s interests. Frankel argues that, “within this creativeredemptive-consummative framework, business people in the Bible have fiduciary duties
to God and others.… In Christian theology, Christ is the perfect fiduciary. He is the selfless
steward who lays down his life for others.”78 Of course, as mentioned, the fiduciary
mandate is often delimited to specific interests (among other caveats), and thus does not
require fiduciaries to be completely selfless, as Christ appears to have been. (However, in
this example, it might be argued that complete selflessness was part of Christ’s unique
fiduciary mandate).
Mary Szto unearths similar examples of the fiduciary obligation in Jewish law:
Fiduciary duties in the biblical tradition begin in the Genesis creation account. The
human mission on earth is to be a fiduciary, a steward of God’s and other’s
property. Israel is a fiduciary. So is Jesus Christ … [A]fter creating the world, God
appoints man and woman as agents. They steward the world, exercise dominion,
and are fruitful.79
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In Leviticus 19:14 the bible also states that, “You shall not curse the deaf nor place a
stumbling block before the blind; you shall fear your God—I am your Lord.”80 In his
analysis of this passage, Hershey Friedman says that,
[t]he blind was interpreted to include [the] ignorant and unknowing…. Thus, one
should not advise another party that it is in his interest to sell his field in order to
buy a donkey, when his true intention is to buy the field for himself. By concealing
the ulterior motive of his advice, he has violated the principle.81
According to Jewish law then, an advisor has a fiduciary obligation of loyalty to her
advisee’s interests; if the advisor misleads the advisee, she may be liable to pay remedies
for breach of fiduciary duty.82
As another example taken from (middle) Eastern thought, the Sharia, or Islamic law, also
recognizes and regulates fiduciary relationships. Similar to the moral-religious
underpinnings of the Babylonian Code, the Sharia is derived from “Divine Islamic Law,”
taken from the Koran.83 The fiduciary obligation can be seen again in the Sharia’s laws
governing agency. If an agent is “careless about looking after the property” to which she
has been made Trustee, or “treated in a manner which was different from the one allowed
by the principle,” then the agent is responsible for it.84 Yet again we see fiduciary liabilities
that parallel those of contemporary jurisprudence: if an agent uses the property for her own
benefit, violating her fiduciary duty of loyalty (trespass), she will be liable to pay strict
remedies that reflect her failed responsibility. Similarly, the Trust (waqf) is also an
important institution in Islamic law, even serving as an alternative to corporations.85
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Frankel suggests that Muslims may have chosen the Trust over the corporation because it
better accords with Islam’s communal vision: “the ancient origin of the institution of
[T]rust, [stems from] its positive commitment to God and community.”86 Again, this seems
to echo the Judeo-Christian conception of an individual’s mission as fiduciary, or steward,
to God.
Finally, the Islamic Trust, or waqf, was actually adapted from the Roman Law of the
Twelve Tables (448 BCE), from which evidence of the fiduciary obligation can also be
found.87 Frankel explains that Roman Law,
required thieves to make restitution payments to their victims starting at double the
value of the stolen goods. The value of the payment due would increase depending
on the circumstance in which such stolen goods were found or confiscated. In
England, prior to the Middle Ages, elaborate and detailed systems of victim
compensation were developed by the Anglo-Saxons, placing the victim’s right to
compensation at the forefront of punishment considerations.88
Here we see again the strict liabilities to which agents and Trustees are held in the event
that they breach their fiduciary obligation. Evidence that Roman jurists incorporated the
specifically moral dimensions of fiduciary obligation into law is illustrated most notably
in the mandatum. The mandatum was a relationship that involved an undertaking by the
mandatory (agent) to act for the benefit of the mandator (principal).89 Cicero hints towards
the link between the moral aspect of a breach of Trust and the legal consequences:
In private business, if a man showed even the slightest carelessness in his execution
of trust [mandatum]—I say nothing about culpable mismanagement for his own
interest or profit—our ancestors considered that he had behaved very dishonorably
indeed. In such cases a trial for breach of trust was held, and conviction on such a

86

Ibid.

87

Ibid. 83.

88

Ibid.

89

Johnson, “Natural Law and Fiduciary Duties,” 281.

34

charge was believed to be every bit as shameful as conviction for an offense such
as theft.90
The idea that the violation of the fiduciary obligation is “dishonourable” and “shameful”
has clear moral connotations. Further still, Cicero says that one who betrays the Trust, “is
undermining the entire basis of our social system.”91 In other words, adherence to the moral
demands of the fiduciary obligation, like other moral obligations, is necessary for social
cooperation and harmony. Accordingly, the violation of the fiduciary obligation—
understood here as a moral obligation—invites social disapprobation and subsequent moral
denunciations, such as “dishonourable” and “shameful.” While one might also experience
various forms of social disapproval or ostracism for breaking purely legal rules (e.g., a
bylaw against smoking in certain public spaces), such violations tend not to attract the same
kind of moral disgust, and we would therefore not (at least not accurately) attach moral
epithets such as “dishonourable” and “shameful” to those who are (mere) rule-breakers.
By way of summary, we have seen in this section that the fiduciary obligation has a long
history in ancient moral, religious, and legal thought. By briefly surveying various
illustrations of the fiduciary obligation throughout history, I have attempted to show that
in each historical instance in which evidence of the fiduciary obligation can be found, it
appears to be invoked as a response to that problem “etched in human nature”: namely,
how to trust or depend on another who undertakes to act on one’s behalf. Insofar as the
fiduciary obligation enjoys near omnipresence across times and cultures, and has as its
“raison d’etre” the promotion of greater social cooperation and harmony, I argue that it is
a moral demand, albeit variously enforced and protected by societal norms, religious
commands, and legal rules.92
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1.2.2

The Fiduciary Obligation and the Principles of Equity

With this background laid, we are now in a position to visit the historical circumstances
that led to the fiduciary obligation’s entrance into Medieval English law (through
Chancery) from which we (in the West and legal systems derived therefrom) gain our
contemporary understanding of the fiduciary relationship. Providing this more recent legal
history is important for my overall thesis because it describes the circumstances in which
the fiduciary obligation (as a moral obligation) entered English law and thus influenced
how we (in the West) understand it today. In other words, with the background laid in the
previous section, we can now appreciate that the adoption of the fiduciary obligation by
English law (and the legal systems derived from it) is just another historical illustration, or
instance, of Western’s society’s enforcement and protection of this important moral
obligation. To reiterate, the moral and societal importance of the fiduciary obligation is
owed to the way in which it mitigates the problem of trust and dependence inherent to an
essential mode of human interaction. The fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship
because it promotes greater social cooperation and harmony by enabling individuals to trust
and depend on one another in this type of relationship. This is important for responding to
the problem of legal-moral equivocation as it makes clear that the fiduciary relationship is
in fact a moral relationship; accordingly, there is no such equivocation involved in using
the fiduciary relationship as a framework for conceptualizing the ethical issues that arise
in medical and research ethics.
The fiduciary relationship, as we know it today, is an institution of English Equity and
comes from the modern Trust. A Trust is a legal relationship whereby a settlor (the
individual who establishes the Trust) entrusts a Trustee to hold or manage Trust assets
(e.g., property, financial assets, etc.) for the sole purpose of furthering the best interests
(vis-à-vis the specific Trust assets in question) of a named beneficiary of that Trust. 93 As
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we briefly saw in the introduction to this chapter, more recent (legal) histories of the
fiduciary relationship describe how the fiduciary obligation began in the Trust and was
later expanded to other relationships, such as the physician-patient relationship.94
However, the history of the English Trust is intricately bound up with the development of
English Equity itself. Hence, to understand how the fiduciary obligation arose and became
an institution of Equity (through the Trust), one must also understand the historical
evolution of Equity. This section therefore describes the circumstances by which the
fiduciary obligation became a principle of Equity and thus became the legal institution that
we recognize today.
The English Trust had an early medieval predecessor in a device of known as the “Use.”
As a framework or mode of interaction in which one undertakes to act on behalf of another,
evidence of the fiduciary obligation can also be found in the Use. The Use was devised
under English feudalism, whereby vassals (tenants) were granted Use of a lord or noble’s
property, known as the “feif.” Under the Use, “a feoffor gave legal title to property to a
‘feofee of uses,’ for the benefit of the feoffor or a third party (the ‘cestui que use’).”95 In
fact, before a lord could grant Use of his property to another, the prospective tenant had to
officially become a “vassal” through a formal ceremony, during which the would-be vassal
paid “homage” (i.e., reverence and submission) to his lord through an act of fealty.
Interestingly, the etymology of “fealty” comes from the Latin fidelitas, from which we
derive fidelity, or loyalty, such as that owed by a vassal to his feudal lord.96 As mentioned,
fidelitas is also the root of the word fiduciary, with its defining obligation in loyalty, or
fidelity, to the beneficiary’s interests. As the progenitor of the Trust, then, it is perhaps
unsurprising to see evidence of the fiduciary obligation in this early feudal arrangement.
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Indeed, the Use was itself influenced by the canon law doctrine utilitas ecclesiae, dating
back to the ninth century. As Frankel explains:
The term “ad opus” in 9th century England “referred to a fiduciary relationship in
favor of a beneficiary with no legal enforcement.” The term “[U]se” was drawn
from Gallic “al os” and “ues” in the Laws of William the Conqueror and the
Domesday Book and became “use.” In addition, the French term “cestui a qui oes
le feffement fut fait” became “cestui que use,” a term for a beneficiary. Thus, the
[U]se was drawn from secular sources (Roman and Salic law) and religious sources
(including the Franciscans, who popularized it).97
Hence, both the secular and religious sources of the Use appear to also include reference
to the fiduciary obligation. The sixth century Salic law concerning the “reliable” or “trusted
person,” for instance, stipulated that, “a trusted person (Salman or Treuhand) could become
a [T]rustee by receiving ‘property from a grantor on behalf of beneficiaries.’”98 The
fiduciary obligation that underlies the English Use and, as we will see shortly, the modern
Trust, therefore may have originated as early as the sixth century in Salic law.99
Regardless, by the ninth century onward the fiduciary principle became integral to feudal
vassal-lord relations, based as they were on mutual trust and loyalty.100 Like the ancient
norms and rules that operationalized the fiduciary obligation before it, such as those in
Hammurabi’s Code or the Roman Law of Twelve Tables, the Use evolved in England
during the Middle Ages in response to specific problems:
For example, vows of poverty prohibited Franciscan Friars from owning land.
Therefore, charitable persons transferred houses to trusted persons for the use of
the Friars. The trusted persons were bound by good conscience to devote the houses
they legally owned, to the exclusive use of the beneficiaries ... Church doctrine of
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utilitas ecclesiae allowed clerics to possess stewardship or beneficial ownership of
church property for personal use...101
The Use was also important during the Crusades between the eleventh and thirteenth
centuries. Crusaders would often entrust “use” of their property to a feofee of uses while
away at war, with the expectation that it would be given back to them upon their return (or
given to an appointed “beneficiary” in the event of their death). The Use’s underlying
fiduciary obligation was therefore adopted to solve the same perennial problem that arises
when one person entrusts another to act on behalf of her interests: namely, the problem of
trust and dependence.102
But the Use eventually came to be employed as a means to evade certain legal obligations,
such as feudal taxes, services, and private debt. For example, lords and tenants alike could
avoid paying feudal dues or services by transferring the legal title for another’s “use.”103
Upon a tenant’s death the law stated that a landlord was entitled to certain property taxes
before the land passed to an heir. Moreover, in the event that no heir existed the immediate
landlord was entitled to the property under the doctrine of escheat. Escheat is an Equitable
doctrine that requires lands to revert back to the lord following the death of a tenant without
an heir or if the tenant is otherwise required to forfeit their lands.104 The doctrine of escheat
was therefore a mechanism by which the Crown, being the supreme feudal lord,
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consolidated lands. However, tenants could avoid the doctrine of escheat by entrusting their
lands for another’s use. The result was that the Crown was no longer able to consolidate
lands, as assigning a feoffee of uses prevented the land from reverting back up the chain of
lords and tenants to the Crown (i.e., following the death or forfeiture of tenant lands). By
transferring title to another individual, or group of individuals for common use, tenants
could therefore effectively evade both feudal taxes and the doctrine of escheat (e.g., by
ensuring there was always an heir). Debtors could do the same and thereby avoid repaying
their debts.105 Recognizing the Use was responsible for a significant loss of Crown revenue
and property, King Henry VIII abolished the Use in 1535 under the Statute of Uses,
effectively converting all Uses into legal estates. As a result, the original owners lost the
legal title to their property.106 This prompted the former feoffors, or the “true” owners of
the entrusted property, to seek rectification for this perceived unfairness, or inequity, by
petitioning the King or Queen (when the Sovereign was a Queen) to override this Common
Law ruling.107 But understanding why feoffors were able to seek rectification by making
an appeal to the King—that is, outside of the Common Law—for these perceived injustices,
requires some understanding the origins of Equity itself.
After the creation of the Common Law courts (i.e., the courts of Common Pleas, King’s
Bench, and Exchequer of Pleas) between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the King
nevertheless retained “residuary power” to do “equal and right justice and discretion in
mercy and truth” to his subjects wherever the Common Law proved “deficient,” or contrary
to equity.108 Initially, the exercise of the King’s residuary power was expected only in rare
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or extenuating circumstances, but by the end of the thirteenth century many petitions, or
“bills,” were being presented to the king, “asking for his grace to be shown in respect of
some complaint,” such as those eventually put forward by feoffors who had lost title to
their lands under the Common Law’s Status of Uses.109 As we will see shortly, these
petitions foreshadowed the rise of the courts of Equity as a jurisdiction separate from, and
ultimately superior to, the Common Law.110
Petitions seeking redress outside the Common Law were precipitated in part by various
“technical failures” or “mischiefs in the law,” to which the early Common Law was
especially susceptible.111 The Common Law court procedures were circumscribed by the
writ system, as well as “the forms of pleading, the rules of evidence, the varying reliability
of sheriffs, and the uncertainties of jury trial.”112 The restrictive nature of the early writ
system of the Common Law, in particular, made pursuing certain forms of complaint, or
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obtaining specific remedies under that system, quite limited.113 This gave rise to an
increasing number of petitions to the King directly, in hopes that he would exercise his
residuary power by hearing their cases and deliver justice according to the dictates of
“good conscience”—that is, according to principles of fairness, or equity. It was in this
capacity that feoffors petitioned the King to rectify the alleged misappropriation of their
lands.
But it was actually one of the King’s representatives, the Lord Chancellor, who eventually
came to oversee the majority of these petitions.114 The court of the Lord Chancellor (or
simply Chancery, as it came to be known) was tasked with exercising on the King’s behalf
his residuary power to do “equal and right justice” to his subjects wherever the Common
Law yielded, or was expected to yield, an alleged “inequity.”115 At the outset, Chancery
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was not a separate court of law but rather a department of the King’s Council.116 The
Chancellor’s function was not to adjudicate or deliver justice himself, “but rather to
facilitate its achievement in other [Common Law] courts, to serve as a convenient clearinghouse for all kinds of business transacted elsewhere.”117 The jurisdiction thus remained
that of the King’s Council. It was only through a “kind of fiction” that the Chancellor was
deemed to represent, “the king and his council in Chancery.”118 As John Baker explains:
The chancellor received no patent or commission defining his authority, he held
office at the king’s pleasure, and he took no part in the ordinary administration of
justice as an assize judge. His powers derived from his custody of the great seal and
from his pre-eminent position in the King’s Council.119
Initially, then, the Chancellor was “an officer of the state and a minister of the Crown.”120
Irrespective of this initial “fiction,” however, as petitioning the King through the
Chancellor became common practice, complainants increasingly requested a specific
remedy from the Chancellor directly, whether or not the case was pending in the Common
Law courts. Eventually, instead of acting as a “clearing-house,” redirecting cases to the
relevant Common Law courts, the Chancellor began to grant “decrees,” which were
binding only to the relevant parties; that is, unlike judgments at Common Law, decrees
were not “judgments of record” and thus did not (at least initially) serve as precedent for
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future cases.121 At first, these decrees were issued in the name of the King’s Council, but
by the 15th century the Chancellor was issuing decrees of his own authority.122
In delivering its decrees, Chancery was not beholden to the language of the Common Law
and instead rendered judgments in the name of “good conscience,” as informed by broad
principles of equality or fairness—that is, of “equity.” For a creditor, promisee, or Trustee
to take unfair advantage of strict Common Law rules was a matter of equity. In such cases,
complainants would appeal to what would become Chancery’s professed equitable
jurisdiction. As Baker again explains:
The Chancery approached matters differently [than the Common Law]. In
exercising his informal jurisdiction the chancellor was free from the rigid
procedures under which inconveniences and injustices sheltered, because he was
free to delve into the facts at large. His court was a court of conscience, in which
defendants could be coerced into doing whatever good conscience required, given
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all the circumstances of the case. Such a court obviously proceeded in a very
different fashion from the Common Pleas.123
It was for this reason that Chancery would often receive petitions when a Common Law
ruling yielded or was expected to yield an inequity, or when no cause for action or remedy
existed at all.124 The paradigm example of such “mischiefs in the law” is the debtor who
was made to repay his debt twice because he lost or simply failed to obtain a written receipt
where the Common Law required written proof of payment.125 In such cases, complainants
had no recourse to justice in Common Law, but could appeal to Chancery where parties
could be made to do “whatever good conscience required.” Hence, it was as the King’s
representative, tasked with exercising the King’s residuary power to do equal and right
justice to his subjects according to principles of equity that Chancery gradually evolved
into its own court of Equity.
Following the Statute of Uses in the sixteenth century, the court of Chancery tended to
issue its decrees in favour of the “feoffors” in their petitions to the King (through
Chancery). As Frankel puts it, “[t]he trusted persons’ duties constituted a social practice,
which the equity courts enforced on the grounds of trust and confidence related to good
conscience.”126 Over time, recognition of such claims created one of the first principles of
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Equity, along with its corresponding institution: namely, the Trust. Chancery considered it
a principle of equity, as determined by good conscience, that when one party undertakes to
hold or manage property for the benefit of another, she must do so with utmost good faith,
confidence, and fidelity to that other’s interests. Along with the Trust came the fiduciary
obligation, which governs all those interactions where one party undertakes to act on behalf
of another’s interests. It would appear then that together with the Trust, the fiduciary
obligation was among the first principles, if not the first principle, of Equity. Indeed, it is
for this reason that Rotman calls the fiduciary obligation the “most doctrinally pure
expression of [E]quity.”127 Echoing this sentiment, Johnson says in the following passage:
As the medieval use developed into the modern law of trusts, the ancient rule
encompassed in the fiduciary principle that no man can serve two masters was
enforced by courts of equity in England and later in the United States.128
Hence, it was through the modern Trust, as an institution of English Equity, that the
fiduciary obligation became enshrined into modern English law, and out of which the
fiduciary relationship evolved into the legal institution we (in the West and legal systems
derived therefrom) recognize today.
In summary, the fiduciary obligation long pre-dated its adoption by Chancery and its
institutionalization in English Equity. The fiduciary obligation existed for thousands of
years as a moral obligation that appears to arise in response to a perennial problem inherent
to an important type of human interaction: namely, how to trust or reliably depend on
another who undertakes to act on behalf of our interests. Along the way, we have seen that
the fiduciary obligation has informed ancient religious edicts and legal rules which
endeavour to mitigate that same problem. The fiduciary obligation eventually gained a
foothold in modern English law through the courts of Chancery. Following the creation of
the Common Law courts the King retained an obligation to do “equal and right justice” to
his subjects. Claimants took advantage of this “residuary power” by petitioning the King
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to oversee their cases when Common Law remedies were deemed unfair or simply nonexistent. The restrictive nature of the writs available in the early Common Law made such
petitions more and more frequent. Eventually overwhelmed with petitions, the King
delegated this task to his councilors. The Lord Chancellor and his clerks in Chancery came
to oversee the majority of these claims. Notably, before the mid-sixteenth century, the
Chancellor was often a Bishop or other high-ranking religious figure and, in his advisory
role to the King, was known as the “Keeper of the King’s Conscience.” Chancery thus
sought to deliver justice according to “good conscience,” as informed by equitable
principles. With its long history in ancient moral, religious and legal thought, the fiduciary
obligation comprised part of the Chancellor’s “good conscience.” It was through its
decrees, specifically to those that eventually gave rise to the Trust, that Chancery adopted
the fiduciary obligation as a principle of equity.
The upshot of the historical narrative I have sketched here is that the fiduciary relationship,
as informed by its defining obligation, existed prior its entry into English law as a moral
relationship. The fiduciary obligation has seemingly existed wherever complex human
societies have developed, serving to mitigate a problem inherent to a specific type human
interaction: namely, the problem created by both the need to reliably trust or depend on
others to act in our interests and the vulnerability that arises from such dependence. The
fiduciary obligation mitigates this problem by prescribing certain other-regarding
behaviour (e.g., utmost loyalty) in the context of such relationships. The fiduciary
principle, like other moral principles, is therefore a requirement of morality, and has been
understood as such.

1.3

Two Objections and Replies

In this section, I raise and respond to two possible objections. The first objection concerns
the historical account I have provided, specifically about the role and nature of Equity. It
is a matter of heated debate among jurists and legal philosophers as to whether Equity in
fact occupies a unique role or jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Common Law. To the extent that
the historical account I have provided commits me to one side of this debate, I am
susceptible to its criticisms. The implication of this criticism for my purposes is that it is
not really clear that the fiduciary obligation, as an apparent innovation of Equity, entered
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the law as a moral supplement to the Common Law. In other words, critics argue that
Equity was never tasked with providing a moralizing role on the Common Law; or as
Rotman puts it, critics reject that the application of situation-specific equitable principles
“humanizes and contextualizes the law’s otherwise antiseptic nature, which makes the law
more just.”129 This claim therefore undermines the historical claim I made about how the
fiduciary obligation entered English law, namely, via Equity’s supplementary moralizing
function vis-à-vis the Common Law. In other words, the objection casts doubt on the
suggestion that Equity, tasked with exercising broad equitable principles, adopted the
fiduciary obligation as a pre-existing moral principle. Notwithstanding the moral
corollaries of the fiduciary obligation in Ancient and Medieval thought, it remains plausible
that the fiduciary obligation (at least as articulated by Western legal traditions) is in fact a
creature of the law. If the fiduciary relationship as we understand it today (in the West) is
a legal construct, then worries about equivocation concerning its application to the ethical
domain remain unresolved.
I begin by briefly outlining this debate. I then discuss the implications of this objection for
my argument. I argue that the success of my historical argument that the fiduciary
obligation is a moral obligation that existed antecedent to its birth in English law, does not
critically depend on which English legal jurisdiction (Equity or Common Law) adopted
that moral principle and subsequently enshrined it in legal doctrine. Put simply, I argue that
the success of my historical argument does not hinge on the outcome of the fusion debate
about the nature of Equity and the Common Law. Although this discussion may be of
interest primarily to jurists and legal philosophers interested in Equity and fiduciary
relationships, to the extent that the purpose my historical argument is to locate the
foundations of the fiduciary relationship in morality, it ought to be of interest to moral
philosophers and bioethicists as well.
The second objection falls squarely within the domain of moral philosophy and bioethics.
It runs as follows: if the fiduciary relationship is such an important moral relationship, then
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why has it received so little attention by moral philosophers, until recently? The implication
here is that the fiduciary relationship is not in fact a moral relationship; if it were, it would
long since have been analyzed by moral philosophers. I respond to this objection, twice:
first, by showing that its central claim is somewhat mistaken; and, second, by conceding
the point somewhat, and offering an explanation as to why the fiduciary relationship may
appear, at first glance, to have received short shrift by moral philosophers.

1.3.1

First Objection

As briefly mentioned, the first objection takes issue with the role or purpose I have assigned
to Equity. I have suggested that the early courts of Chancery, through the exercise of
equitable principles, have (at least historically) functioned as a kind of moral supplement
to, or constraint on, the Common Law. I have suggested that Equity contextualizes the
Common Law in those cases where it would yield an injustice, or unfairness, in a particular
case. For example, while the Common Law would require the debtor who failed to obtain
a written receipt after the original payment (where the Common Law requires written proof
of payment) to pay the debt twice, Equity would look to the facts of the case and do
whatever “good conscience” (equity or fairness) requires. But the idea that Equity came to
play this constraining, supplementary, or contextualizing role on the strict application of
laws is the subject of an ongoing debate. Modern jurists and legal philosophers debate
about whether there is any substantive distinction between Equity and the Common
Law.130 Insofar as I subscribe to the view that Equity occupies a unique equitable
jurisdiction, whose express purpose is to be a moral constraint on the law, then I have made
myself vulnerable to the criticisms of those who claim, as Justice Maitland famously did,
that Equity is simply,
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that body of rules administered by our English courts of justice which, were it not
for the operation of the Judicature Acts, would be administered only by those courts
which would be known as Courts of Equity.131
In other words, the jurisdictional separation between Equity and the Common Law is
merely a historical accident and thus there is nothing inherent to Equity, procedurally or
substantively, that could not be (or is not already) done by the Common Law courts; and
this includes the exercise of so-called equitable principles.
For my purposes, the objection discredits an important link in the chain of historical events
I have presented here. I have argued that the fiduciary obligation’s entry into English law
is merely its most recent actualization in a system or body of norms and rules in a long
history of similar such attempts to operationalize this important moral obligation.
Specifically, I argued that it was through the exercise equitable principles that Equity acted
as a moral constraint on the Common Law, making it the appropriate vehicle by which the
fiduciary obligation, qua moral obligation, entered the law. The claim that Equity does not,
in fact, serve this function therefore undermines the coherence of this narrative, if only
minimally, by casting doubt on the mechanism (i.e., Equity) by which the fiduciary
obligation entered the law.
Fortunately, the debate about Equity and that Common Law does not, as far as I can tell,
present a serious difficulty for my claim that the fiduciary relationship is a moral
relationship that gained a foothold in the law through the exercise of equitable principles.
At bottom, the success or failure of this argument does not rest on which jurisdiction
exercised those principles or performed equity’s substantive role (if any). Indeed, I argued
that it is a matter of historical contingency that the fiduciary relationship is a legal (and not
simply moral) relationship at all, regardless of the jurisdictional avenue by which its
underlying moral obligation was introduced into English law. If the fiduciary relationship
had never become an institution of English law and had simply remained a moral obligation
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(governed variously by certain nonlegal norms and rules), then it would not be necessary
to show that the fiduciary relationship is not a purely legal relationship. The problem of
legal-moral equivocation would not even arise. I do think, however, that Equity was the
predictable avenue for the fiduciary obligation to enter the law, given its historical role
(however contingent) as an equitable, and sometimes moral, supplement or constraint on
the law. But for my purposes it is immaterial which legal jurisdiction—Equity versus the
Common Law—performed this important equitable function. Apart from creating the
positive law, had the Common Law also made use of equitable principles to constrain,
supplement, or reform the law, the details of the historical narrative I have told might be
slightly different, but the upshot of my argument would remain the same: the fiduciary
relationship is a moral relationship that long predates its origins in English law.
Indeed, regardless of whether there is any substantive role uniquely performed by Equity
(e.g., as a moral constraint on the positive law) there appears to be a need for some vehicle
or mechanism by which the law is judged to be just or unjust, right or wrong, and where
necessary amended to bring it into alignment with objective morality. As Jurist Sheldon
Amos puts it:
The method of supplementing the prevalent legal system by a subsidiary system of
less rigidity, and of greater capacity for fine moral discrimination, is almost
universal and indeed necessary in all advanced countries if law is in any measure
to carry out the dictates of justice.132
Dennis Klimchuk appears to agree:
On my reconstruction, it is a claim of Aristotle’s account of equity that a legal
system cannot get by only with a set of rules that specify the rights and duties
persons hold and bear. It will also need a set of rules that constrain the manner in
which and the ends for the sake of which persons exercise their rights.133
Finally, commenting on the fiduciary relationship, Rotman says that,
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[a]s an instrument designed to facilitate the inclusion of social mores into law, the
fiduciary concept occupies a role that has been fulfilled by different vehicles
throughout history. It is […] one means by which law transmits its ethical resolve
to the spectrum of human interaction.134
Nevertheless, discussing the history of the fiduciary obligation’s entry into English law
through Equity is still important for alleviating the problem of legal-moral equivocation.
Most histories of the fiduciary relationship begin in Medieval English Equity, attributing
its creation (as a legal institution) to that legal jurisdiction. What I have attempted to do
here is provide a more comprehensive historical analysis of the fiduciary obligation, one
that predates its origins in English law. By drawing attention to its various manifestations
leading up to its entry into English law I have attempted to illustrate that the fiduciary
relationship is not merely a creature of Equity. Moreover, understanding the role that
Equity came to play (however historically contingent) as a moral supplement to the law is
an important part of the fiduciary obligation’s moral history. Just as previous societies have
attempted to operationalize and enforce the moral demands of the fiduciary obligation—
through moral, religious, and legal norms and rules—so too has ours, through the specific
role that Equity has come to play in introducing moral norms and other societal values into
law.

1.3.2

Second Objection

The second objection also questions the underlying moral nature of the fiduciary
relationship, but it does so in a different way. It asks, if the fiduciary relationship is such
an important moral relationship, why then has it not received more attention in moral
philosophy? Surely if the fiduciary relationship was in fact a moral relationship, it would
have been identified and received substantial ethical analysis long before now. Moral
philosophy has long recognized other moral relationships, such as parenthood, friendship,
business, professional and political relationships. Moral philosophy has also given much
attention to relationships that tend to overlap with the fiduciary one, such as relationships
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that involve trust, loyalty, or promises.135 But there is very little sustained ethical reflection
on the fiduciary relationship itself. So, doesn’t this show that there is something wrong
with the claim that, at bottom, the fiduciary relationship is moral in nature?
In response, one might try to suggest that moral philosophers have analyzed the fiduciary
relationship by analyzing relationships that overlap with it substantially, such as those of
trust and loyalty. Yet, as mentioned, the fiduciary relationship is not reducible to these
other relationships. For instance, fiduciary relationships often involve trust. But while trust
may be an important and desirable feature in most fiduciary relationships, it is not therefore
identical with it. As discussed in the Introduction, trust relationships do not necessarily
contain certain defining features of the fiduciary relationship, such as a structural
imbalance of power and dependence, the pursuit of significant practical interests, or
(arguably) the exercise of meaningful discretionary power. Indeed, the fiduciary
relationship can arguably persist in the complete absence of trust. For example, a patient
might fail to trust her physician, but nonetheless remain the physician’s beneficiary, which
means that the physician’s fiduciary obligation to her patient’s best medical interests does
not simply dissolve when the patient fails to trust her physician.136 Conversely, one might
fundamentally distrust the fiduciary relationship, as an institution, and merely be forced to
rely or depend on it (say, for lack of options). Loyalty, too, is perhaps a constant feature of
fiduciary relationships, but is clearly not reducible to it. Many loyalty relationships plainly
lack other essential features inherent to the fiduciary relationship. For example, I might be
loyal to my favourite sports team, but this does not imply that I am therefore a fiduciary to
that team; that is, I am not, by virtue of my loyalty, in a relationship that requires me to
exercise my discretion on behalf of the team’s significant practical interests. Nor do
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relationships of loyalty necessarily share the same structural features of the fiduciary
relationship, such as the inherent inequality of power and dependence.
If the fiduciary relationship is not reducible to any of these similar or overlapping moral
concepts, and it is (as I claim) a moral relationship, why then has it not received its own
substantial ethical analysis before now? In response to this criticism, I want to point out
first that the fiduciary relationship has been the subject of some ethical analysis, and not
only recently. In fact, the fiduciary relationship has received considerable attention by
moral philosophers and others, albeit perhaps not always by that name.
As we saw above, historically, many moral or religious thinkers pondered relationships
that were essentially fiduciary. Many societies recognized the vital social and economic
importance of the fiduciary relationship and sought to formalize certain duties intended to
ensure the continued integrity, or ongoing viability, of this relationship. From the laws
concerning agency and bailment in Hammurabi’s Code, to the Old Testament’s religious
command that “no man shall serve two masters,” to the moral teachings of Confucius, and
finally to today’s fiduciary laws and the burgeoning ethical discourse in bioethics, we see
that the fiduciary relationship has received considerable attention.137 Indeed, the fiduciary
relationship’s status as arguably one of the most important social and economic
relationships in complex interconnected societies is precisely what explains the persistent
attention it has received over the course of modern human history.
Secondly, the fiduciary relationship has in fact received sustained ethical analysis within
moral philosophy and applied ethics, sometimes under the guise of other ethical concepts
or relationships and often with a focus on a particular kind of fiduciary relationship (e.g.,
between parent and child). Perhaps the most prominent examples exist in parenthood
ethics, professional and business ethics, and healthcare ethics.
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In parenthood ethics, ethicists often discuss the fiduciary obligation in terms of parental
responsibility, such as the responsibility of parents to promote the “best interests” of their
child. Parental ethical responsibilities are often said to involve the same selfless and otherregarding norms and rules, such as the loyalty and care characteristic of the fiduciary
obligation. Parents are also clearly tasked with exercising a significant degree of
“discretionary power” in pursuit of their child’s best interests. Subsequently, the parentchild relationship is understood to share the same structure as the fiduciary relationship,
by virtue of the inequality between parental (fiduciary) discretionary power and the
dependence of the child (beneficiary) on that power. For example, Brighouse and Swift
provide a fiduciary analysis of the parent-child relationship:
The parent is charged with responsibility for both the immediate well-being of the
child and the development of the child’s capabilities. This is the fiduciary
relationship emphasized by the child-centered argument for parental power. The
child has immediate interests in being kept safe, enjoying herself, being sheltered
and well nourished, having loving relationships with others, and so on. She has
future interests in many of these same things, but also in becoming the kind of
person who is not entirely dependent on others for having her interests met and the
kind of person who can judge well and act on her interests. The parent’s fiduciary
obligations are to guarantee the child’s immediate well-being and to oversee and
ensure her cognitive, emotional, physical, and moral development.138
Similarly, in professional ethics, Michael Bayles defines the professional as fundamentally
a “fiduciary.” Bayles argues that professionals are often “knowledge workers” with
extensive training in a specific skillset or expertise and thereby entrusted with exercising
their professional judgment or discretion (based on that knowledge) on behalf of their
client’s interest.139 Michael Bayles also discusses fiduciary obligations of professionals to
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their clients, such as confidentiality, loyalty, and care.140 Lastly, William May has claimed
that the professionals owe fiduciary-like obligations to the public.141
Relatedly, in business ethics the duties of chief executive officers (CEOs) to remain loyal
to the interests of their shareholders (and perhaps to “stakeholders” as the debate goes) are
a central theme. In fact, in a seminal paper, famed economist Milton Friedman argued
against corporate social responsibility based on the claim that CEOs have an overriding
“fiduciary” and ethical obligation to increase profits for their shareholders. 142 Employees
are also sometimes said to have fiduciary ethical (as well as legal) obligations of loyalty,
qua agents of their employers—especially when it comes to protection of intellectual
property rights or other trade secrets.143
In healthcare ethics, Carolyn McLeod has argued that physicians are fiduciaries to both the
public and their patients. In the former case, physicians act as gatekeepers to the access of
health-related public goods, such as abortion and medical assisted death. In the latter case,
the physician-patient relationship bears all the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship and is,
therefore, fiduciary.144 Similarly, Chalmers C. Clark has grounded the physician’s “duty
to treat” in emergency situations (such as bioterrorist attacks, HIV infections, and
pandemics) in a duty of loyalty to public health interests.145 For instance, Clark argues that
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a “broad conception of a fiduciary duty to treat survives within an implicit social contract
that exchanges professional trust for the social bequest of professional autonomy.”146
It is clear, then, that the fiduciary obligation has received considerable attention and ethical
analysis before now. As we have now seen, not only can evidence of the fiduciary
obligation be found in moral, religious, and legal discourse of the past few millennia, it has
also become the subject of more recent ethical discourse, especially in the so-called
“applied” areas of professional, business, and healthcare ethics.147 One might ask why
scholarly interest in the fiduciary relationship, as a moral relationship, has been confined
largely to applied ethics? One reason might be that philosophers who do normative ethics
(and are primarily concerned with universal moral principles) have little reason to home in
on fiduciary relationships, because they are narrower in scope than other moral
relationships, such as trust. Others perhaps, like some applied ethicists, may write about
fiduciary relationships but elect not to use the term “fiduciary” in their analyses. As
mentioned in the Introduction, some bioethicists in medical and research ethics do not
invoke the “fiduciary relationship” by name, possibly because they assume that such a
relationship is, as Miller argues, “purely legal in nature.” Philosophers and ethicists
therefore may prefer to couch their ethical analyses in more familiar moral vernacular, such
as loyalty, trust, promising and the like. But by revealing the fiduciary obligation to be a
moral obligation that protects those socially and economically important interactions in
which people undertake to act on behalf of one another, I hope to have removed this barrier
to discussing fiduciary relationships openly in ethics and to applying the fiduciary
framework specifically to pressing problems in bioethics.

146

Chalmers C. Clark, “In Harm's Way: AMA Physicians and the Duty to Treat,” The Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2005): 65–87 (emphasis added).
147

But it is worth noting here that the amount of scholarly attention the fiduciary relationship has received
by moral philosophers or ethicists is not determinative of its status as a moral relationship. Nevertheless,
given the fiduciary relationship’s long history, we might expect it to have received at least some recent
scholarly attention, which indeed it has.

57

1.4

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the problem of legal-moral equivocation: viz., the worry that the
fiduciary relationship is a purely legal relationship (i.e., an artifact or construction of law),
and therefore the normativity of this relationship is relevant only in the legal domain. I
suggested in the Introduction that the problem of legal-moral equivocation is a conceptual
threat to the widespread adoption and application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethics,
along with its attendant benefits for ethical analysis. I have therefore sought to mitigate this
worry by illustrating that the fiduciary relationship is, in fact, a moral relationship. I have
argued the fiduciary relationship is moral insofar as its defining obligation is essential to
social harmony. By serving as an obligation that regulates human behaviour in those modes
of interaction in which people undertake to act on behalf of others’ significant practical
interests, the fiduciary relationship makes it possible for individuals to trust, or at least
reliably depend, on one another in those contexts. This ability is crucial to social and
economic

cooperation

in

complex

human

societies

characterized

by

the

compartmentalization of knowledge, skill, and expertise. I traced the fiduciary obligation
through history in an effort to illustrate that where historical evidence of the fiduciary
obligation can be found, the obligation has been invoked to solve the problem of trust and
dependence, and thereby promote greater social cooperation. With this background laid, I
then described the events that led to the fiduciary obligation becoming a principle of
English Equity, from which we gain our modern (Western) understanding of this important
relationship. I argued that these events can be understood as Western society’s most recent
attempt to operationalize the moral demands of the fiduciary obligation, as has been done
for millennia before. I also suggested that given the moral nature of the fiduciary
relationship, it is perhaps appropriate or expected that it should gain entry into English law
via Equity, given the latter’s historical role as one important mechanism by which moral
and social norms enter the law.
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Chapter 2

2

Paternalism, Autonomy, and the Fiduciary Relationship

This dissertation aims to address two important impediments to the widespread adoption
and application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis: namely, legal-moral
equivocation and paternalism. The previous chapter sought to address the former problem.
By tracing the history of the fiduciary obligation, I sought to illustrate not only that
fiduciary relationship long predates its origins in Medieval English law, but that it has been
a constant feature of human civilizations. Its presence across time and cultures, I argued,
is attributable to the way in which it responds to the problem of trust and dependence that
arises when one individual undertakes to act on behalf of another’s significant practical
interests. More specifically, by enabling mutual dependence and cooperation across a
diversity of human interactions within complex societies characterized by the
compartmentalization of knowledge, skills, and expertise, the fiduciary obligation is an
important moral obligation that serves to promote social harmony. As a moral obligation
that governs a socially and economically important type of relationship, I showed how the
fiduciary obligation has been present in moral, religious, and legal rules throughout history.
Finally, I suggested that the fiduciary obligation’s status as a legal institution in
contemporary Western English law is merely the latest attempt in a long line of such efforts
to operationalize and enforce the demands of the fiduciary obligation, given its social
importance.
This chapter takes up the problem of paternalism, or more specifically, the worry that the
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and therefore a discredited ethical framework for
healthcare professionals and their patients. But by building on the historical argument of
the previous chapter, I argue that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy
promoting. To the extent that I show the fiduciary relationship to be essentially autonomy
promoting, worries about paternalism dissolve. I argue that when we understand autonomy
as fundamentally relational—namely, that our ability to pursue our chosen plans, projects,
or causes is inextricably bound up with, and dependent upon, our relationships with
others—how the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy becomes clear. Given, again,
the

interconnectedness

of

complex

societies

through

the

ever-increasing
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compartmentalization of knowledge, skill, and expertise, fiduciary relationships are
important social and economic relationships that make possible the pursuit of interests
necessary for meaningful self-governance.
In Chapter 1, I argued that the fiduciary relationship is moral because of the essential role
it plays in fostering social harmony. Chapter 2 essentially builds upon and further fleshes
out this argument by suggesting that being able to trust and depend on fiduciaries is
essential to an individual’s ability to be self-governing. Therefore, by making trust and
dependence possible, the fiduciary relationship not only fosters social harmony through
promoting societal cooperation, it also does so by allowing for the pursuit of self-directed
ends that are critical to autonomy. Together, then, Chapters 1 and 2 provide a full account
of the moral foundation of the relationship: namely, the fiduciary relationship is an
important moral relationship insofar as it fosters social harmony by ensuring that the
necessary “background conditions”—i.e., certain important relationships—are secured for
the exercise of meaningful autonomy. In this way, Chapter 2 may be viewed as a
companion piece to Chapter 1, as it builds upon and reinforces arguments presented in that
chapter. However, the arguments proffered here also stand alone, and can therefore be read
independently of Chapter 1.
In arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting, and thus not
paternalistic, I engage with Matthew Harding as my main interlocutor. Harding argues that
among the primary roles of Equity is to take an interest in maintaining socially important
“institutions,” or simply, relationships.148 Specifically, Harding argues that through
judicial governance, Equity maintains various institutions as distinct “options” from which
individuals can choose in ordering their interactions with one another. By governing
institutions, and thus maintaining options of choice, Harding says that Equity thereby
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promotes autonomy. I begin, first, by applying Harding’s analysis of the way Equity
promotes autonomy through its governance of socially important institutions, to the
fiduciary relationship. As we saw in Chapter 1, the fiduciary relationship is one such
institution that Equity has taken an interest in governing and maintaining. Harding’s
analysis thus provides some support for the argument in Chapter 1 that the fiduciary
relationship is an important moral relationship, which English law (through Equity)
subsequently sought to protect and operationalize through its governance. However, more
importantly for my purposes in this chapter, applying Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary
relationship suggests that this relationship is not paternalistic insofar as it serves a distinct
“option” among various frameworks, or “modes of human action,” from which individuals
can choose in the process of self-governance.
However, I argue that the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy beyond its role as a
mere “option” that people can choose in governing their interactions or in the pursuit their
autonomous ends. Instead, I suggest that the fiduciary relationship is essential to promotion
and realization of autonomy promoting. In making this argument, I go beyond Harding’s
analysis by invoking a relational theory of autonomy, which is different from the (Razian)
conception of autonomy adopted by Harding. I argue that when we use such a theory (a
relational one), the essential role that fiduciary relationships serve in promoting autonomy
becomes clear. Finally, drawing from Paul Miller’s specific account of the fiduciary
relationship, I suggest that fiduciary power (the exercise of which the fiduciary relationship
makes possible) is a relational means by which the beneficiary exercises her autonomy.
Fiduciary relationships are a critical means by which individuals exercise their capacity to
govern themselves. Moreover, the nature of our relational web constitutes the conditions
under which we both develop autonomy skills at the outset (i.e., in childhood) and through
which we continue to set and pursue our chosen ends as full-fledged autonomous agents.
In short, by arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting, in a
relational sense, I aim to both mitigate the problem of paternalism and further flesh out the
moral nature of the fiduciary relationship. I claim that this relationship is moral not only
because it fosters broad societal cooperation—and thus social harmony—but also because
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it makes possible the very conditions in which autonomous agents can pursue their selfdirected ends.

2.1

Harding on Equity and Institutions

All societies, from the simplest to the most complex, require varying degrees of
cooperation and corresponding mutual dependence. As mentioned, with increased
complexity comes increased compartmentalization of knowledge, skill, and expertise,
requiring individuals to rely on others in myriad different ways. Particularly in complex
modern societies, we find ourselves inextricably bound up with, and thus dependent upon,
others for the unique, specific, and often vital role they perform in society. Recognizing
the importance of our assorted interactions, Matthew Harding argues that Equity has taken
on the role of governing and maintaining socially and economically important institutions
in order to ensure their continued viability as distinct “options” from which individuals can
choose in directing their lives. Institutions, as Harding defines them, are “arrangements or
frameworks for human action that have some distinctive normative identity and are oriented
to some purpose or goal.”149 Harding says that an institution’s “normative identity,” in
turn, is constituted by an “irreducible core” of norms or principles and is what individuates
one institution (i.e., a “mode” or “framework” for human interaction) from another.150
Institutions are thus a subset of relationships that are defined by the purposes or ends they
serve, together with the norms and principles that govern behaviour in the achievement of
those ends, giving each relationship its unique “normative identity.”151 Harding says the
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purpose of an institution also helps to define its normative identity by delimiting the kinds
of norms likely to protect or maintain the integrity, or continued viability, of the institution.
In other words, an institution’s underlying principle both defines its purpose and gives rise
to certain norms and rules that function to protect the continued viability of the institution
itself.
For example, we saw in the previous chapter that the fiduciary obligation underlies the
legal Trust.152 The fiduciary obligation informs both the purpose of the Trust and the norms
and rules that serve to protect it. The fiduciary obligation states that when one undertakes
to act on behalf of another, one must do so with utmost fidelity to that other’s best interests.
The purpose of the Trust involves holding or managing Trust assets (e.g., property,
finances, etc.) for the sole purpose of furthering the best interests (with respect to the
specific Trust assets in question) of the beneficiary of that Trust. The purpose of the Trust,
in turn, gives rise to various norms and rules—or, in this case, legal duties—meant to
protect the integrity of the Trust relationship as a distinct “mode” or “framework” for
human action. Trustees, for example, have a strict duty of loyalty to the beneficiary of the
Trust. To illustrate, consider Keech v Sandford, a seminal case for both Trust and fiduciary
law, describing the nature of fiduciary loyalty. An infant (Keech) had inherited a lease in
an estate, which was entrusted to Sandford as Trustee until Keech came of age.153
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However, the lease expired before Keech reached the age of majority. When Sandford
attempted to renew the lease, the lessor refused (on grounds that he did not want to lease
to a minor). Sandford subsequently renewed the lease for himself. The court held that the
lease acquired by Sandford be given to Keech and, furthermore, that Sandford account for
any profits (i.e., that any profits acquired as a result of Sandford’s acquiring the lease be
transferred to Keech). The judge, Lord King LC, explained that unless the Trustees be held
to a strict duty of loyalty to their beneficiary’s interests, “few trust estates would be renewed
to cestui que use [i.e., the trust beneficiary].”154 A Trustee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty is
intended to ensure that she respect the purpose of the Trust relationship—to further the
specific interests of the Trust beneficiary—which helps to ensure the continued viability of
the relationship itself as a unique mode or framework for human action.
It is for this reason that Harding argues that Equity’s “interest” in institutions is to ensure
that “institutions are formed, well-governed and viable.”155 More generally, Harding says
that it “is an interest in ensuring that institutions flourish as arrangements or frameworks
for human action.”156 Equity plays an important role in protecting, maintaining, and (where
necessary) reforming important social and economic relationships, or institutions, so that
they remain viable “modes” or “frameworks” through which individuals are able to
interact. In other words, Equity is concerned to protect the viability of certain relationships
of social or economic importance, and (as we will see shortly) Equity is “normatively
justified” in doing so to the extent that the maintenance of such relationships promotes
autonomy.
As an example of Equity’s interest in institutions, Harding focuses on the charitable Trust.
The judges of Equity (or rather, judges employing the doctrines and principles of Equity)
continue to exercise control over the boundaries of charitable Trusts. In doing so, “they
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maintain an institutional type as a defined and demarcated object of choice for those who
seek to utilise the law’s facilities in planning and ordering their affairs.”157 The charitable
Trust is therefore not available as a framework for human action for the attainment of goals
or purposes that do not count as “charitable.” As mentioned, the defining purpose of the
Trust is the duty of the trustee to apply Trust assets for the benefit of the trust
beneficiaries.158 Harding says that the purpose of the Trust gives rise to norms that give it
a distinctive normative identity, and thus make it a unique “institutional type.” These
norms, Harding suggests, include norms of stewardship, trustee accountability, and
fiduciary responsibilities, “at least in cases where trustees exercise discretionary
powers.”159 Harding explains that
[u]nderpinning the [T]rust’s irreducible core, along with norms of stewardship,
trustee accountability and fiduciary responsibility, is a distinctive sort of purpose,
which helps to lend unity to the trust as an institutional type: the purpose of holding,
managing and applying assets for the benefit of others.160
In short, the “normative identity” of the Trust is made up of the purposes, norms, and
principles that together constitute its irreducible core.
How Does Equity Govern Institutions?
But how exactly does Equity govern institutions? Alternatively, how does Equity maintain
institutional types? One way that Equity governs and maintains institutions is indirectly.
Harding says that Equity governs institutions by imposing duties on those who are
responsible for managing and directing those institutions. In the context of the Trust, this
would include the duties and liabilities placed on Trustees as the “managers” of the Trust
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relationship. Equity’s adjudication of institutional claims is therefore not primarily directed
at the individual beneficiary but is instead concerned to ensure the continued viability of
the institution, or relationship, itself. To illustrate, when a Trustee is found to be in breach
of her fiduciary responsibilities, Harding says that the liabilities imposed by the judges of
Equity are “not to meet the claim of any particular beneficiary; rather, it is a liability to
preserve the integrity of the institutional structure within which beneficiary claims fail to
be considered and dealt with.”161 This is not to say that Equity is indifferent to the claims
of individual beneficiaries. As Harding himself points out, such a view would be incoherent
given that the whole point of the institution of the Trust is to provide beneficiaries with
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recourse to such claims. He nevertheless maintains that “[E]quity’s interest in beneficiary
claims is via rules that have as their primary concern the structure of the [T]rust itself.”162
Another way that Equity governs institutions is by looking to their purposes, which
themselves give rise to managerial duties. As we saw above, the purpose of the Trust is to
apply the Trust assets for the benefit of Trust beneficiaries.163 By governing institutions in
light of their purposes, “[E]quity exhibits a concern that governance be faithful to
institutional settings within which it takes place.”164 When instances of an institution are
at odds with moral, social, or political norms, Equity can look to the purposes of those
institutions to facilitate institutional change. The continued viability of institutions over
time requires that they remain relevant to changing societal norms.165
The cy-près doctrine for charitable Trusts is an example of the way in which Equity amends
institutions to remain consonant with social values. The cy-près doctrine allows courts to
apply Trust assets to purposes other than those for which the Trust was originally intended
by the settlor. In order to invoke the cy-près doctrine, the settlor’s (suspect) charitable
purpose must be “impossible, impracticable, or illegal” to carry out. In such cases, the
courts have sometimes not only gone beyond the settlor’s original purposes, but even put
Trust assets to purposes ostensibly at odds with the original purposes, where those original
purposes fail to conform to prevailing social, moral, and political norms.
For example, in re Dominion Students’ Hall Trust, Evershed J approved a scheme
permitting the trustees of a racially discriminatory charitable trust to administer that
trust on a non-discriminatory basis; in doing so, he noted that social understandings
of racial discrimination had changed since the trust was first settled.166
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The purpose of the charitable Trust is to further some public or social good. It goes without
saying that a charitable Trust that is racially discriminatory is inimical to the public or
social good. The cy-près doctrine therefore allows Equity to directly intervene in order to
maintain the purposes of the charitable Trust qua institutional type.
Justifying Equity’s Interest in Institutions
It is perhaps now clear that Equity has been tasked in part with maintaining and, where
necessary, reforming certain institutions. A related question thus arises concerning
Equity’s justification for doing so. What justifies Equity in interfering in the ways in which
capable and freely consenting individuals choose to interact with one another? For instance,
in recent years there has been increased settlor demand for bespoke Trust arrangements,
tailored to such a degree that many of the Trust’s core norms—including stewardship,
trustee accountability, fiduciary responsibility—are minimized or eliminated altogether. At
what point do bespoke Trust arrangements cease to resemble the original institutional type
itself? In these instances, questions arise concerning whether Equity ought to intervene to
maintain the Trust (defined by its irreducible core) as a unique institutional type and,
furthermore, whether it is justified in doing so. As Harding points out, these questions
become especially salient if we consider that the recrafting of institutions in this way
actually appears to be in keeping with the law’s more general “facilitative project”: a liberal
conception of law based on the facilitation of, or removal of impediments to, individual
freedom. On this view, why not allow bespoke Trust or other institutional arrangements,
in which core norms and purposes are jettisoned completely, if they serve the relevant
individuals’ aims? Alternatively, why think the loss of certain institutions is a problem in
which Equity is justified in intervening?
According to Harding, the answer to these questions lies in Equity’s role in promoting
autonomy. Harding takes as his starting point law’s foundation in a “particular version of
liberalism,” which also informs its more general facilitative project.167 Harding says that
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from a liberal point of view the justification for any state action, “lies in the contribution
of that state action to an overall social, economic and political order in which people are
able to live autonomous lives.”168 Hence, Harding argues that Equity, as an arm of the
state, is justified in governing institutions insofar as it enables people to live autonomous
lives. Aside from remedial justice, then, Equity also has a normative justification in
facilitating and promoting (a liberal sense of) autonomy. Without Equity’s supervision and
guidance (i.e., by governing, maintaining, and reforming institutions) Harding argues that
such relationships would be diminished or eliminated altogether, ostensibly diminishing
autonomy as a result. Hence, in order to facilitate relationships and thus promote autonomy,
Equity is justified in governing institutions so that they remain “viable and succeed.”169
Razian Autonomy
But why suppose that certain institutions in particular are important for autonomy? On
what conception of autonomy do institutions play a meaningful role in its promotion? To
make this connection between institutions and autonomy, Harding adopts Joseph Raz’s
conception of autonomy. Raz’s starting point, like Harding’s, is a version of “liberalism
centred on the political ideal of autonomy.”170 Raz’s conception of liberalism is based on
moral pluralism, which in turn grounds his conception of autonomy.171 Moral pluralism,

168

Ibid., 26.

169

Ibid., 13.

170

Harding, “Equity and Institutions,” 32.

171

Raz’s views about autonomy are couched in debate with Rawls and Nozick about the nature of
liberalism and the role of the liberal state. Raz rejects both Rawls’ and Nozick’s liberalism, which he dubs
the “politics of neutral concern.” The politics of neutral concern is the view that with respect to political
action the state ought to remain neutral between its citizens, especially regarding conceptions of “the good
life.” Raz says that the plausibility of the doctrine of neutral concern is derived from a conception of the
good that values autonomy; that is, the state remains neutral with respect to conceptions of the good life so
that individuals can be free to choose a conception of the good and govern their lives accordingly. It is in
this way that Rawls (in particular) seeks to justify the politics of neutral concern. Rawls argues that because
of the plurality of competing moralities in society, the state, in its facilitative role in helping individuals to
realize their own conception of the good, ought to remain neutral vis-à-vis their respective ideals of the
good. This is also what Rawls calls the “social role of justice,” namely, to “enable all members of society to
make mutually acceptable to one another their shared institutions and basic arrangements, by citing what
are publicly recognized sufficient reasons” (Raz, “Liberalism, Autonomy, and Politics,” 115). But, Raz
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according to Raz, is “the view that there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships,
commitments, and plans of life which are mutually incompatible, so that autonomous
people can and should choose between them.”172 Given the multiplicity of morally
worthwhile conceptions of the good, self-determination, and thus choice, is central to
autonomy for Raz. As well, he says it is not enough for autonomy to have one’s choices
dictated by one’s basic needs. Rather, autonomy requires “a range of meaningful options”
from which one is able to choose in the process of self-governance. Among those
meaningful options ought to be the ability to “develop relationships” and to commit to
“projects, plans, and causes.”173 The measure of one’s autonomy depends on the degree to
which those relationships and projects are chosen, or self-determined, by the autonomous
individual. To have a “significant” degree of autonomy, then, one must have a choice
among morally worthwhile possibilities, and not simply among basic needs. Importantly,
Harding says this “requires that the state should make worthwhile options available and
accessible to individuals.”174 Therein lies the connection between institutions and
autonomy.
Quoting Raz in The Morality of Freedom, Harding claims that autonomous persons must:
possess and develop certain capacities and dispositions such as literacy, numeracy,
and the cognitive ability to think about the choices that they make […] autonomous
people must be free to some sufficient degree of coercion and manipulation in

points out that political neutrality does not follow from the recognition that individuals have their own
conceptions of the good. Rather, Raz argues that moral pluralism is equally compatible with the social role
of justice, albeit by yielding “imperfect” (yet equally valid) principles of justice. Raz ultimately argues that
imperfect principles of justice are preferable, practically speaking, to Rawls’ idealized principles of justice.
Raz argues that Rawls principles are derived from a conception of the individual (behind the veil of
ignorance) completely abstracted from all features that give an individual identity (e.g., moral, political, and
religious views, as well as “natural endowments”), rendering the principles of justice derived therefrom an
impossibility (or at least impracticable), if not simply meaningless. It is, however, beyond the scope of this
chapter to discuss Raz’s argument in detail. See Joseph Raz, “Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of
Neutral Concern,” Midwest Studies In Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1982).
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deliberating about their options and choosing among them […] [and] people must
have available to them a sufficient range of options from which to choose in
realising a self-determining path in life.175
With Raz, Harding argues that one of the roles of the state (through Equity, in this case) is
to promote a significant degree of autonomy by individuating and maintaining institutions
as distinct “options” from which individuals can choose. It is through various institutional
types, like the charitable Trust, that individuals are able to pursue certain relationships,
projects, plans, or ends. Insofar as these specific institutions make possible the fulfillment
of particular ends or purposes, they remain important as “options” of autonomous choice
in the general process of self-governance.
We have now seen how this particular version of liberalism—namely, a Razian
liberalism—justifies the state’s interest in governing and maintaining institutions. The state
is justified in governing institutions insofar as it is founded on a version of liberalism
concerned to promote autonomy through principles of moral pluralism. The state, through
its governance of institutions, maintains meaningful “options” that are necessary for
individuals to exercise their autonomy by choosing between morally worthwhile
relationships, projects, plans or causes. This understanding of autonomy necessitates that
options be individuated and maintained so that they remain distinct objects of choice;
insofar as the (roughly Razian) liberal state is grounded upon a concern to promote
autonomy in this sense, it is “normatively justified” in governing socially and economically
important institutions.
The Trust is just one example of an institutional “option” that Equity maintains in order to
promote autonomy, by making possible certain forms of human action. We have seen how
Trusts enable individuals to interact with respect to specific purposes, namely, those
involving the management or application of Trust assets for the benefit of Trust
beneficiaries. As a further example, Harding says the institution of private property has
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value “insofar as it reflects the distinctive ways of valuing and regulating relations with the
resources of the world.”176 Furthermore, Harding says that the law of contract, “may also
have value insofar as it establishes distinct contract types that appeal and are available to
differently situated people depending on their purposes and goals.”177 Insofar as equitable
doctrines continue to guide the development or maintenance of these institutions, Equity
plays a role in promoting autonomy by providing individuals with distinct options from
which they may choose to relate to one another, or as the means to pursuing important
projects, plans, or causes.178 As Harding puts it, Equity has an important function in
“constituting, maintaining and refining options and in individuating those options so that
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normative commitments that underpin them; (ii) on the basis of the purposes or goals that they might
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For example, the institution of contract has changed significantly over the past 400 years to
accommodate changing business and economic practices. Before Stilk v Myrick (1809), 2 Camp. 317, 170
E.R. 1168 early English courts, relying in part on equitable principles, would generally enforce (or not
enforce, as the case may be) contractual promises based on moral “consideration,” such as fairness. With
the nascent market economy of the early nineteenth century, however, came a new formalism in the law of
contracts. This formalism was in part a response to the needs of commercial actors to have more certainty
in their contractual relations with one another. Through Stilk v Myrick the courts developed the formal
doctrine of consideration, defining “consideration” (i.e., the legal basis upon which contracts are
enforceable) as the requirement that a promisee undergo a “legal detriment” (i.e., to do something they are
not legally obligated to do). Interestingly, after almost 200 years of formalism in which the doctrine of
consideration reigned, the institution of contract appears to again be changing in response to greater
complexity in both global and local business practices (at least in Common Law jurisdictions). The strict
formalism of Stilk v Myrick appears ill-suited for modern business relations, which often involve both
legally unsophisticated actors and those with greater legal sophistication and resources (who are sometimes
able to use the law to their unfair advantage). In the landmark Canadian case Greater Fredericton Airport
Authority Inc. v Nav Canada (2008), 290 D.L.R. (4th) 405 (N.B. C.A.) the New Brunswick Court of
Appeal affirmed the English judgment in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nichols (Contractors) Ltd, [1989] ELR
23 which all but entirely jettisons the doctrine of consideration (understood as requirement that the
promisee undergo a legal detriment). The court found that so long as both parties receive some “practical
benefit,” and there is no “economic duress,” a contract is prima facie valid and thus enforceable. In other
words, the courts have begun to look at the “intentions” of parties to a promise (or contract), enforcing or
not enforcing promises as “good conscience” requires. These alterations and additions to the law of
contract are clear examples of the courts maintaining an institutional type in response to changing societal
norms in order to enable individuals to pursue their associated projects, plans, or ends. (In conversation
with Professor Joel Bakan).
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people may choose among them in self-determining ways.”179 Moreover, Harding says
that,
by taking an interest in the development, governance and reform of institutions,
[E]quity contributes to the development and maintenance of individuated options
that might be the subject of autonomous choice, whether these options be
distinguished by their underpinning [i] values and commitments, [ii] the purposes
and goals that they facilitate, or [iii] the modes of interaction that they enable and
embody. And finally, to the extent that [E]quity makes that contribution, [E]quity,
like the whole body of facilitative private law, seems appealing when measured
against fundamental liberal commitments, at least from the perspective of a
liberalism centred on the political ideal of autonomy.180
In sum, from a liberal point of view centred on autonomy, there are reasons to maintain the
distinctiveness of institutional types, which in turn justifies Equity’s critical role in serving
that end—especially in the face of interests or forces that would render those institutions
unrecognizable or otherwise blur the lines between them, undermining an important
mechanism by which individuals are able to achieve their autonomous ends.

2.2

Equity, Autonomy, and the Fiduciary Relationship

From what has been said, it is perhaps already clear that the fiduciary relationship is an
institution that Equity has individuated, maintains, and continues to govern.181 Indeed,
Equity’s historical interest in the fiduciary relationship—and, specifically, the fiduciary
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Recall that Harding defines an “institution” as “arrangements or frameworks for human action that have
some distinctive normative identity and are oriented to some purpose or goal” (Harding, “Equity and
Institutions”). Elsewhere he says institutions are “modes” or “frameworks” of human action. For this
reason, I have suggested that institutions, as Harding defines them, comprise different types of
relationships. For example, the Trust, as an institution, is a framework whose purposes, norms, and duties
guide (and govern) human behaviour in the context that type of human interaction, or relationship.
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obligation—was a central theme of Chapter 1. Yet, beyond merely mentioning the
fiduciary obligation as one (among other) core “norms” of the legal Trust, Harding does
not discuss the fiduciary relationship as an “institution” itself. In fact, Harding’s
identification of the fiduciary obligation as a “norm” of the Trust seems to suggest that he
may not have considered the possibility that the fiduciary relationship is an institution in
its own right. In my view this is an important oversight, because, as argued in the previous
chapter, the fiduciary relationship is an important mode or framework of human action that
makes possible the furtherance of a plethora of different purposes, projects, and ends
critical to meaningful self-governance.
In the second part of this chapter, then, I first extend Harding’s own analysis of Equity’s
interest in institutions to the fiduciary relationship. I illustrate how Chapter 1 provides
historical support for the claim that Equity has taken an interest in governing and
maintaining the fiduciary relationship. In turn, Harding’s analysis mutually reinforces the
central thesis of Chapter 1 by providing a theoretical rationale as to why the fiduciary
relationship may have been taken up by early Chancery. I argue that the fiduciary
relationship is clearly an “institution” (indeed, a paradigmatic one) that Equity has taken
an interest in preserving and protecting. The history of how Equity came to recognize and
eventually govern the fiduciary relationship provides a case example of Harding’s analysis
of Equity’s interest in institutions. Harding’s argument suggests that the social and
economic importance of the fiduciary relationship is what accounts for Equity’s interest in
maintaining it as an institutional type, or distinct “option,” through which self-governing
agents achieve meaningful purposes or ends. In this way, the fiduciary relationship
promotes autonomy.
Accordingly, extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship has preliminary
implications for both the problem of legal-moral equivocation and the problem of
paternalism. First, by suggesting that Equity only intervenes to preserve and protect
socially and economically important relationships, this analysis provides some support for
Chapter 1’s argument that the fiduciary relationship is informed by an underlying moral
obligation whose own importance is evidenced by its enforcement through moral, religious,
and legal norms throughout history. Extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary
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relationship therefore ought to help further alleviate concerns about legal-moral
equivocation. Second, extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship suggests
that the latter plays a role in promoting autonomy, which mitigates the concern that the
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic; viz., insofar as the fiduciary relationship is autonomy
promoting, it is not paternalistic. I begin by briefly describing the problem of paternalism
as it relates to the fiduciary relationship. I then go on to illustrate how Harding’s account
of the way in which institutions promote autonomy may alleviate the concern that the
fiduciary relationship is paternalistic.
Extending Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship does appear to mitigate the
problem of paternalism; insofar as the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy by serving
as an option from which agents can choose to frame and govern their interactions with one
another in the pursuit of their autonomous ends, this relationship is not paternalistic.
Nevertheless, while I agree with Harding that the fiduciary relationship promotes
autonomy in this way, his analysis fails to account for the way in which the fiduciary
relationship is essentially autonomy promoting. By “essential” here I mean that fiduciary
relationships play an important and often critical role in promoting autonomy, though
perhaps not in every instance.182 I therefore do not claim that fiduciary relationships are
necessary for autonomy in every case; however, I do think that, practically speaking, the
multifarious fiduciary relationships in one’s life will be “essential,” or crucial, to the
meaningful exercise of autonomy. In order to appreciate the essential role that fiduciary
relationships play in promoting autonomy, we must go beyond Harding’s analysis
generally, and his conception of autonomy in particular. We must think harder about the
way fiduciary relationships themselves promote autonomy. I argue that Harding’s Razian
conception of autonomy does not account for the ways in which our myriad relationships
are essential to both the development of “autonomy skills” (as in the parent-child
relationship) and the ongoing ability to govern ourselves. By adopting a more plausible
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relational theory of autonomy, I argue that the fiduciary relationship is among the most
important kinds of relationship that constitute the very “conditions” that make meaningful
autonomy possible.
First, by juxtaposing Razian autonomy with relational autonomy, I highlight how the
former fails to explain how our various relationships play a crucial role in the development
and ongoing exercise of our autonomy. I argue that when we recognize the relationality of
autonomy, the essential role that the fiduciary relationship plays in enabling individuals to
will (that is, to set and pursue certain projects, plans, or causes) becomes manifest. In
making this argument, I employ Paul Miller’s influential “fiduciary powers” theory of the
fiduciary relationship. I argue that fiduciary power is a relational capacity through which
individuals exercise their will.
I conclude by emphasizing that the fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship, grounded
in its essential role in promoting autonomy. In this way, I take the forgoing two chapters
to have mitigated both the problems of equivocation and paternalism.

2.2.1

Equity’s Interest in the Fiduciary Relationship

Recall, again, that institutions according to Harding are “arrangements or frameworks for
human action that have some distinctive normative identity and are oriented to some
purpose or goal.”183 An institution’s “normative identity” is constituted by an “irreducible
core,” comprising moral norms, principles, and a defining purpose. An institution’s
underlying moral principle often helps to define its purpose as well as the moral norms
that, in turn, serve to protect and maintain that purpose and thus the integrity of the
institution itself. Equity’s particular interest in these important social and economic
institutions, or relationships, involves ensuring that institutions are “formed, well-governed
and viable.”184 As we saw in the previous section, outside of remedial justice, Equity also
has a “normative justification” in taking an interest in institutions to maintain their integrity
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or viability. This normative justification is based in the law’s general facilitative project,
grounded in a particular form of liberalism that seeks to promote autonomy. To facilitate
autonomy, Equity governs institutions by individuating, maintaining, and (where
necessary) reforming them so that they remain “viable and succeed” as distinct options
through which autonomous agents can structure their interactions and ultimately achieve
their autonomously chosen ends.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the fiduciary obligation first gained entry into the law
as a principle or norm of the legal Trust. However, the fiduciary relationship has since
become an Equitable institution in its own right, enshrined through legal duties and
liabilities. Indeed, the fiduciary relationship has arguably become the quintessential
equitable institution, rivalled perhaps only by the Trust. But the fiduciary relationship has
broader applicability, encompassing the Trust itself and cutting across other important
institutions and thereby defying classic legal taxonomy in the process (to the dismay of
some jurists).185 Questions concerning the scope, meaning, and demands of the fiduciary
relationship in the context of these and other disparate interactions (e.g., from parents to
Chief Executive Officers) have therefore often been left to the equitable domain.
Extending Harding’s analysis of Equity’s interest in institutions to the fiduciary
relationship makes it clear that the fiduciary relationship is indeed an “institution” and thus
plays a role in promoting autonomy. To begin, the fiduciary relationship has a unique
“normative identity,” oriented toward some purpose or goal, and made up of an “irreducible
core” norms, values, and principles. As described in Chapter 1, the fiduciary relationship’s
central moral obligation, or principle, is something like the following: in undertaking to
act on behalf of another’s interests, a fiduciary ought to do so with strict fidelity, or loyalty,
to the relevant interests of the beneficiary. From the fiduciary obligation, we get both the
purpose of the fiduciary relationship and the norms and rules that function to protect it.
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The purpose of the fiduciary relationship, according to Miller’s influential account, is to
authorize “the exercise of discretionary power by the fiduciary over the practical interests
of the beneficiary.”186 In other words, the purpose of the fiduciary relationship is to
authorize another to exercise their discretion on behalf of one’s “significant practical
interests.” According to Miller, a beneficiary’s interests are significantly “practical” where
they implicate matters of personality, welfare, or right.187 Matters of personality refer to
interests significant to one’s identity, such as the determination of one’s ends; matters of
welfare include decisions bearing on one’s physical, psychological, or economic wellbeing, such as health, paternal or financial care; and matters of right include decisions
bearing one’s moral or legal rights, such as to be free from violence or coercion.188 The
purpose of the fiduciary relationship is to enable another to exercise their (often
professional) discretionary power to act on behalf and in the best interests of matters
concerning one’s personality, welfare, or right.
Fiduciary norms and rules, in turn, demand that the purpose of the fiduciary relationship
be upheld. As we will see below, fiduciary duties ensure the proper exercise of fiduciary
power, which in turn ensures the continued integrity, or viability, of the fiduciary
relationship as a specific mode of human action.189 Miller argues that fiduciary norms and
rules arise out of the fiduciary relationship’s “structural properties.” The structure of the
fiduciary relationship is characterized by inequality, dependence, and vulnerability.190
Miller says that “[w]henever one person enjoys fiduciary [discretionary] power over
another, their relationship will be asymmetrical in respect of the power itself.”191 In other
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words, the structure of the fiduciary relationship is asymmetrical vis-à-vis the exercise of
discretionary power. Inequality reflects the structural asymmetry between power and the
dependence. Dependence thus refers to the way in which the beneficiary relies upon the
fiduciary’s appropriate exercise of her discretionary power. And vulnerability refers to the
risk that the beneficiary takes in authorizing the exercise of fiduciary power: namely, the
risk that the fiduciary will abuse, misuse, neglect, or otherwise exploit that power.
Vulnerability follows from the risk that the fiduciary “will fail to meet the demands of
fiduciary [discretionary] power.”192 These structural properties give rise to the norms and
rules meant to protect the integrity of the fiduciary relationship. The inequality,
dependence, and vulnerability that are built into the structure of the fiduciary relationship
are therefore also what generate fiduciary duties. Equity’s “interest” in the fiduciary
relationship may therefore be seen as an attempt to maintain the integrity, or continued
viability, of this important mode of human action by enforcing the very norms and values
that define and guide appropriate conduct within it. As we saw above, Equity often governs
institutions indirectly, by imposing duties on those who are responsible for managing and
directing those institutions. Fiduciary norms and values such as trust, confidence, care,
loyalty, good faith, and responsibility give rise to duties or obligations intended to maintain
the integrity of the fiduciary relationship qua institution or as a unique framework for
human action through which individuals can pursue their significant practical interests.
It would seem, then, that the fiduciary relationship is an “institution” as Harding defines it.
But why think that the fiduciary relationship is among the institutions that Equity has taken
an interest in governing? What evidence is there that Equity governs and maintains the
fiduciary relationship?
First, recall that Equity governs institutions both indirectly and directly. As just mentioned,
it does so indirectly through the duties and obligations imposed upon the managers of those
institutions. For example, a Trustee is the manager of the Trust, the assets of which the
Trustee manages for the beneficiary’s benefit. In the fiduciary relationship the managers
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are the fiduciaries themselves, such as parents, physicians, lawyers, financial advisors,
etcetera. The obligations that Equity imposes on fiduciaries are those required to ensure
the purpose of the fiduciary relationship—i.e., securing the beneficiary’s interests—is
upheld. With the exception of loyalty, the type and number of fiduciary duties are
somewhat contested, but often include the duties care and candour. Loyalty, for instance,
demands that fiduciaries exercise their discretionary power with complete fidelity to their
beneficiaries’ interests—or at least those “significant practical interests” specified as
within the fiduciary mandate. This prevents fiduciaries not only from exploiting individual
beneficiaries, but also from undermining the purpose, and thus integrity, of the fiduciary
institution itself. Similarly, in the law there are also certain rules, such as the no-profit and
no-conflict rules, that (some argue) serve a “prophylactic” function, prohibiting and
deterring fiduciaries from profiting from their privileged capacity as fiduciaries and thus
from undermining the purpose, and thus “viability,” of the fiduciary interaction itself.193
Equity maintains the fiduciary relationship indirectly, then, by identifying and enforcing
fiduciary norms and rules intended to protect its normative identity—the underlying
principle, purpose, norms and values—of the fiduciary interaction, which includes
ensuring that fiduciaries act in accordance with their obligations as fiduciaries.
Equity also governs the fiduciary relationship directly through fiduciary jurisprudence. By
looking to the fiduciary principle, the courts of Equity ensure that the fiduciary relationship,
as an institution, remains faithful to its purpose while its animating norms and rules cohere
with moral norms and social values. Part of Equity’s role in maintaining institutions is to
ensure that their defining purposes—as informed by underlying principles—are not
undermined, blurred, or otherwise rendered unrecognizable, ostensibly so that these
institutions, or relationships, remain meaningful options from which autonomous agents
can choose in governing their lives. Hence, in demarcating the fiduciary relationship from
other institutions, such as contract, Equity maintains the fiduciary relationship as a distinct
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“option” from which autonomous agents might choose to interact in an effort to pursue
valuable relationships, meaningful projects, or other ends important to self-governance.
The case law is rich with examples of Equity maintaining the boundaries of the fiduciary
relationship. For instance, there have been numerous attempts to “contract-out” fiduciary
norms and duties, including the quintessential fiduciary duty of loyalty. As we might
expect, in light of Harding’s account, the courts of Equity have so far been unamenable to
such efforts, opting instead to maintain the defining purpose of the fiduciary relationship
along with the norms and rules that protect that purpose. In the seminal case, Meinhard v.
Salmon, Equity can be seen as governing the fiduciary institution. In that case, Justice
Cardozo, writing for the majority, famously stated:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a
workaday world for those acting at arm’s length are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee [i.e., fiduciary] is held to something stricter than the morals
of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.194
Justice Cardozo maintains the fiduciary institution by looking to its purpose along with the
norms and rules intended to maintain it. He was unwilling to jettison one of the defining
norms of the fiduciary relationship, namely, the fiduciary’s duty of “finest loyalty” to the
beneficiary’s interests. Moreover, Cardozo demarcates the fiduciary relationship from,
specifically, the institution of contract. Fiduciaries, he says, are not merely agents to a
contract, “acting at arm’s length,” they are, rather, “held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place.” Even honesty alone, an important norm in contractual
relationships, is insufficient in the context of the fiduciary relationship.195 Instead,
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fiduciaries must display “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Justice Cardozo
also gestures toward Equity’s “tradition” of maintaining the fiduciary relationship; he notes
that Equity has exercised an attitude of “uncompromising rigidity” toward similar attempts
to undermine fiduciary norms and purposes through a process of “disintegrating erosion”
of exceptions. Equity can thus be seen here maintaining the fiduciary principle, along with
its animating purpose, by ensuring that fiduciary norms and values remain “at a higher
level than that trodden by the crowd.”196
The application of Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship and the arguments laid
out in Chapter 1 mutually reinforce one another. On the one hand, Harding’s account of
Equity’s interest in institutions provides theoretical support for the historical account
provided in Chapter 1. It does so by providing a theoretical explanation for Equity’s
historical role in governing the fiduciary relationship as we understand it today. The social
and economic importance of the fiduciary relationship makes it a prime candidate for legal
protection through Equity’s governance. By extending Harding’s analysis, we can view
English Equity’s interest in the fiduciary relationship as the most recent attempt to enforce
the demands of the fiduciary obligation and thus protect the integrity of the fiduciary
interaction. On the other hand, Chapter 1 provides historical support for Harding’s
theoretical analysis of Equity’s interest in institutions. Chapter 1 described the presence of
the fiduciary relationship across times and cultures, operationalized through moral
prescriptions, religious commands, and legal rules. This narrative conveys the societal
importance of the fiduciary relationship and may now be understood, on Harding’s
account, as providing the reason for Equity’s historical interest in it. In other words, on
Harding’s view, the clear social importance of the fiduciary relationship accounts for
Equity’s interest in individuating and maintaining it as a distinct “option” through which
self-governing agents can choose to pursue valuable relationships, plans, projects, or other
ends. Indeed, Harding himself notes that how exactly institutions become identified and
individuated by Equity at the outset is a complex process that involves both “historical and
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cultural factors.”197 The historical account provided in Chapter 1 may therefore be viewed
as an attempt to elucidate some of the historical factors that led to the identification and
individuation of the fiduciary relationship.

2.2.2

Implications for Equivocation and Paternalism

Extending Harding’s analysis of Equity’s interest in institutions to the fiduciary
relationship has implications for both the problems of equivocation and paternalism. First,
as we just saw above, it helps to mitigate the problem of equivocation by supporting the
argument made in Chapter 1 that the fiduciary relationship is a moral relationship that
existed long before Equity’s interest in it. Chapter 1 outlines the history of the fiduciary
obligation as a moral obligation that responds to the problem of trust and dependence in
those interactions where one undertakes to act on behalf of another’s interests and does so
in a way that fosters greater social cooperation and harmony. Harding’s analysis of
Equity’s interest in institutions suggests that it was the evident social and economic
importance of the pre-existing fiduciary relationship that led to Equity’s eventual interest
in ensuring its continued viability through its governance and protection. Put simply, the
fiduciary relationship is not a creation of English Equity. Accordingly, the normative
prescriptions of the fiduciary obligation are not purely legal in nature (at least in their
foundation); rather, they are also moral prescriptions. This understanding of the fiduciary
relationship ought to go some way toward mitigating the worry that applying the normative
prescriptions of the fiduciary relationship to the ethical problems of bioethics involves an
illicit equivocation between the normative “ought” of the law and that of morality.
Harding’s analysis also has implications for the problem of paternalism. Before explaining
why, let me review this problem as it pertains to bioethics specifically. As mentioned in
the Introduction, the paternalistic model of the physician-patient relationship refers to a
discredited model in which the physician makes unilateral, and even overriding, decisions
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on the patient’s behalf. 198 It assumes that the physician, with her professional knowledge
and expertise, knows what is in the patient’s best medical interests—irrespective of the
patient’s expressed values, preferences, or beliefs. The history of medical and research
ethics is rife with examples of ethical violations perpetrated and justified according to the
“doctor knows best” rationale. Contemporary medical and research ethics has evolved out
of, and largely in response to, the abuses, neglect, and exploitation that occurred under the
paternalistic model. Accordingly, today medical ethics employs a patient-centred model of
care that aims to foster patient autonomy in healthcare decision-making and other healthrelated patient interests.199 Focused on patient autonomy, patient-centred care advocates
for “deliberation” between healthcare professionals and their patients; deliberation
involves not only providing patients with the information relevant to their situation, but
also engaging in a dialogue whereby the healthcare professional can come to learn a
patient’s values, preferences, and beliefs and thus better understand how she can most
effectively realize her patient’s healthcare goals (and understand in the first place what
those goals are). To be clear, on this model it is not the healthcare professional who
chooses the best medical treatment for her patient based on the patient’s values, goals,
etcetera; rather, the dialogue between the healthcare professional and her patient enables
the professional to better understand her patient’s choices, and to act accordingly. Of
course, the healthcare professional brings her professional knowledge and expertise to bear
on this dialogue so that the patient can make informed choices about their health interests—
but it is ultimately the patient, not the professional, who decides. This patient-centred care
model is reflected in recent strategic funding priorities by the Canadian Institute of Health

198

Ezekiel J Emanuel and Linda L Emanuel, “Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship,” JAMA
267, no. 16 (April 22, 1992): 2221–2226.
199

Emanuel and Emanuel, “Four Models.” Only in rare circumstances is paternalism deemed permissible
in healthcare ethics (with important caveats); such as in emergency care settings wherein it is often
impossible to engage in meaningful dialogue with otherwise competent patients (e.g., where they are
unconscious or otherwise incapacitated), and where doing so would in some cases actually undermine the
patient’s assumed medical interests in survival.

84

Research’s Strategy for Patient-Oriented Research and the U.S. Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute.200
The problem of paternalism refers to the worry that the fiduciary relationship is a
paternalistic framework for the relationship between healthcare professionals and their
patients and is therefore something that most bioethicists would and should reject.
However, the description above of the patient-centred model reveals that physicians can be
fiduciaries without in fact being paternalistic. They can use their discretionary authority to
guide their patients in making health care choices that serve their health care interests and
also use it to effectuate those choices through the health care they provide. 201 Fiduciaries
who use their discretionary power in this way are not acting paternalistically. Harding’s
analysis takes us further in implying that the fiduciary relationship is autonomy promoting.
It suggests that institutions, like the fiduciary relationship, serve as “options” among
various frameworks of action through which individuals can achieve their self-directed
ends. In the healthcare setting, the healthcare professional-patient relationship makes it
possible for patients to realize their health-related interests. It does so by suggesting that
discretionary authority exercised by the fiduciary is an essential means by which the
beneficiary is able to pursue her autonomously chosen ends. Through dialogue and joint
deliberation, the fiduciary is better able to understand the beneficiary’s chosen plans or
goals. The fiduciary can then use her (often) professional knowledge, skill, or expertise to
effectuate those ends. Carrying out the beneficiary’s autonomously chosen plan of action
will invariably require the fiduciary to exercise her discretion, but this fact does not thereby
render the relationship paternalistic; indeed, it is precisely owing to the fiduciary’s specific
ambit of discretionary power (e.g., over medical, legal, or financial interests) that the
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beneficiary solicits a particular type of fiduciary to facilitate the realization of her selfdirected plans, projects, or causes.
In the end, therefore, Harding’s account is helpful in mitigating the problems of both
equivocation and paternalism. Nevertheless, I argue that it fails to account for the full
extent to which the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy. On Harding’s account the
fiduciary relationship is rendered a mere means to autonomy via its role as an “option,”
among many others, through which individuals can pursue their chosen ends. It is therefore
not the fiduciary relationship per se that promotes autonomy; rather, it does so through its
role as an option among a range of other options that promotes autonomy. This analysis is
based on a Razian theory of autonomy, which, I argue, does not pay due attention to the
essential role that relationships play in constituting the very conditions that make both the
development and ongoing exercise of autonomy possible. By adopting a relational theory
of autonomy, which places relationships at the centre of any understanding of autonomy, I
argue that fiduciary relationship is not merely instrumentally autonomy promoting, but it
is essentially so.

2.3

Beyond Razian Autonomy

We saw briefly above that Harding draws his understanding of autonomy from Raz.
According to Raz, the liberal state plays a role in promoting autonomy by creating
“options” that enable individuals to choose and pursue the life they have embarked upon.
Raz begins from the assumption that self-governance requires more than meeting one’s
“personal needs.” Personal needs are the conditions necessary to enable a person to live the
life they have. Choices are dictated by personal needs “if all but one nontrivial option will
sacrifice a personal need and will make impossible the continuation of the life the agent
has.”202 Personal needs are not only the basic needs of survival but include the need to
have a “morally worthwhile life.” The idea that autonomy requires more than the
fulfillment of basic needs seems to be based on the intuitive idea that a “morally worthwhile
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life” involves more than mere subsistence. If one’s only “option” is between survival or
death one’s autonomy is effectively meaningless; such a “choice” is more akin to duress or
coercion, as if one is forced to “choose” with a gun to the head—only the “gun” in this case
is, say, starvation. However, Raz suggests that one need not be facing a decision between
life or death for one’s autonomy to be severely undermined. For example, he says that a
pianist may lose the life she has embarked upon, if her fingers are irreparably broken. For
the pianist, the “choice” between continuing her life as pianist or not, may be practically
equivalent to a life-or-death decision; one can imagine that, for her, living a life without
playing the piano—the life the pianist has embarked upon—is simply not worth living.
But perhaps for these reasons, Raz says that autonomy is a matter of degree: one can be
more or less autonomous. It is then perhaps fair to say that the concert pianist who can no
longer play the piano nevertheless has more autonomy than someone whose sole
occupation is to secure their next meal. Again, Raz says that to have a “significant degree”
of autonomy requires more than the satisfaction of personal needs; significantly
autonomous persons are those who “shape their life and determine its course.”203 In other
words, to have significant autonomy requires having a range of meaningful options that
enable one to be the self-determining author of their own lives. The liberal state thus
promotes autonomy by creating and maintaining “options” that enable individuals to
pursue a life that, for them, is worthwhile. In Raz’s own words:
autonomous persons are not merely rational agents who can choose between
options after evaluating relevant information, but agents who can in addition adopt
personal projects, develop relationships, and accept commitments to causes,
through which their personal integrity and sense of dignity and self-respect are
made concrete. In a word, significantly autonomous agents are part creators of their
own moral world. Persons who are part creators of their own moral world have a
commitment to projects, relationships, and causes which affects the kind of life that
is for them worth living. It is not that they may not sacrifice projects or causes they
are committed to for good reasons, but rather that there are certain kinds of actions
vis à vis their commitments which amount to betrayal, compromise their integrity,
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sacrifice their self-respect, and in extreme cases render their life, i.e., the life they
made for themselves, worthless or even impossible (in a moral sense).204
Raz identifies at least three aspects of autonomy. The first is the (classic) capacity to form
“informed and effective judgments.”205 This seems to imply more than having mere
“capacity” to be held responsible for one’s choices, but to have the ability to undergo a
process of higher-order critical reflection. The second is “relational,” by which he means
that autonomous persons “are not subjected to the will of another.”206 Finally, the third
aspect concerns the quality of the options open to the agent; specifically, “their choices
must not be dictated by personal needs.”207 Related to the first, Raz says this in part
requires that “[o]ne is a part author of one’s world only if in creating it one is not merely
serving the will of another.”208 So a person who coerces another violates that person’s
autonomy by forcing them to conform to their will. The coercer succeeds in forcing others
by “restricting their options.”209 For this reason, Raz says that the more the third condition
of autonomy is undermined (such as through coercion), the more one’s choices will be
dictated by personal needs, and thus the less autonomous one will become. For Raz, to
facilitate autonomy through moral pluralism, the liberal state plays a critical role in
individuating and maintaining options that make a morally worthwhile life possible.
Harding therefore appears to be correct in interpreting Raz as saying that the defining
feature of Razian autonomy is having a choice among a range of “options.” Only by being
free to choose among a meaningful array of options—enabling the pursuit of projects,
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relationships, and causes that constitute one’s “moral world”—and thus to act beyond the
mere satisfaction of personal needs, does one acquire a “significant” degree of autonomy.
On Raz’s account, the fiduciary relationship is made a mere means to autonomy. It
becomes an “option” that autonomous agents can choose (or not, presumably) in the
authorship of their lives. However, as I will now argue, this theory of autonomy does not
account for the vital role fiduciary relationships play in constituting the conditions that
make meaningful autonomy possible. In this way, fiduciary relationships are not
“optional”; rather, they are essential for the development and ongoing exercise of
autonomy. The Razian conception of autonomy fails to acknowledge this critical feature
of autonomy: namely, the way in which our various relationships constitute the very
“background conditions” that make significant autonomy possible.

2.3.1

Relational Autonomy

“Relational” theories of autonomy are grounded in the recognition that relationships shape
or create one’s ability to be a “self-governing” agent. Relational theories were first
developed by feminist philosophers keenly aware of the oppressive effects that
relationships can have on the autonomy of women and other subjugated members of a
white supremacist patriarchal society.210 As Natalie Stoljar puts it, these theories began as
an attempt “to answer the question of how internalized oppression and oppressive social
conditions undermine or erode autonomy.”211 Relational autonomy emphasizes the
importance of the “conditions” in which autonomy develops and is realized. 212 These
conditions include our various relationships with others, which have the potential not only
to damage our autonomy, but to be supportive of it.213
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Relational autonomy theorists begin their analyses in the same way that most moral
philosophers do: namely, by defining autonomy as “self-governance.”214 However,
feminist philosophers point out that self-governance is not the same as having complete
control over our lives.215 Rather, self-governance involves acting on “reasons, values, or
ends of our own.”216 These reasons, values, and ends can, and inevitably do, encourage us
to depend on others. For example, in valuing love one chooses to depend on family, friends,
or partners to secure this important need. Alternatively, one might also value financial
stability, and so choose to depend on the advice, knowledge, or skill of a financial advisor
for the best chances of achieving this particular end. The same is true of numerous other
personal and professional relationships. McLeod and Ryman express this point well:
So long as we rely on others for these things, however, we do not control what
happens to us, not completely anyway. Rather, some of this control lies with other
people: those who will shape how much we are able to flourish. It follows that
autonomy is not about controlling things in our lives; autonomy and control are not
identical.217
Relational theorists thus reject the individualistic view of autonomy that assumes selfgovernance requires near complete independence from the influence of others. Feminist
philosophers have long been sceptical of this “atomistic” and naively idealistic (not to
mention masculinist) understanding of autonomy: that is, the dubious understanding of the
autonomous agent as completely self-sufficient, whose judgment and actions are
unadulterated by others—as if it were possible to operate in a social vacuum. Feminist
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philosophers have challenged this atomistic understanding of autonomy, arguing that
“articulating the [social] conditions of autonomy is essential to understanding gender
oppression and related concepts such as objectification.”218
There are a number of different theories of relational autonomy. Broadly, relational
theories of autonomy can be classified as (i) procedural or substantive, and (ii) causal or
constitutive.219 Procedural theories parallel the literature on autonomy more generally, by
focusing on the capacity to reflect on one’s motivations, values, and beliefs and make
decisions based on those reflections.220 Procedural theories of autonomy are “content
neutral” insofar as they are concerned with the process by which one comes to a decision,
rather than the content of the decision itself. On this view, the choices of an individual of
sound mind are autonomous, however oppressive in outward appearance (i.e., in content)
those choices might be. Conversely, substantive theories are not content neutral, rather they
are “value laden.” In other words, they subject the content of one’s decisions to normative
constraints. There are both strong and weak substantive theories of autonomy. Strong
substantive theories subject the contents of one’s decisions to direct normative
constraints.221 For example, the preference to be enslaved cannot be autonomous on a
strong substantive view, as (it goes without saying) slavery is normatively and morally
repugnant. Weak substantive theories, on the other hand, “build in normative content, but
do not place direct normative constraints on the content of agents’ preferences.”222 For
example, a weak substantive theory might simply require that to count as autonomous,
moral agents must exhibit moral attitudes of self-respect, or a robust sense of their own
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self-worth.223 So long as they meet these constraints, they are considered “autonomous”
on the weak substantive view.
Causal relational theories of autonomy acknowledge the influence of social relationships
and socio-historical circumstances on autonomy.224 Causal views take into consideration
the vital role that relationships play in enabling and fostering autonomy. In other words,
they emphasize that our relationships play a causal role in the development of our
autonomy. Our relationships with parents, teachers, friends and loved ones can either
support or undermine our autonomy as we grow into fully developed adults. In this way,
social and historical conditions can promote or impede autonomy. It is important to
emphasize that on the causal view of autonomy, our relationships and socio-historical
circumstances affect the degree to which we develop into autonomous agents. Importantly,
however, such relationships are not the focus of our ongoing exercise of autonomy.
Constitutive relational accounts, by contrast, provide an analysis of autonomy in terms of
how our interpersonal and socio-historical circumstances constitute the “defining
conditions” of autonomy. In other words, these theories recognize the importance of social
and economic relationships to the continued or ongoing exercise of autonomy—not just
the development of autonomy (as in the causal view). For instance, bell hooks (among
many others) points out that “white supremacist patriarchal society” systematically
undermines the autonomy of women and people of color by severely constraining access
to “external goods”—including social goods, such as affordable housing, quality
education, employment, and healthcare—required for autonomous choice and action.225
Limiting access to these external goods is incompatible with autonomy on some
constitutive views. Stoljar explains that this is because autonomy is a “global” condition
of moral agents, requiring that they have “de facto power and authority over choices and
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actions significant to the direction of [their lives].”226 Severely constraining the external
conditions of autonomy—such as critical social and professional relationships—removes
the de facto power required for autonomy.227 However, other constitutive theorists focus
more on “local” conditions of autonomy: namely, those conditions required for “choices,
preferences, or desires at particular times to count as autonomous.”228 Still, what makes a
relational theory constitutive is the claim that no matter how robust an agent’s
psychological capacities are, if the relevant external conditions do not obtain at a given
time, an individual’s choices will not be autonomous.229 The constitutive view therefore
rejects the classic moral philosophical view that merely having the capacity for (or simply
undergoing the process of) rational reflection, as in the procedural view, is sufficient for
autonomy.
While all theories of relational autonomy emphasize the critical role that our relationships
play in autonomy, the theory I will adopt here is a procedural-constitutive theory: namely,
one according to which being autonomous involves having both the capacity to undergo
critical reflection on one’s motivations, beliefs, and values, and to have access to the
“external conditions” that make possible the exercise of “de facto power and authority” for
meaningful self-governance. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in any
substantive debate about the preferred or most plausible theory of relational autonomy;
suffice to say, that I adopt the procedural-constitutive theory because I believe it is basically
correct: not only does it account for the classical (and arguably intuitive) idea that
autonomy requires certain mental capacities and processes of rational and critical
reflection, but it also accounts for the ways in which our relationships are both causally
formative for our autonomy and (as I argue below) essential for the ongoing “global”
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exercise of autonomy. I will therefore use this theory to show why the fiduciary relationship
is essentially autonomy promoting.230

2.4

A Moral Ground for the Fiduciary Relationship

I propose that when we understand autonomy relationally, together with the recognition of
the crucial role that fiduciary relationships play in the satisfaction of important human
needs and interests, then the way in which fiduciary relationships are essentially autonomy
promoting becomes evident. All societies are made up of a web social, political, and
economic relationships. Modern societies, in particular, are increasingly complex. With
increased technological advancements and global interconnectedness comes increased
compartmentalization of knowledge, skills, and expertise. As global citizens we trust and
depend on others in a multiplicity of different ways, from securing the food we purchase
at the grocery to the surgeons who perform our operations. The modern global world is
made possible only through social cooperation and consequent mutual dependence at an
immense scale. To “self-govern,” then, we simply must be able to trust or reliably depend
on others.
The fiduciary relationship, in particular, is an essential “mode of human action” by which
we become, and continue to function as, autonomous agents. In the other words, fiduciary
relationships are essential not only for developing the procedural capacity for autonomy,
but also for its ongoing exercise. The parent- (or caregiver-) child relationship, for instance,
is amongst the most important of fiduciary relationships for developing the capacities, or
“skills,” necessary for autonomy. Parents, teachers, and other authority figures in a child’s
life are responsible for helping children to develop the capacity for rational self-reflection
required for procedural autonomy. Diana Meyers, who takes a procedural view, argues
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that what she calls “autonomy competence” requires certain “agentic” or “autonomy
skills.”231 Meyers says that,
Autonomous people exercise a repertoire of skills to engage in self-discovery, selfdefinition and self-direction, and [...] the authentic self is the evolving collocation
of attributes that emerges in this ongoing process of reflection, deliberation and
action.232
Meyers suggests that, at a minimum, the “repertoire of skills” required for self-definition
and self-reflection include the following: introspective skills, imaginative skills, memory
skills, communication skills, analytical and reasoning skills, volitional skills, and
interpersonal skills.233 Moreover, Meyers emphasizes the importance of critical thinking
for autonomy competence:
[O]ne must command critical thinking skills. Not only must one be alert for errors
of fact and fallacies in reasoning, but one must also register emotional cues that
signal confusion or danger. Still, extracting what is worthwhile from newly
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encountered material is the key to enriching one's self-knowledge and to redefining
oneself. Thus, one must be able to identify such ideas, incorporate them into one's
own cognitive and emotional viewpoint, and apply them as one defines oneself.234
Meyers says that, “[b]y exercising autonomy skills, such as the ones I enumerated
previously, people gain authenticity or autonomy.”235 The parental (or guardian)
relationship is critical to the development of these skills and thus of the child into a selfgoverning and authentic individual.236 Moreover, parents are fiduciaries: they undertake—
indeed, are obliged both morally and legally—to act in the best interests of their children.
They are tasked, in part, with helping their children develop the procedural capacity and
skills to be autonomous. Performed well, their role is essential to the development of a
child’s future autonomy.
Fiduciary relationships are also necessary for the continued exercise of autonomy. As
mentioned,

the

interconnectedness

of

complex

societies

has

led

to

the

compartmentalization of knowledge, skills, and expertise such that one must trust and
depend on innumerable individuals to secure not only basic needs (such as food, clothing,
education, and healthcare) but also the realization of life projects, plans, causes, and other
autonomous ends. Many of these relationships are also fiduciary. Healthcare professionals,
lawyers, financial advisors, chief executive officers, and perhaps even the state itself are
fiduciaries tasked with exercising their judgment (usually based on a unique set of
knowledge, skills, and expertise) on behalf of others.237 As was made clear in the previous
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chapter, the presence of the fiduciary relationship throughout history and across cultures
speaks to its profound social and economic importance. Societies throughout history have
had a stake in protecting, governing, and maintaining the fiduciary relationship. Without
access to at least some fiduciary relationships, and the ends they make possible, individuals
would be unable to meaningful guide the direction of their lives. For example, without
parents (or guardians) acting in a fiduciary capacity—loyal to the best interests of their
child(ren)—the development of skills and processes essential for self-governance would
be severely curtailed. The same is true for some fiduciary relationships in adulthood.
Healthcare professionals and lawyers, for instance, make possible the pursuit of one’s
chosen health or legal plans or goals, respectively. Without the professional knowledge
and expertise of these individuals, along with the reliable expectation that these individuals
can be trusted or depended upon to exercise their professional discretion on behalf of our
best interests, it would be exceedingly difficult (if not practically impossible) to secure
certain of these interests.238 Needless to say, without access to healthcare or legal justice,
we would simply lack some of the most crucial relationships for the meaningful exercise
of our autonomy.
Razian autonomy does not appear to account for the ways in which relationships of any
kind are essential to autonomy. Raz’s brief reference to the “relational” aspects of
autonomy is entirely negative; he refers to the potential of our relationships to undermine
our autonomy by coercively subjecting our will to that of another. True, Raz mentions the
importance of pursuing “relationships” insofar as relationships constitute options in the
authorship of one’s moral life. However, Raz does not mention the ways in which
relationships can themselves be constitutive of our autonomy, in a positive and affirmative
sense. Again, the constitutive view stresses the importance of having certain relationships
for the ongoing exercise of autonomy. On this view, our various social and professional
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relationships—from (as we saw above) parents, to lawyers, to healthcare professionals—
are among the “external goods” that constitute the (positive) conditions necessary to be a
self-governing agent. Relationships are a “global” condition of autonomy, in that they are
necessary for the exercise of “de facto power and authority over choices and actions
significant to the direction of [our lives].”239
Raz does recognize, however, that certain “natural conditions” can force people to make
choices on the basis of personal needs, thus undermining their autonomy. It is here that Raz
comes closest to acknowledging what relational theorists call the “conditions” that are
constitutive of autonomy:
The ideal of the perfect existentialist with no fixed biological and social nature who
creates himself as he goes along is an incoherent dream. An autonomous personality
can only flourish against a background of biological and social constraints which
fix some of its human needs. Some choices are inevitably determined by those
needs. Yet, harsh natural conditions can reduce the degree of autonomy of a person
to a bare minimum just as effectively as systematic coercive intervention.
Moreover, noncoercive interferences with a person’s life and fortunes may also
reduce his or her autonomy in the same way as coercive interventions do. The only
differences are that all coercive interventions invade autonomy and they do so
intentionally, whereas only some noncoercive interventions do so and usually as a
by-product of their intended results. They are not direct assaults on the autonomy
of persons.240
Still, Raz’s framing of relationships here is entirely negative; namely, he seems to
acknowledge only the way in which relationships can be deleterious to autonomy.
Moreover, he seems to shrug off this apparent autonomy-eroding effect of relationships by
pointing out, again, that autonomy is a matter of degree. Raz suggests that no one is
completely autonomous, because it is impossible to be entirely free from the dependence
on, or influence of, others. Therefore, because relationships appear to equally undermine
the maximum degree to which individuals can be autonomous, Raz concedes that not all
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relationships are “regrettable.” Again, however, we see that Raz views relationships as
entirely autonomy eroding, not promoting.
Even putting aside the fact that Raz does not acknowledge the way in which relationships
can function as positive mechanisms of self-governance, it seems to me that it would be
anachronistic to suggest that Raz has in mind here the idea that our relationships constitute
the conditions for autonomy, in the sense proffered by relational theorists. By the phrase,
“background of biological and social constraints,” Raz is referring to “human needs,” and
the way in which we are bound by those needs. Raz says that biological and social human
needs (such as food, shelter, clothing, social connection, etc.) are the “natural conditions”
that constrain or undermine autonomy, just as the coercive actions of some individuals can.
Again, Raz does not appear to account for the ways in which human relationships are
constitutive of autonomy, as some relational theorists do. To suggest that Razian autonomy
accounts for the ways in which autonomy is relational by referring to his discussion of
“human needs” and the way in which “natural conditions” can undermine autonomy would,
I think, be an abuse of the principle of charity.
However, Raz does go on to say that “inasmuch as the liberal concern to limit coercion is
a concern for the autonomy of persons, the liberal will also be anxious to secure natural
and social conditions which enable individuals to develop an autonomous life.”241 It might
be argued, then, that to the extent that the “social conditions” of autonomy include
relationships that can impede or promote autonomy, it is fair to say that Razian autonomy
is compatible with relational theories of autonomy. But while the Razian account of
autonomy may leave room for the conceptual work laid down by relational theorists, it
clearly does not do the work of relational theorists. Raz does not acknowledge, identify, or
discuss the many ways in which relationships are fundamental to the development of
autonomy, as well as the social conditions under which autonomy can flourish.
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As a Razian on autonomy, it is therefore doubtful that Harding recognizes the full
importance that our relationships have as constituting the “conditions” of autonomy.
Relationships are more than merely individuated “options” from which sovereign
individuals might choose in curating an authentic self. Our interpersonal relationships
make up the “external conditions” that constitute our autonomy itself; without these
relationships, we would lack the conditions necessary for meaningful self-governance, and
would thus simply fail to be autonomous. As will become clear in a moment, fiduciary
relationships, in particular, along with the interests and ends they make possible are
essential to autonomy. Only when we understand autonomy as both procedurally and
constitutively relational does it truly become clear how fiduciary relationships promote
our autonomy.

2.4.1

The Fiduciary Relationship as Relational Capacity

To understand how the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting it will first
help to get clearer on what exactly its defining features are. What does it really mean to
say that a fiduciary is “authorized” to exercise “discretionary power” over the “significant
practical interests” of the beneficiary? Drawing again from Miller’s influential analysis of
the fiduciary relationship, I argue that part of the answer to this question lies in the nature
and purpose of fiduciary power: namely, the fiduciary relationship makes possible the
exercise of fiduciary power as a means—or capacity—by which the beneficiary is able to
pursue, set, or determine her autonomous ends.242 Fiduciary power is therefore what I call
a “relational capacity,” one that enables individuals (beneficiaries) to meet important
needs and pursue meaningful projects and interests. Fiduciary power, and by extension the
fiduciary relationship, enables individuals to pursue and procure important interests,
without which they would simply fail to lead autonomous lives.
We have already seen that the purpose of the fiduciary relationship is to enable interactions
in which one party (the fiduciary) is authorized to exercise discretionary power over the

242

Miller, “Justifying Fiduciary Duties.”

100

significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary). It is the fiduciary’s authority to
exercise discretionary power that is peculiar to the fiduciary relationship.243 Fiduciary
power is exercised on behalf of the beneficiary’s “significant practical interests.” Recall
that a beneficiary’s interests are “practical” where they implicate matters of personality,
welfare, or right.244 Personality refers to interests significant to one’s identity, such as the
determination of one’s ends; welfare includes decisions bearing on one’s physical,
psychological, or economic well-being, and right concerns decisions about one’s moral or
legal rights.245 Clearly, practical interests comprise many of those interests that are central
to self-determination and autonomous action.
These “practical interests” are united in the following way. It is only through the
authorization of the bearer of those interests (the beneficiary) that the fiduciary obtains the
capacity to exercise discretionary power in relation to these specific interests. For this
reason, Miller notes that fiduciary power is by nature authorized, relational, and
specific.246 Let me elaborate.
First, as an autonomous agent with the capacity to will and set ends for herself, the
beneficiary grants the fiduciary the authority to use her discretionary power to further her
(the beneficiary’s) interests.247 Unlike unauthorized and thus coercive uses of power, the
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As previously mentioned, I assume for the sake of simplicity the paradigm case in which the
beneficiary in a fiduciary relationship is autonomous and thus has the capacity to authorize fiduciary
power. I recognize that some beneficiaries in a fiduciary relationship (such as children and those with
certain cognitive impairments) may lack the requisite autonomy or capacity to authorize fiduciary power.
By way of brief response, Carolyn McLeod suggests (in conversation) that, in the case of children, it might
be argued that the fiduciary exercises their fiduciary power on behalf of the child’s future autonomy. With
respect to those lacking the capacity to authorize fiduciary power due to cognitive impairments, this raises
interesting questions about whether such relationships are in fact fiduciary (or, rather, straightforwardly
paternalistic). One reason why we might nevertheless call such relationships (e.g., between a caregiver and
a patient with cognitive impairments) fiduciary is precisely because of the way in which they enable such
individuals to set and pursue certain (ideally) self-determined ends. But, as Anthony Skelton cannily points
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beneficiary’s authorization “legitimates conduct that would otherwise be illegitimate or
positively wrongful.”248 Miller says that fiduciary power thus “alters the normative
conditions under which people interact,” insofar as it “legitimates the subjection of the
beneficiary’s capacity to set and pursue certain significant practical interests for herself to
the will of the fiduciary.”249 In other words, the authorization of fiduciary power renders
otherwise wrongful conduct—i.e., the subjection of one’s moral or legal capacity to
another—permissible.
Second, fiduciary power is relational insofar as it is exercised on behalf of the beneficiary.
Miller says the relationality of fiduciary power is “substitutive.”250 In acting on behalf of
the beneficiary’s interests the fiduciary “stands in substitution for that person within the
ambit of the power” specified by the fiduciary mandate.251 The authorization of fiduciary
power “legitimates a limited form of substitution of legal [and moral] personality.”252 It is
the discretionary nature of fiduciary power, in particular, that has this substitutive effect

out, autonomy interests are not the only interests parent-fiduciaries are tasked with promoting; rather, there
are a range of goods involved in the fiduciary relationship between parents and children, to which an
exclusive focus on autonomy does not do adequate justice. Nor does an exclusive focus on autonomy do
full justice to the complexity involved in parenting, which involves balancing these various goods at, and
across, times. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore these fascinating questions in
more detail.
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of fiduciary’s ambit over significant practical interests suggests that such execution will involve a
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according to Miller. The fiduciary’s ambit for discretionary power means that she is not “a
mere proxy.” Agents, with no or severely limited discretionary powers, act for their
principals—not on their behalf. Conversely, fiduciaries literally act on behalf of their
beneficiaries. The fiduciary acts in the beneficiary’s capacity by effectuating her will. In
other words, at least within the scope of vested authority, the fiduciary “exercise[s]
judgment in determining whether, when, and how it [i.e., fiduciary authority] is to be acted
upon.”253
Third, specificity reveals that the substitutive nature of fiduciary power is ultimately
limited. The fiduciary does not, after all, “overtake the personality” of the beneficiary.
Rather the fiduciary’s power is usually circumscribed to a specific mandate, capacity,
interest, or end.

Fiduciary power thus remains a means by which the beneficiary

effectuates her will. Hence, it is not entirely accurate to say that it is the fiduciary’s will to
which the beneficiary subjects her own. Instead, the beneficiary authorizes the fiduciary in
a limited capacity to execute her own will. As McLeod and Ryman point out, fiduciary
discretion is not only exercised on behalf of the beneficiary’s will but also informed by
discussions about the beneficiary’s values, beliefs, and interests. As we saw above, it is
through dialogue and joint deliberation that the fiduciary is able to learn the beneficiary’s
choice—or will—and use her (often professional) fiduciary power to carry out that decision
and effectuate her will. Put simply, it is in relation to the beneficiary’s will that the
fiduciary exercises her fiduciary powers. It is in this way that the fiduciary can be seen as
a “relational capacity” through which the beneficiary carries out her will.254
In sum, these features of fiduciary power—authority, specificity, and relationality—reveal
the purpose for which the power is held, and thus the purpose of the fiduciary relationship
itself: to serve as a relational means by the which the beneficiary pursues her autonomous
will. As Miller puts it, “fiduciary power, and by extension the fiduciary relationship, thus
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enables one person to act purposively on behalf of another.”255 Furthermore, Miller says
that fiduciary power is derived from the “capacities constitutive of the legal [and moral]
personality of another person, [and therefore] cannot but be understood as an extension of
that other person’s personality.”256 Again we see that, as an extension of beneficiary’s
personality, fiduciary power is a relational capacity through which she pursues her selfdirected projects, plans, or causes.
When the nature and purpose of fiduciary power is considered in light of a relational
constitutive theory of autonomy, the essentially autonomy-promoting function of the
fiduciary relationship becomes clear. On a constitutive view of relational autonomy, certain
relationships constitute the “defining conditions” of autonomy. We require access to
myriad relationships to pursue important plans, projects, and causes essential to meaningful
self-governance. Self-governance requires of autonomous agents that they have “de facto
power and authority over choices and actions significant to the direction of [their lives].”257
Given the nature of complex, interconnected global societies, this power requires that they
have access to a variety of fiduciary relationships, from healthcare professionals who
enable them to act upon health-related decisions, to governments who are tasked with
effectuating their interests in liberty and security. Conversely, severely constraining these
external conditions—i.e., relationships—undermines the de facto power required for
autonomy.258 Without the aid and support of fiduciary relationships, in particular, we
would simply lack some of the conditions necessary to secure important needs or to pursue
identity-conferring projects. Fiduciary relationships are essential to enabling individuals,
through the use fiduciary power, to maintain de facto power and authority over their
significant practical interests by authorizing others, often with a specific set of skills or
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knowledge, to carry out their autonomous decisions. Lastly, this vital purpose—of
promoting autonomy—gives the fiduciary relationship a foundation in morality.

2.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the fiduciary relationship is not only not paternalistic, it
is essential to our autonomy. I began by outlining and then applying Harding’s analysis of
Equity’s interest in governing institutions to the fiduciary relationship. I argued that the
fiduciary relationship is in fact an “institution” as Harding defines it. I suggested
furthermore that Chapter 1 provides historical support for the claim that Equity has taken
an “interest” in the fiduciary relationship. I also argued that Harding’s claim that Equity
only takes an interest in governing socially important institutions provides reciprocal
theoretical support to the historica, argument in Chapter 1 that the fiduciary relationship
predated, or existed prior to, its entry into English law through Chancery.
Next, I applied Harding’s analysis to the fiduciary relationship, arguing that this
relationship is not paternalistic. Adopting a Razian theory of autonomy, Harding argues
that Equity promotes autonomy by individuating, maintaining, and reforming institutions
so that they remain “viable and succeed” as distinct options through which self-governing
agents can pursue their chosen projects, plans, or causes. Self-determination, according to
Raz, requires agents to have meaningful choices among a “range of options” that enable
one to embark upon, or continue to live, a “morally worthwhile life.” This requires choices
among options beyond those allowing for the mere satisfaction of basic needs. Harding
argues that Equity (as an arm of the liberal state) promotes autonomy by ensuring the
continued viability of various institutions that function as “modes of human action”
through which autonomous agents can achieve their ends. Having illustrated that the
fiduciary relationship is in fact one such institution, I argued that—according to Harding’s
own account—the fiduciary relationship is autonomy promoting, rather than paternalistic.
Nevertheless, I went on to argue that Harding’s analysis does not go far enough in
recognizing the full extent to which the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy. I stated
that this relationship is essential to autonomy, beyond its function simply as an “option,”
among a range other options, from which individuals can choose in the satisfaction of their
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ends. To make this stronger claim, I suggested that we reject Razian autonomy and adopt
an (arguably) more plausible relational theory of autonomy. I argued that Razian autonomy
fails to account for the essential role that relationships play in constituting the “conditions”
that make autonomous action possible. Here, I endorsed a procedural-constitutive theory
of relational autonomy. A procedural theory of autonomy accounts for the classical idea
that autonomy requires certain cognitive capacities and rational processes. A constitutive
theory of autonomy accounts for both the essential role that relationships play in the
development of autonomy (in childhood) and the ongoing of exercise of autonomy (in
adulthood). On a procedural-constitutive theory of autonomy, relationships constitute the
“background conditions” that make self-governance possible. In other words, without
various relationships (such as those with parents and professionals) our autonomy would
be severely curtailed.
It is therefore with a procedural-constitutive theory of autonomy in mind that I proposed
we understand the autonomy-promoting function of the fiduciary relationship. I argued that
fiduciary relationships comprise some of the most important relationships in the relational
web that constitute conditions that make meaningful self-governance possible. Fiduciary
relationships encompass a wide array of social and professional relationships without
which we would simply be unable to be meaningfully self-governing. Parents (or
guardians), as fiduciaries, are essential to enabling children to develop critical autonomy
skills and capacities in adulthood. Even in adulthood, however, we continue to rely on a
multitude of relationships to secure our ends and pursue meaningful projects, plans, or
causes. In complex modern societies characterized by the compartmentalization of
knowledge, skill, and expertise, many of these important fiduciary relationships are
professional in nature; teachers, doctors, lawyers, financial advisors, and other
professionals make possible the pursuit and satisfaction of our autonomous ends. Adopting
Miller’s “fiduciary powers” theory, I argued that fiduciary relationships can be helpfully
understood as a relational capacity through which individuals carry out their autonomous
wills. Through dialogue and joint deliberation, the fiduciary comes to learn not only the
beneficiary’s beliefs, values, and preferences, but also the beneficiary’s choices. In a word,
the fiduciary uses the power conferred on her by the beneficiary in determining how best
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to carry out the beneficiary’s will; by making it possible for the beneficiary to pursue her
self-directed ends, the fiduciary relationship thereby promotes her autonomy.
As mentioned, an important implication of this argument is that the fiduciary relationship
is not paternalistic. Rather, to the extent that it is the very function, or raison d’etre,259 of
the fiduciary to be a relational capacity by which autonomous agents (beneficiaries) are
able to pursue their freely chosen ends, the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy
promoting. Another implication of this argument is that, insofar as the fiduciary
relationship is essential to autonomy, it is a moral relationship. In Chapter 1, I argued that
the moral nature of the fiduciary relationship is grounded in the critical role it plays in
fostering social harmony, by enabling individuals to trust or reliably depend on one
another. The argument in this chapter could be viewed as fleshing out the argument of
Chapter 1. The fiduciary relationship fosters broad societal cooperation, and thus ultimately
social harmony, by making possible the conditions in which autonomy can flourish. When
autonomy is understood relationally, it becomes clear that autonomy and social cooperation
are inextricably linked, where one mutually reinforces the other. It is the nature and quality
of our relationships that determines the degree to which we are both autonomous and are
able to cooperate in harmony together. A society founded on cooperative relationships that
enable individuals to pursue their self-directed ends, and to live an authentic and “morally
worthwhile” life, will likely also be one in which individuals live in relative harmony.
Jointly, Chapters 1 and 2 show that the moral grounding of the fiduciary relationship lies
in the essential role it plays in promoting relational autonomy.
This understanding of the fiduciary relationship helps to mitigate the problems of both
legal-moral equivocation and paternalism. The worry about applying the normative
prescriptions of the fiduciary relationship to the ethical problems of medical and research
ethics is diminished once we recognize that this relationship is moral in nature. The worry
that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic, and therefore represents an inappropriate
ethical model for the relationship between healthcare professionals and their patients, is
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alleviated once we see the moral role that the fiduciary relationship plays in fostering
autonomy. By mitigating these two problems, I hope to have removed two important
conceptual hurdles to the widespread application of the fiduciary framework to the ethical
problems of bioethics. In the next chapter, I illustrate the practical utility of this framework
for clarifying a complex ethical issue in research ethics.
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Chapter 3

3

An Ethical Analysis of the SUPPORT Trial: Addressing
Challenges Posed by a Pragmatic Comparative
Effectiveness Randomized Controlled Trial

In the forgoing two chapters, I argued that the fiduciary relationship is an important moral
relationship, informed by an underlying moral obligation and grounded in the essential role
that the relationship plays in promoting autonomy. I argued that when we understand that
autonomy is fundamentally relational, the indispensable role that specifically fiduciary
relationships play in enabling individuals to plan, set, and pursue their self-directed ends
becomes plain.
As societies increase in complexity, so too does the compartmentalization of knowledge,
skill, and expertise, leading to profound interdependence and requiring involved systems
and institutions of social and economic cooperation. It is an inescapable feature of human
experience that we exist in relation to, and with, others. Indeed, on the proceduralconstitutive theory of relational autonomy I endorsed in the previous chapter, our
relationships comprise the very background conditions that constitute autonomy itself. In
other words, our autonomy is inextricably bound up with, and fundamentally dependent
upon, our relationships with others. Without the care and guidance of parents, teachers,
and caregivers in childhood, the “skills” and capacities necessary for autonomy would fail
to develop properly, or even at all. In adulthood, our countless relationships, with family,
friends, colleagues, professionals, and even with the state makes possible the ongoing
pursuit and achievement of our self-directed ends.
In modern complex societies, in particular, the relationality of autonomy has arguably
taken on even greater significance, requiring us to trust or depend upon others with very
specific areas of expertise or skillsets.260 These individuals, often professionals, act as
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gatekeepers to important needs and interests essential to meaningful self-governance.
Moreover, many of these individuals are fiduciaries: we authorize these individuals to act
on behalf of, and in relation to, our specific “significant practical interests.” But the scope
of this fiduciary power is delimited precisely in this way; namely, by its being authorized,
relational, and specific. It is for this reason that I argued fiduciary power is a “relational
capacity” by which a beneficiary is able to effectuate her will and pursue her significant
practical interests. “Practical interests,” in turn, implicate interests crucial to autonomy,
including interests in personality (e.g., identity), welfare (e.g., basic needs), and right (e.g.,
to equality). The role that fiduciaries play as both gatekeepers to those “significant practical
interests” necessary for meaningful self-governance, and the way in which they function
as a relational capacity by which individuals are able to pursue those interests, makes the
fiduciary relationship essential to meaningful self-governance, or autonomy. Furthermore,
by enabling individuals to trust or reliably depend on one another in the context of a specific
mode of human action, fiduciary relationships also play an important role in fostering
social harmony. I noted in the previous chapter that when we understand autonomy as
relational it becomes clear that enabling individuals to trust and depend on one another in
the pursuit of their self-directed ends, simultaneously fosters both social harmony and
individual autonomy. Together, these functions provide a foundation for the fiduciary
relationship in morality.
Recall from the Introduction that this dissertation is motivated by the promise of the
fiduciary relationship to provide conceptual clarity to the difficult ethical issues that arise
between healthcare professionals and their patients. The fiduciary relationship has already
proven auspicious in providing clarity to longstanding and sometimes heated bioethical
debates, such as those pertaining to commercial surrogacy, conscientious objection, and an
important ethical concept in research ethics known as “clinical equipoise.” 261 Given the
promise of the fiduciary relationship, this dissertation is also motivated to address two
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apparent obstacles to its widespread acceptance and application within bioethics: namely,
legal-moral equivocation and paternalism. I pointed out that equivocation and paternalism
present two substantial conceptual hurdles to the cogent use of the fiduciary relationship
as an ethical framework—specifically as applied to ethical issues that arise between
healthcare professionals and their patients. I sought to address these problems in the
previous two chapters by arguing, ultimately, that the fiduciary relationship is a moral
relationship grounded in its essential role in promoting autonomy.
In this chapter, I intend to put the fiduciary relationship to use in my own bioethical
analysis. Specifically, my goals in this chapter are twofold. First, by applying a fiduciary
analysis to a real-world debate about an ethically divisive randomized clinical trial (RCT),
known as the SUPPORT trial, I intend to provide a meaningful contribution to a particular
issue in research ethics. Second, in so doing, I aim to illustrate the practical utility of the
fiduciary relationship for clarifying ethical problems that arise in the context of healthcare
professional-patient relationships. I therefore hope to show how the fiduciary relationship
can be used for thinking clearly and systematically about the different ethical roles and
duties physicians and researchers have with respect to their patients and participants,
respectively. For instance, when we identify an individual as a “fiduciary,” they are held
to the demands of the fiduciary obligation, which, in turn, have their own ethical
implications (such as the kind of behaviour that is either prescribed, or proscribed, with
respect to the beneficiary’s interests). Alternatively, it can be equally helpful for systematic
ethical analysis to determine who is not a fiduciary, and thus not subject to the demands of
the fiduciary obligation. Accordingly, in this chapter, I argue that the ethical crux at the
centre of the debate about the SUPPORT trial concerns the question of who is a fiduciary,
who is not a fiduciary, and ultimately what that means for conceptualizing various aspects
of the SUPPORT study protocol.
Furthermore, as we will see shortly, the SUPPORT trial concerns not only parents or
guardians, but also their (nonautonomous) premature infants as potential beneficiaries, and
therefore constitutes a “hard case” for the application the fiduciary analysis I developed in
the previous two chapters. I briefly noted in the previous chapter that, for the sake of
simplicity, I would concern my analysis primarily with paradigm fiduciary relationships
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in which the beneficiary is autonomous. In other words, my argument that the fiduciary
relationship serves as relational capacity through which the beneficiary is able to pursue
her autonomous ends requires that, at the outset, the beneficiary has the requisite capacity
to authorize the fiduciary to wield her fiduciary power in the pursuit of the beneficiary’s
self-directed ends. Infants, however, clearly lack the capacity to authorize the exercise of
fiduciary power on their own behalf (although some children, not infants, may be said to
have the capacity to deny or withdraw consent for certain treatments). Moreover, lacking
autonomy, it is not clear that infants and children can even have “self-directed” ends. It
would therefore appear that where the beneficiary lacks the necessary autonomy “skills”
or capacities, the fiduciary relationship cannot be seen as an extension of the beneficiary’s
will. Accordingly, I discuss the implications of this “hard case” for my analysis of the
fiduciary relationship in this chapter.
The bulk of the remainder of this chapter is taken from a previously published co-authored
article, albeit with substantial updates and revisions to appropriately apply the analysis
developed in the previous two chapters.262 Section 3.7, in particular, has been substantially
updated and should therefore be understood as reflecting only my own views and analysis,
not those of my co-authors. To signal that shift, in section 3.7 I abandon the first-person
plural pronoun “we” (which I use throughout, save for this introduction) and adopt instead
the first-person singular pronoun “I”.
Section 3.1 begins by explaining the ethical problem posed by an innovative research
methodology, known as the pragmatic comparative effectiveness randomized controlled
trial (ceRCT), of which the SUPPORT trial is (purportedly) a token example. Section 3.2
provides important background information including the motivation for conducting the
SUPPORT trial, and the relevant details of the trial itself. Section 3.3 describes the ethical
debate that followed the publication of the results of the trial, bifurcating the various
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arguments into “defenders” and “critics” of SUPPORT. In section 3.4, we explain how the
debate fails to identify the central ethical issue raised by SUPPORT. We argue that the
central issue is whether we ought to conceptualize the SUPPORT trial interventions as
clinical research or medical practice. Accordingly, in section 3.5, we provide a brief primer
on the “research-practice” distinction and, specifically, the important role that the fiduciary
relationship plays in demarcating clinical research from medical practice. With this
groundwork laid, section 3.6 entertains the view that the SUPPORT trial interventions
ought to be conceptualized as practice. However, in section 3.7, I reject this view and
argue—using a fiduciary analysis—that the SUPPORT trial interventions ought to be
conceptualized as research. We conclude, in section 3.8, by considering the implications
of this analysis for similar ethical problems and by emphasizing the utility of the fiduciary
relationship for providing conceptual clarity to complex bioethical issues, such as those
posed by the SUPPORT trial.

3.1

Pragmatic Comparative Effective Trials

Pragmatic comparative effectiveness randomized controlled trials (ceRCTs) evaluate the
effectiveness of one (or more) interventions under real-world clinical conditions.263 The
results of ceRCTs are often directly generalizable to everyday clinical practice, providing
information critical to decision-making by patients, clinicians, and healthcare
policymakers. The PRECIS-2 framework identifies nine domains that serve to score a trial
on a continuum between very explanatory to very pragmatic.264 According to the
framework, pragmatic trials may have one or more of the following features: there are
fewer eligibility criteria for participants, in an effort to mirror the target patient population;
the implementation of study interventions occurs in real-world clinical settings; the
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intervention and its delivery do not require specialized training for clinicians or staff, and
thus allow for flexibility in how the interventions are delivered; there is no special strategy
for monitoring protocol compliance; patient monitoring and follow-up occur as in routine
clinical practice; outcomes are clinically meaningful and patient-oriented; and all
randomized patients are included in the analysis.265
The pragmatism movement in medical research has gained momentum in recent years
owing to a multitude of factors, including: increased attention to waste in medical research;
pervasive and persistent unexplained variability in clinical practice; high rates of
inappropriate care; and increased healthcare expenditures.266 Historically, the majority of
RCTs have been explanatory in design. Explanatory trials are often conducted under tightly
controlled conditions—such as with strict recruitment and monitoring practices—in order
to determine the efficacy of an intervention under ideal conditions. But treatments found
to be efficacious in explanatory settings do not always prove effective in the real world.
Accordingly, explanatory trials may fail to provide results that support decision-making by
patients, healthcare providers, research funders, and policymakers and they may, thereby,
merely contribute to research waste. Recently, there has been increasing recognition that
the need for evidence to inform healthcare decision-making requires a shift to pragmatic
ceRCTs. Reflecting this insight, ceRCTs have been identified as strategic funding priorities
by the Canadian Institute of Health Research’s Strategy for Patient-Oriented Research, and
the U.S. Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute.267
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Of particular importance for healthcare decision-making are pragmatic ceRCTs that
involve usual care interventions. Pragmatic ceRCTs of usual care interventions are a type
of comparative effectiveness trial that evaluate the effectiveness of one or more
interventions used routinely in medical practice, head-to-head. Usual care interventions, or
medically recognized standards of care, “are treatments or procedures that have been
accepted by medical experts as appropriate treatments or procedures for a given type of
disease or condition, and are commonly used by healthcare professionals.”268 Comparative
effectiveness RCTs involving usual care interventions offer an opportunity to improve
healthcare by answering clinically relevant questions about the comparative effectiveness
of treatments (or policies) used routinely in clinical practice. Through integration with costeffectiveness analyses, usual care ceRCTs can also inform decision-makers about treatment
costs in the real world. Comparative effectiveness RCTs involving usual care interventions
can therefore help to reduce variations in care, improve uptake of evidence-based practice,
reduce treatment costs, and improve patient outcomes.
All research involving human participants must conform to high scientific and ethical
standards. Contemporary research ethics is founded upon four internationally accepted
ethical principles: respect for persons, beneficence, justice, and respect for communities.
These principles serve as the ethical foundation for global guidance documents and
national regulatory frameworks.269 The principles aim, first and foremost, to protect the
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liberty and welfare interests of individual patients. (Protections for communities are a
recent innovation.) But the existing ethical and regulatory frameworks were developed
with explanatory trials in mind. The traditional ethical framework assumes a clear
distinction between research and clinical practice; the tightly controlled conditions under
which explanatory trials are designed make the demarcation of the research components
from practice components of the trial relatively straightforward. This is because the
traditional research–practice distinction assumes the domain of clinical practice is largely
autonomous and self-regulated; hence, not only is third-party review not necessary, but the
norms of the physician–patient relationship prohibit such outside interference. Conversely,
third-party review is both justified and necessary in the research domain.
But with the move towards pragmatic ceRCTs, traditional ethical guidance is more difficult
to interpret. Pragmatic ceRCTs intermingle interventions routinely used in clinical practice
with research, and this belies a straightforward distinction between research and practice.
The lack of guidance on interpreting internationally accepted research ethics principles in
the context of ceRCTs of usual care interventions has left researchers and research ethics
committees without a unified and systematic method of ethical analysis for these critically
important trials. As a result, research participants are left vulnerable to the unavoidably
capricious judgments of individual researchers and research ethics committees. This has,
in turn, led to controversies in the wake of a few ceRCTs, resulting in unnecessary and
costly delays. The absence of clear ethical guidance for ceRCTs therefore poses a practical
threat to the conduct of this socially valuable research.

Related Research Involving Humans (CIOMS (Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences), International Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research Involving Humans, 2016, accessed
April 24, 2016. http://cioms.ch/ethical-guidelines-2016/WEB-CIOMS-EthicalGuidelines.pdf); CIOMS
International Ethical Guidelines for Epidemiological Research (CIOMS (Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences), International Ethical Guidelines for Epidemiological Research, 2009,
accessed February 9, 2016.
http://www.cioms.ch/index.php/publications/printablev3/541/view_bl/65/bioethics-and-health-policyguidelines-and-other-normative-documents/47/international-ethical-guidelines-for-epidemiologicalstudies?tab=getmybooksTab&is_show_data=1), and the World Medical Association Declaration of
Helsinki (World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki, 2013, accessed February 9, 2016.
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/).
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3.2

The SUPPORT Trial

The Surfactant, Positive pressure, and Pulse Oximetry Randomized Trial (SUPPORT)
provides a timely and poignant example of the kinds of ethical controversies to which
ceRCTs give rise. Premature infants are at a substantial risk of mortality and morbidity,
including retinopathy of prematurity—an important cause of blindness—and neurological
impairment.270 Due to the incomplete development of their lungs, premature infants
commonly receive supplemental oxygen. The historical use of supplemental oxygen in
neonatology dates back to the early 1940s.271 In those early years, unrestricted or “liberal”
use of supplemental oxygen (up to 100% inspired oxygen) resulted in drastic reductions in
rates of mortality; however, underdevelopment of the lungs and eyes renders oxygen
uniquely toxic to preterm infants. Unrestricted oxygen use has since been associated with
various morbidities, such as retinopathy, neurological impairment, and lung toxicity.272
Over the past seven decades, numerous studies—both randomized and nonrandomized—
have been conducted in an effort to determine the optimal oxygen saturation range that
reduces both mortality and morbidity. On the one hand, some studies suggest that the
incidence of retinopathy may be lower in preterm infants exposed to reduced levels of
oxygenation than in those exposed to higher levels of oxygenation.273 On the other hand,
studies have also indicated that reduced levels of oxygenation may lead to increased rates
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of mortality.274 A 2009 Cochrane Review concluded that “the question of what is the
optimal target range for maintaining blood oxygen levels remains unclear, [and thus]
further research should be undertaken to resolve this important clinical question.”275 The
range of oxygen saturation used routinely in neonatology intensive care units at the outset
and during the course of the SUPPORT trial fell within a range between 85% to 95%.276
Nonetheless, as justification for their study design, the SUPPORT trial authors say that it
was “becoming common practice to use lower target ranges of oxygen saturation with the
goal of reducing the risk of retinopathy of prematurity.”277
Owing to this uncertainty, and the purported trend in clinical practice at the time, the
SUPPORT trial sought to determine the optimal saturation target levels of supplemental
oxygen in preterm infants for minimizing retinopathy without increasing adverse
outcomes, including death. The SUPPORT investigators conducted a multi-centre
randomized controlled trial, with a 2-by-2 factorial design, comparing two target levels of
oxygen saturation, and two ventilation approaches.278 The oxygen saturation component of
the trial compared a lower target range of oxygen saturation, 85% to 89%, with a higher
target range, 91% to 95%, on a composite primary outcome measure—a combination of
multiple study endpoints—of severe retinopathy of prematurity or death.279

274

K. W Cross, “Cost of Preventing Retrolental Fibroplasia?” The Lancet 302, no. 7835 (1973): 954–56;
D. P. Bolton, G. and K. W. Cross, “Further Observations on Cost of Preventing Retrolental Fibroplasia.”
The Lancet 303, no. 7855 (1974): 445–48.
275

Askie et al., “Restricted Versus Liberal Oxygen Exposure,” 381.

276

Ibid; see also, AAP ACOG (American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists), Guidelines for Perinatal Care, 6th ed. American Academy of Pediatrics, Elk Grove Village
(IL): AAP; Washington, DC (2007): ACOG.
277

SUPPORT, “Oxygen Saturation in Preterm Infants,” 1967.

278

Ibid.

279

Ibid. This paper focuses entirely on the component of the SUPPORT trial that compared the two target
levels of oxygen saturation. However, others take issue with the aspect of the trial that compared two
different ventilation approaches, continuous positive airway pressure and surfactant (see Carome, Wolfe,
and Macklin 2013; Macklin and Shepherd 2013).

118

Eligible infants included those born between 24 weeks and 28 weeks of gestation for whom
a decision to provide full resuscitation had been made.280 A total of 1316 infants were
randomized. The study was reviewed and approved by 22 research ethics committees (the
precise number of study sites is unclear), and written informed consent was obtained from
the parent or guardian of each child before delivery.281 To be clear, while parents or
guardians provided consent for trial participation, it was their premature infants who
received the study interventions (supplemental oxygen) and were therefore the study
participants.
Investigators ensured that blinding, or masking, was maintained with the use of
electronically altered-pulse oximeters.282 A pulse oximeter is a noninvasive device that
enables clinicians to continuously monitor the level of oxygen saturation in the patient’s
bloodstream. The altered-pulse oximeters showed saturation levels between 88% to 92%
for both low and high target oxygen saturations arms, with a maximum variation of 3%.
For instance, a reading of 90% corresponded to actual levels of 87% in the low-oxygen
(85% to 89%) saturation arm, and 93% in the high-oxygen saturation arm (91% to 95%)
of the trial.283 Clinicians were therefore told to maintain oxygen saturation levels between
88% and 92% with the use of the altered-pulse oximeters, ensuring that they were unaware
to which study intervention the individual patient had been randomized. In an effort to
ensure that infants were not inadvertently exposed to oxygen saturation levels beyond the
range usual care (85% to 95%), the algorithm used for the altered-pulse oximeters
gradually reverted back to actual (non-altered) values when readings were less than 84%,
or higher than 96%, in both treatment groups. As an additional safeguard, an alarm was

280

Ibid., 1961.

281

Ibid., 1960.

282

SUPPORT, “Oxygen Saturation in Preterm Infants.”

283

Ibid.

119

triggered when actual oxygen saturation levels reached 85% or lower, and 95% or
higher.284
The results of the trial showed no significant difference in the rate of the composite primary
outcome (severe retinopathy or death before discharge) between the low- and high-oxygen
saturation arms (28.3% and 32.1%, respectively; relative risk with lower oxygen saturation,
0.90; 95% confidence interval, 0.76 to 1.06; P = 0.21). However, a prospective analysis
revealed that infants in the low-oxygen saturation arm were subject to an increased risk of
death, while survivors experienced reduced rates of severe retinopathy.285 In other words,
while instances of severe retinopathy were significantly lower in infants administered low
target oxygen saturation (8.6% versus 17.9%; relative risk, 0.52; 95% CI, 0.37 to 0.73; P
< 0.001; number needed to treat, 11), mortality was significantly higher in the low target
oxygen saturation intervention, when compared with the high target oxygen saturation
intervention (19.9% versus 16.2% relative risk, 1.27; 95% CI, 1.01 to 1.60; P = 0.04;
number needed to harm, 27).286
Given the purported trend in clinical practice toward lower target ranges of oxygen
saturation in order reduce the risk of retinopathy of prematurity, the evidence from
SUPPORT “adds to the concern that oxygen restriction may increase the rate of death
among preterm infants.”287 Indeed, the results of the trial suggest that there is one
additional death for each two cases of severe retinopathy prevented. The investigators thus
concluded by urging that “caution should be exercised regarding a strategy of targeting
levels of oxygen saturation in the low range for preterm infants, since it may lead to
increased mortality.”288
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Following the publication of the trial in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2010, an
anonymous complaint was filed against the SUPPORT trial investigators, regarding what
it claimed were egregious inadequacies in the content of the informed consent documents.
In response, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections launched a formal
investigation into the SUPPORT trial. They sought to “evaluate allegations of
noncompliance with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations for
the protection of human research subjects (45 CFR part 46).”289 In conformity with a
section of U.S. regulations, known as the Common Rule, researchers are required to provide
research-participants with “a description of any reasonably foreseeable risks and
discomforts” (45 CFR 46.116(a)(2)). However, only two of the 22 approved informed
consent documents included blindness as a risk of participation in the trial, while none of
the informed consent documents disclosed death as a reasonably foreseeable risk of study
participation.
The investigators appear to have elected not to inform parents or guardians of these risks
according to the rationale that “all of the treatments proposed in the study are standard of
care, [and therefore] there is no predictable increase in risk for your baby.”290 The only risk
investigators disclosed in the “possible risks” section of the 20 informed consent
documents—those that did not list either blindness or death as research risks related to the
use of the pulse oximeter—was “the possible risk of skin breakdown at the site.”291
Upon investigation, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections concluded that “the
anticipated risks and potential benefits of being in the study were not the same as the risks
and potential benefits of receiving standard of care.”292 They argued that, “for the infants
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assigned to the upper range [. . .] the risk of ROP [retinopathy of prematurity] was greater,
while for the infants assigned to the lower range the risk of ROP was lower,” and therefore
the risks should have been disclosed to the parents or guardians of participating infants.293
The Office for Human Research Protections therefore determined “that the conduct of this
study was in violation of the regulatory requirements for informed consent, stemming from
the failure to describe the reasonably foreseeable risks of blindness, neurological damage
and death.”294

3.3

The Debate on the SUPPORT Trial

The U.S. Office for Human Research Protections determination incited considerable debate
in the literature. While the determination focused on the alleged inadequacies in the content
of the informed consent documents, the debate on the SUPPORT trial has focused
primarily on whether infants were in fact exposed to increased risk as a result of trial
participation. On the one hand, critics of the SUPPORT trial argue that various features of
the study posed an a priori (as opposed to post hoc) increase in risk to enrolled infants,
when compared with infants not so enrolled; that is, critics argue that the risks associated
with low range oxygen supplementation in preterm infants was known before the onset of
the trial, based on the previously mentioned preliminary data. On the other hand, defenders
of the SUPPORT trial argue that participation in the trial did not pose an a priori increase
in risk to enrolled infants compared to those infants treated in clinical practice as the study
inventions were standard care.

3.3.1

Critics of the SUPPORT Trial

The SUPPORT trial has garnered much criticism.295 Broadly speaking, critics of the
SUPPORT trial raise three substantive objections. First, some critics invoke the fiduciary
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relationship (or at least some of its duties), arguing that certain features of the study
compromised the fiduciary duties the physician owes to her patient. 296 They argue that
aspects of the study design and implementation violate the physician’s duty to exercise her
personal judgment in the best interests of the individual patient. George J. Annas and
Catherine L. Annas, for instance, argue that “in treatment a patient has a physician who is
bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s best interests.”297 These critics argue that
the lack of physician judgment exposed enrolled infants to increased risk compared to
patients who are not part of a research study; as fiduciaries, physicians are required to
exercise their professional judgment, and discretion, when acting on behalf of their
patient’s medical interests. Randomization to treatment protocols undermines physician
discretion and, ostensibly, increases risk to enrolled infants. Annas and Annas thus
conclude that, “the primary argument [that] . . . no new risks were introduced to the patient
is explicitly rejected by this court.”298
Second, some critics argue that the study was not appropriately designed to answer the
primary study question.299 For instance, Charles Natanson argues that in cases in which a
given standard of care is specified across a range, randomizing patients to the extremes of
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that range no longer constitutes the medical standard of care.300 He argues that this creates
“practice misalignments which carry risks and do not represent usual care.”301 This concern
was also echoed in the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections determination. They
argued that enrolled infants had a greater chance of receiving an oxygen saturation at the
low, or high, extremes of the range (i.e., 85% or 95%, respectively) that comprised the
(then-current) standard of care:
[P]articipating in the study would have significantly increased the chance of an
infant being assigned to oxygen levels at both the very low (85% to 88%) and the
very high ends (92% to 95%), as opposed to the level they would have received
[88% to 92%], had they not been in the study. (OHRP 2013, 4)
As a result, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections argued that it was “much more
likely that they [i.e., enrolled infants] would be within the range in which there were
significant concerns about increased mortality,” when compared with infants treated in
clinical practice.302 In other words, Natanson argues that the low and high oxygen
saturation range interventions do not reflect usual care, and therefore the SUPPORT trial
does not compare one or more “usual care” ranges.303
Third, and finally, some authors claim that particular features of the study design exposed
infants to additional risk over that of routine clinical practice.304 They argue, variously, that
randomization, treatment by protocol, and the use of altered-pulse oximeters ultimately
exposed infants enrolled in the SUPPORT trial to increased risks of retinopathy,
neurological damage, and death, when compared with infants not so enrolled.
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3.3.2

Defenders of the SUPPORT Trial

John Lantos, who is among the most prolific and forceful defenders of the SUPPORT trial,
disagrees with the above objections.305 Lantos argues that infants enrolled in the SUPPORT
trial were not exposed to increased risk when compared with those infants treated within
clinical practice. Lantos claims that there are ethically relevant differences between
ceRCTs of usual care interventions and randomized trials who compare a novel
intervention with a control; accordingly, he argues that new regulations are needed for
ceRCTs.
First, Lantos claims that the purpose of so-called “innovative therapy research”—i.e., a
clinical trial with a novel intervention—is different from that of ceRCTs of usual care
interventions. In the former, Lantos says the risks and benefits are “truly unknown,” and
thus the aim is to “better characterize the safety and efficacy profile of the new
treatment.”306 In ceRCTs of usual care interventions, by contrast, he says that “both
therapies are in widespread use and can be considered standard”; 307 consequently, “much
is known about them,” including knowledge about their potential harms and benefits.308
Second, Lantos notes that the therapy patients receive within a ceRCT is not appreciably
different from the therapy they would receive outside of the study. In other words, if a
patient chose not to enroll in a ceRCT comparing usual care interventions, they would
nonetheless “get the exact same treatment,” namely, the existing standard of care.309 Lantos
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argues that this is unlike a scenario in which a patient opts out of a randomized controlled
trial with a novel intervention, or, as he calls it, “innovative therapy research”; this is
because patients that opt out of a trial with a novel intervention would no longer be exposed
to the “innovative therapy” but would instead receive the existing standard of care. Finally,
Lantos argues that ceRCTs involving usual care interventions do not pose an increased risk
to study participants because the treatment arms are not appreciably different from routine
clinical practice.
Lantos therefore disagrees with critics who claim that the SUPPORT trial exposed infants
to increased risk. To those critics who argue that features of the design undermine the
physician’s fiduciary duties to her patient, Lantos responds by pointing out that “these
criticisms of SUPPORT [. . .] can be generalized as criticisms of any prospective
randomized clinical trial.”310 Accordingly, he suggests that we ought to consider how these
apparently ethically problematic aspects of the design of randomized controlled trials have
been addressed in the past.
Furthermore, Lantos suggests that concerns about treatment by protocol and the use of
altered-pulse oximeters are similarly misplaced. For instance, in their determination letter
the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections argued that
[w]hen there is a range of oxygen levels within the standard of care, clinicians (and
their institutions) often do, in fact, make their own determinations regarding which
oxygen levels within that range to employ in treating their patients. Some
physicians, recognizing the particular concerns about risks near the low (85%) and
high (95%) ends of that range, might choose to avoid one or both of those
regions.311
However, citing neonatologist Keith Barrington,312 Lantos claims that neonatologists do
not, in fact, make “decisions about oxygen saturation targets for each patient based on the
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patient’s particular clinical situation and their clinical judgment about whether a lower or
higher oxygen saturation should be targeted”; rather, “neonatologists always treat babies
by protocol.”313 Lantos thus concludes that the argument that infants were exposed to
increased risk as a result of the physician’s inability to exercise her personal judgment on
behalf of her patient, due to various features of the study design, “are particularly irrelevant
to the SUPPORT controversy.”314
Finally, Lantos rejects Natanson’s and the U.S. Office for Human Research Protection’s
claim that practice misalignments posed increased risk to enrolled infants. He says that the
standard of care does not fall neatly within the 85% to 95% range, and so, rather than
imagining that the conventional treatment at the time was to target 85[%] to 95[%],
a more accurate statement would be that, in each NICU, there was a different target
and that most of those targets were within the range 85[%] to 95[%].315
Furthermore, insofar as Natanson’s argument suggests that usual care involves the use of
a physician’s judgment on behalf of the best interests of her individual patient, Lantos
simply reiterates that the administration of oxygen for preterm infants in neonatal intensive
care units is “provided by a predetermined protocol,” precluding the need for clinician
discretion.316
Lantos concludes that concerns about the design and implementation of the SUPPORT trial
do not show that enrolled infants were exposed to increased risk. On the contrary, he argues
that the risks and benefits associated with enrollment in the trial were not appreciably
different from those associated with routine clinical practice. Indeed, Lantos says, “the
primary difference is that, outside of [ceRCTs] [. . .] the choice of a treatment is [made] by
idiosyncratic practice variation,” whereas in a ceRCT, “the treatment a patient receives is
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determined by formal randomization.”317 What is needed, according to Lantos, are
regulations that “acknowledge the distinctiveness” of ceRCTs involving usual care
interventions. He says that the aforementioned aspects of the design and implementation
of the SUPPORT trial make it “a paradigmatic case upon which to develop [such]
regulatory policy for similar studies in the future.”318

3.4
The Central Ethical Issue Raised by the SUPPORT
Trial
The debate on the SUPPORT trial has been preoccupied with interpreting U.S. regulation.
This brief overview of the overarching arguments in the debate demonstrates that
proponents and critics alike are predominantly focused on determining whether the
SUPPORT trial presented “reasonably foreseeable risks” to enrolled infants, pursuant to a
section of U.S. regulation on human participants research, known as the Common Rule (45
CFR 46.116(a)(2)). However, insofar as pragmatic ceRCTs are a global phenomenon, the
manifest preoccupation with U.S. regulation has made this debate largely irrelevant to an
international audience. This is because proponents and critics alike have failed to ground
the debate in internationally accepted ethical principles. As a result, the debate on the
SUPPORT trial has been largely ad hoc, in that it identifies a loosely related—and not
necessarily comprehensive—set of issues and fails to trace them to a central ethical
principle. As a further consequence, this debate has predictably failed to provide a
systematic analysis applicable to a broader class of pragmatic ceRCTs, based on the
relevant underlying ethical principles.
Our diagnosis is that the central ethical issue, or question, raised by the SUPPORT trial is
the following: should the SUPPORT trial interventions be conceptualized as practice, or
research? As we will see below, determining whether the trial interventions are practice or
research turns critically on whether the fiduciary obligation of healthcare professionals
responsible for treating enrolled infants is threatened or potentially undermined. To be
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clear, while it is uncontroversial that the SUPPORT trial as a whole is research, the novel
question posed by pragmatic ceRCTs involving one or more usual care interventions is
whether the usual care intervention(s) should be conceptualized as practice, or research.
The answer to this question will have important implications for the ethical analysis of
ceRCTs. Indeed, how these study interventions are conceptualized will have implications
for various downstream ethical requirements, including whether the usual care
interventions in pragmatic ceRCTs (i) fall under the purview of research ethics, (ii) undergo
harm–benefit analysis, and (iii) are included in informed consent procedures.
Determining whether the usual care interventions in pragmatic ceRCTs that compare one
or more usual care interventions constitute medical practice or clinical research is therefore
antecedent to questions pertaining to research ethics review, analysis of study benefits and
harms, and the content of informed consent procedures. In other words, questions
concerning whether the study interventions in the SUPPORT trial posed additional risk to
premature infants are subordinate to determining how the interventions ought to be
conceptualized. Determining how the usual care interventions in pragmatic ceRCTs of
usual care interventions ought to be conceptualized will therefore enable us to provide a
systematic analysis of the SUPPORT trial, grounded in the relevant foundational ethical
principles.

3.5

The Research-Practice Distinction

Broadly speaking, research “refers to a class of activities designed to develop or contribute
to generalizable knowledge,” while medical practice “refers to a class of activities designed
solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or client.”319 Contemporary
research ethics, and corresponding research regulation, have evolved in response to the
historical abuses perpetrated by researchers against research participants—including the
German wartime experiments on prisoners, the infamous Tuskegee Study, and the Jewish
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Chronic Disease Case320—in the name of furthering generalizable knowledge. Research
therefore often involves the pursuit of interests that potentially undermine those of the
individual patient: namely, the research-related interests of investigators who seek to
“develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge,” and thereby also the interests of future
patients, and society in general. Specifically, these competing interests have the potential
to undermine the physician’s fiduciary obligation to remain loyal to her patient’s best
interests, and thereby warrants prospective, and ongoing, third-party review and oversight.
According to Fried’s seminal work in research ethics (discussed in the Introduction), the
fiduciary relationship forms the primary basis upon which the medical practice and clinical
research are bifurcated into distinct ethical and regulatory domains. As we explain below,
distinguishing practice from research is the foundation upon which the current research
ethics framework is built, and from which numerous national and international research
ethics guidelines and regulations are derived.321
In medical practice, the physician—qua fiduciary—is expected to exercise their
professional knowledge, skill, and expertise, as determined by their professional judgment
and ongoing discretion, on behalf of the patient’s best medical interests. As we have seen,
the exercise of this “fiduciary power” is delimited by its being authorized, relational, and
specific, and may therefore be understood as a relational capacity of the autonomous
patient.322 Accordingly, the planning and administration of the patient’s care must involve
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a dialogue about the patient’s will, or ends, vis-à-vis her medical interests; such a dialogue
might concern patient values (e.g., religious, cultural, or spiritual), preferences (e.g.,
concerning treatment options or methods of delivery), medical history (e.g.,
contraindications), and any other relevant patient interests (e.g., a past trauma). 323 The
presumption that the physician is bound by the fiduciary obligation thereby obviates the
need for prospective ethical (or legal) oversight and review of the physician-patient
interaction. In this way, the domain of medical practice is effectively self-regulated and
autonomous: “patient consent to care and professional autonomy are intended to ensure
that the intervention in question is the product of joint deliberation and agreement between
patient and doctor” (Freedman, Fuks, and Weijer 1992, 653). In other words, the
presumption is that the medical intervention serves the patient’s interests, rather than the
doctor’s interests. Furthermore, it is the physician’s fiduciary obligation to remain loyal to
the patient’s interests, which protects the patient from the vulnerability inherent to the
structure of the physician-patient relationship. Hence, it is the fiduciary nature of the
physician-patient relationship that confers upon it its privileged (i.e., private and
confidential) status, prohibiting any prospective third-party interference. While the
physician-patient interaction may be reviewed retrospectively by a hospital, a council of
peers, an administrative tribunal, or the courts (such as in a negligence or battery suit), the
fiduciary relationship between physician and patient prohibits prior (or concurrent) review
or oversight by third parties.
By contrast, in clinical research the physician’s fidelity to her patient’s medical interests
is (at least) potentially undermined by competing research-related interests, such as those
that aim to contribute to scientific or other generalizable knowledge, the welfare of future
patients, public health, private or institutional research agendas, and corporate affiliations
or influence. For example, research often includes numerous interventions, or other aspects
of a study protocol, that are performed purely for the sake of scientific validity—and thus
in the interests of “generalizable knowledge”—such as randomization, blinding, and
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invasive or noninvasive forms of data collection (e.g., a blood draw or questionnaire).
Hence, in the research context, there is a presumption that the physician cannot be relied
upon to exercise her fiduciary power solely on behalf of the patient’s best medical interests.
When the physician can no longer be entrusted or reliably depended upon to adhere to the
demands of the fiduciary obligation, the fiduciary relationship itself dissolves, and other
prophylactic ethical precautions are necessary and justified to protect patient-participants.
It is the presumption that the demands of the fiduciary relationship can no longer be relied
upon that gives rise to the separate ethical norms and rules in the context of research. The
ethical norms and rules of research include precisely the kind of third-party oversight and
review of physician-patient relationship that is prohibited in the medical practice context,
such as review by RECs, ongoing oversight by data and safety monitoring committees, and
other research specific regulations. In a word, the fiduciary relationship demarcates
medical practical from clinical research. It is thus widely accepted that regulation, review,
and oversight are needed in research, because the medical interests of the patient are no
longer the sole interests at stake. Third-party review by research ethics committees, and
research regulations, are put into place in an effort to ensure that the interests of patientparticipants are protected in the face of competing interests and in light of the consequent
dissolution of the fiduciary relationship.
However, the distinction between research and practice is often understood as applying to
whether whole study protocols ought to be considered research or practice, and,
consequently, whether they ought to be subject to review and oversight by third parties.
But pragmatic ceRCTs that compare one or more usual care interventions introduce a new
wrinkle on this historical problem, because they comprise elements of both practice and
research. Indeed, as briefly mentioned above, no one denies that the SUPPORT trial as a
whole is research, and thus ought to be subject to research review and regulation.
Additionally, it is uncontroversial that the various features of the study design, such as
randomization, the use of masking (or blinding) with altered-pulse oximeters, and data
collection (except when using solely anonymized routinely collected data) are plainly and
unabashedly research interventions. Rather, the point of contention—and the uniqueness
of the question posed by ceRCTs, if any—is whether the usual care intervention(s) in
pragmatic ceRCTs constitute practice or research, and, accordingly, whether the usual care
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interventions ought to be regulated by the ethical norms and principles of medical practice,
or those of clinical research.

3.6
Conceptualizing the SUPPORT Trial Interventions
as Practice
What arguments might be proffered in favor of conceptualizing the SUPPORT trial
interventions as practice? To begin, both the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions
in the SUPPORT trial fell within the range recognized as “standard of care” for the
treatment of extremely preterm infants.324 Recall that a standard of care is a routine or
prevailing practice pattern within a given medical community.325 Insofar as the study
interventions in the SUPPORT trial comported with the then-current range routinely used
in neonatal intensive care units, they appear to constitute clinical practice.
As we saw above, clinical practice is largely self-regulated, and thus enjoys a degree of
professional autonomy that precludes prospective third-party review by research ethics
committees. Again, no one disputes the contention that the study as a whole is research, or
that other features of the study protocol—such as randomization, the use of masking with
altered-pulse oximeters, and data collection—are research interventions, and therefore
ought to be conceptualized as such in the ethical analysis. Rather, the claim is that the
SUPPORT trial interventions are usual care, and therefore ought to be conceived of as
practice. It follows straightforwardly, according to this view, that both the low- and highoxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial ought to be conceptualized as practice and
thus governed by the rules and norms of the fiduciary relationship between physician and
patient.
This is not an implausible view. Indeed, it is evident that Lantos, the SUPPORT trial
investigators, and the 22 research ethics committees that approved the trial, appear to have
conceptualized the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions in precisely this way,
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that is to say, as clinical practice. At the very least, they may be reasonably understood—
for the sake of ethical coherency—as being committed to such a view. This interpretation
is supported by the fact that the investigators elected not to disclose risks of mortality,
retinopathy of prematurity (at least in 20 of the 22 informed consent documents), and
neurological damage as risks of study enrollment, ostensibly because these are risks of
routine clinical practice.326
Indeed, the investigators appear to adopt just this rationale when they state in the template
used for the informed consent documents that “all of the treatments proposed in the study
are standard of care, [and therefore] there is no predictable increase in risk for your
baby.”327 In fact, with the aforementioned exception of two study sites, the only risks
investigators elected to disclose in the “possible risks” section of the informed consent
documents relate to the use of the pulse oximeter, namely, “the possible risk of skin
breakdown at the site.”328 Furthermore, it appears that all of the participating research
ethics committees endorsed this rationale as well, at least tacitly, given that they approved
the trial along with the informed consent documents that expound this reasoning. This also
includes the two sites that did include blindness as a possible risk of study participation, as
they nonetheless elected not to disclose death or neurological damage as risks of study
participation, again ostensibly reasoning that such risks are inherent to clinical practice.
This framework makes it plain that Lantos may also be more clearly, and productively,
understood as arguing that the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions in the
SUPPORT trial ought to be considered clinical practice, and therefore ought to be exempt
from third-party review and research regulation.
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Several implications follow from the contention that the SUPPORT study interventions
ought to be conceptualized as clinical practice, and not research. First, because the
administration of low and high supplemental oxygen in preterm infants is governed by the
norms of the fiduciary relationship—that is, of medical practice—these components of the
trial are appropriately exempt from research ethics committee review. Second, the
SUPPORT study interventions do not require a systematic harm-benefit analysis. Harmbenefit analysis is compulsory for all research protocols; if the study interventions are
practice, and not research, then they do not enter a research ethics committee’s deliberation
on study benefits and harms. All that remains for the research ethics committee to
determine, then, is that the risks of the research interventions are minimized consistent with
sound scientific design, and that they are reasonable in relation to the scientific knowledge
to be gained.329 Third, and finally, no information about the low- or high-oxygen saturation
interventions need be disclosed to research participants. These interventions fall within the
norms of the physician–patient relationship, and, as a result, neither the nature of the
interventions, nor their benefits and harms—including retinopathy, neurological damage,
lung toxicity, or death—need be disclosed as part of the research informed consent
procedures (of course, any “material risks” would need to be disclosed as part of the clinical
informed consent process).

3.7
Conceptualizing the SUPPORT Trial Interventions
as Research
Nevertheless, I argue here that the above view is not the correct way to conceptualize the
SUPPORT study interventions.330 By applying the fiduciary analysis developed in the
previous two chapters, I argue that the SUPPORT trial interventions are not practice, rather
they are research interventions. I begin by first discussing how the fiduciary framework
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developed in the previous chapters applies to “hard cases,” like SUPPORT, in which the
beneficiaries are not autonomous. In the next three subsections I provide three independent
reasons to believe that the low- and high-oxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial
ought to be conceptualized as research, and not practice. In each case, I argue that aspects
of the study protocol (or the interventions themselves) suggest the fiduciary relationship
between the treating neonatologist and enrolled infants is undermined. The first two
reasons may be applicable to a broader class of ceRCTs involving one or more usual care
interventions, whereas the third, and final, reason is likely specific to a particular type of
ceRCT, of which the SUPPORT trial is an exemplar. However, we leave open for future
inquiry any substantive answer to the question regarding the utility of our analysis of the
SUPPORT trial for conceptualizing other pragmatic ceRCTs.

3.7.1

A “Hard Case”: Infants as Nonautonomous Beneficiaries?

The SUPPORT trial presents a “hard case” for the application of fiduciary framework
developed in the previous two chapters. This is because I argued that the fiduciary
relationship is essentially promoting autonomy, insofar as it functions as a relational
capacity of the beneficiary’s autonomous will. The question then arises, how can the
fiduciary relationship be a relational capacity that serves to effectuate the will, or selfdirected ends, of beneficiaries who cannot effectively will anything for themselves?
Infants, children, and others lacking the “procedural” capacities often thought to be
necessary for autonomous choice or action (and thus for responsibility for those decisions
or actions), cannot be said to authorize the exercise of fiduciary power on their own behalf.
This raises questions about what implications these hard cases have for the previous
chapter’s argument that the fiduciary relationship is essential to promoting autonomy. If
some beneficiaries lack the capacity to will anything for themselves, how is it that the
fiduciary relationship can function as a relational capacity that effectuates the will, and thus
autonomy, of nonautonomous beneficiaries?
Recall that on a procedural-constitutive theory of relational autonomy the fiduciary
relationship is essential for both the development of “autonomy skills” (during childhood,
in particular) and for the ongoing exercise of autonomy into adulthood, as relationships
continue to constitute the background conditions against which the pursuit of autonomous
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ends is possible. In Chapter 2 we saw that Diana Meyers, who takes a procedural view of
relational autonomy, argues that “autonomy competence” requires certain “agentic” or
“autonomy skills.”331 At a minimum the “repertoire of skills” required for selfdetermination

include

introspective

skills,

imaginative

skills,

memory

skills,

communication skills, analytical and reasoning skills, volitional skills, and interpersonal
skills.332 Meyers also stresses the importance of “critical thinking” skills in particular. With
this in mind, and in beginning to answer the question posed above, it is perhaps fair to say
that on a procedural-constitutive theory of relational autonomy the fiduciary mandate of
parents or guardians is to foster the development of these and other important autonomy
skills in their child-beneficiaries (I will discuss infants, in particular, below). In other
words, parent-fiduciaries are tasked with promoting their child’s future autonomy interests.
While children are unable to authorize the exercise of their parents’ or guardians’ fiduciary
power, as they lack the requisite autonomy to do so, the parent-child relationship
nevertheless is (or ought to be) ultimately autonomy promoting; that is, the parent-child
relationship is such that the parent enables and facilitates the child to foster the requisite
autonomy skills and capacities in order to become autonomous. If the parent-fiduciary is
successful, the child-beneficiary will develop into an adult with the capacities necessary to
set and pursue their own practical interests (with or without the aid of other fiduciaries).
Indeed, this idea is given some support by the fact that, in law, where parents or guardians
fail to perform their fiduciary obligation (e.g., as a result of abuse or neglect), when the
child comes of age, they may have cause to bring legal action against their parent(s) or
guardian(s) for breach of fiduciary duty. In other words, once the child-beneficiary
becomes an autonomous adult, they are in a position to do a post hoc assessment to
determine whether their autonomy interests were promoted by their parent-fiduciaries.333
Alternatively, through child welfare services, the state (acting as fiduciary to the child),
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may intervene to protect and promote the child’s “best interests.” In this way, parents or
guardians (including the state) may be said to serve as a kind of proxy for the child’s future
autonomy interests; that is, until the child develops a minimum level of the requisite skills
and capacities to set, determine, and pursue their own self-directed ends.
However, while this may be true of the parent- or guardian-child relationship, it is likely
not entirely true of the parent-infant relationship—which is of particular relevance to the
SUPPORT trial. Infants are simply too young for parents or guardians to begin to develop
the repertoire of skills important to the exercise of their future autonomy. How, then, can
parent-fiduciaries be said to promote their infant-beneficiaries’ autonomy through the
exercise of their fiduciary power? As fiduciaries, parents or guardians are clearly still
obligated to remain loyal to their infant-beneficiary’s best interests. As with childbeneficiaries, this will no doubt include infant-beneficiaries’ future autonomy interests.
Parent-fiduciaries foster the child-beneficiaries future autonomy interests by developing
important autonomy skills. With infant-beneficiaries, however, parent-fiduciaries promote
their autonomy by making decisions for them in a way that keeps their future open to their
own autonomous decision making.334 In this way, parent-fiduciaries are still proxy decision
makers for infant-beneficiaries in much the same way they are for child-beneficiaries. The
difference is that the relevant interests of the infant-beneficiaries over which parentfiduciaries exercise their fiduciary power are broader than those of child-beneficiaries.
These will likely include many of those decisions relating to post-natal (and perhaps even
pre- and peri-natal) care that have a foreseeable and/or appreciable impact on infants’
physical and psychological development and may therefore be said to materially affect
(positively or negatively) infants’ future ability make important decisions relating to
identity formation and other aspects of self-determination.335
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While other fiduciaries in an infant or child’s life, such as caregivers, teachers, and
healthcare professionals, no doubt also play a role in promoting the child’s future autonomy
interests, parent- or guardian-fiduciaries appear to play a unique role as proxy to their
infant- or child-beneficiary’s interests across all other of their fiduciary relationships.
Namely, while the healthcare professional is no doubt a fiduciary to the infant or child
themselves (i.e., tasked with acting on behalf of their best medical interests) as proxy to the
child’s future autonomy interests the parent- or guardian fiduciary is tasked with engaging
in dialogue and joint-deliberation with the healthcare professional in the infant or child’s
stead (and on their behalf). The exercise of the parent or guardian’s fiduciary power is
therefore more substitutive than those of other of the infant or child’s fiduciary
relationships. As we saw in the previous chapter, fiduciary power is always substitutive—
to a degree. The substitutive nature of fiduciary power is delimited by its being authorized,
relational, and specific. Recall also that it is the delimited nature of fiduciary power that
ultimately renders the exercise of that power a means, or relational capacity, of the
beneficiary’s autonomous will. The problem, again, is that infant and children (and other
nonautonomous individuals) lack the capacity to authorize the fiduciary’s substitutive
power. Nevertheless, the substitutive nature of fiduciary power arguably remains delimited
in this case in both its relationality (i.e., it’s being exercised on behalf of the beneficiary)
and its specificity (i.e., its being exercised with respect to specific interests), albeit less so
than with autonomous beneficiaries. Accordingly, the substitutive nature of fiduciary

autonomy skills to the maximum degree possible. Aside from practical constraints, such as time, economic,
emotional and other resources, it seems to me that attempting to maximize autonomy in this way bumps up
against parents’ or guardians’ own autonomy interests, and it’s not clear to what extent a parent-fiduciary
might be required to “sacrifice” their own autonomy for that of their child-beneficiary. I imagine that the
positive duties of parents in this regard will be context dependent, taking into account factors like time and
resources, as well as the parent’s own degree of autonomy. It’s possible that there will be different
“standards of care” parent-fiduciaries will be required to meet that correspond to these differing contextual
factors. This, of course, also raises difficult and controversial questions about parents’ own subjective
views about how, and to what extent, they ought to intervene to promote a child’s future autonomy
interests. For example, some parents may believe (e.g., for religious or societal reasons) that male or female
circumcision (sometimes called genital mutilation) serves their child’s future autonomy interests (e.g., by
making them a more desirable spouse as informed by certain socio-cultural or religious beliefs). Other
examples include decisions over whether to vaccinate, or to seek traditional versus “Western” forms of
medical care for one’s infant or child. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I bracket these
controversial issues.
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power appears to be of a greater degree in the parent-infant (and child) relationship. In
brief, as proxy to the infant- or child-beneficiary’s future autonomy interests, parentfiduciaries exercise their greater substitutive capacity, to authorize fiduciary power in the
context of all other fiduciary relationships that the infant or child may enter into, on their
behalf. In other words, as proxies, parent-fiduciaries consent to the exercise of fiduciary
power on behalf of their infant child-beneficiaries’ future autonomy interests.
This analysis suggests that the complexity of the SUPPORT trial controversy is in part
attributable to the tripartite fiduciary relationship at play: namely, that between (i)
physician and biological mother (qua patient); (ii) physician and infant (qua patient) and
parent or guardian (qua proxy); and (iii) parent or guardian and infant (qua proxy and
fiduciary). It was parents (or guardians) who were approached and solicited for study
enrolment by their physicians. Nevertheless, it was on behalf of their infants that consent
for trial participation was sought, and it was the infants who ultimately received the study
interventions (i.e., low or high saturations of supplemental oxygen). Finally, it was the
treating neonationalists, as fiduciaries, that carried out the study interventions on enrolled
infants. Ethical analysis of the SUPPORT trial therefore must consider each of these
relationships and the implications of each for conceptualizing elements of the study
protocol, including the trial interventions. However, as the infants are, ultimately, the
research-participants of the SUPPORT trial the bulk of the ethical analysis will concern
the relationship between physician (in this case, the treating neonatologist) and enrolled
infants. The fiduciary relationship between physician and parent (e.g., during the
biological mother’s pre- and post-natal care) and between parent(s) or guardian(s) and
infant appears to remain largely unchanged by the SUPPORT trial protocol—save for the
way in which the physician solicits the parent(s) or guardian(s) consent for trial
participation on behalf of the infant.
As proxy to the infant, it appears that parental or guardian consent to participate in the trial
will largely depend on how the trial interventions are presented by the enrolling physician.
How the risks of enrollment in the SUPPORT trial are portrayed to parents or guardians
will no doubt affect how they choose to act on behalf of their babies, such as whether to
provide their proxy consent. As we just saw above, the parent(s) or guardian(s) proxy
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decision will aim to promote the infant’s autonomy by attempting to ensure that the future
remains open for his or her decision making. In this case, the proxy decision that parents
or guardians are being asked to make on behalf of their babies concerns a trade-off between
the possibility of blindness or death—needless to say, both of these options clearly affect
the future of prospectively enrolled infants future autonomy.
But, as we saw above, whether or not risks of blindness or death are disclosed as risks of
research to parents or guardians as proxy decision makers will depend on whether study
interventions are conceptualized as practice, or research. If the trial interventions are
conceptualized as practice, the physician will not disclose the risks of blindness and death
as risks of trial of participation. Alternatively, if the interventions are conceptualized as
research, risks of blindness and death must be disclosed to parents or guardians as possible
risks of trial participation. As we also saw, whether the interventions are conceptualized as
research or practice depends in turn on the integrity of the fiduciary relationship between
healthcare professional and patient; namely, whether the fiduciary’s obligation to remain
loyal to the beneficiary’s best interests is potentially undermined by other research-related
interests. As the relationship between physician and biological mother, and parent or
guardian and baby, remains largely unchanged by the SUPPORT trial, the answer to this
question must look at the way in which the SUPPORT trial does, or does not, undermine
the treating neonatologist’s fiduciary obligation of loyalty to enrolled infants. Accordingly,
in the next three sections, I identity three independent reasons that suggest the SUPPORT
trial interventions should be conceptualized as research.

3.7.2

The First Reason: Randomization Interferes with the
Discretionary Judgment of the Physician

The interventions in the SUPPORT trial ought to be conceptualized as research because,
contra Lantos, the enrolled infants are deprived of the benefit and protection of the
discretionary judgment of their physician. In the neonatal intensive care unit, very
premature infants are prescribed oxygen therapy by their treating neonatologist who, as
demanded by the fiduciary obligation, must rely upon her professional judgment, or
discretionary power, to prescribe the best treatment for the child. Professional judgment,
derived (as it is) from professional knowledge, skill, or expertise, is a portmanteau
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comprising a multiplicity of considerations, including: an individual infant’s diagnosis and
prognosis; the medical history of the infant’s biological parents; the values or preferences
articulated by the infant’s parent(s), or guardian(s); the oxygen saturation range routinely
used in the neonatal intensive care unit; the state of evidence in the literature on the benefits
and harms of oxygen treatment; and past experience—including the experience of
colleagues—in the treatment of similar infants. It is worth emphasizing here that, pace
Lantos, neonatologists do—and, indeed, must—exercise their professional judgment
whether or not that judgment is constrained by a defined protocol. As just illustrated, the
range of oxygen saturation routinely used in a neonatal intensive care unit is but one of
many factors that neonatologists must consider when treating extremely premature infants.
Therefore, even if neonatologists did follow a prescribed protocol for supplemental oxygen
blindly, this would not thereby alleviate them from their fiduciary obligation to exercise
their discretionary judgment over other relevant aspects of their patient’s care.
Furthermore, even within a protocolized range, neonatologists must still use their discretion
to determine what subset of that defined range is appropriate for a given infant, again in
light of all other relevant considerations. This argument is expounded in more detail below.
As we saw in the previous chapter, in paradigm fiduciary relationships, it is through a
process of joint deliberation and dialogue with the beneficiary that the fiduciary comes to
learn the beneficiary’s beliefs, values, goals, and preferences and, ultimately, the
beneficiary’s choice. It is important to emphasize that the fiduciary exercises their
knowledge, skill, or expertise in pursuit of those ends chosen by the beneficiary. During
this dialogue the fiduciary also provides the beneficiary with any information necessary or
relevant that might aid the beneficiary in coming to an informed decision about how best
to achieve their chosen ends or pursue their interests. In this way the fiduciary functions as
a relational capacity through which the beneficiary effectuates their own will—it is in this
way that the fiduciary relationship promotes autonomy. Of course, as discussed above, in
the case of SUPPORT—where the patient-beneficiaries are nonautonomous—this dialogue
will occur between the physician and the parent or guardian who acts simultaneously as
both fiduciary and proxy for their baby. Again, how the SUPPORT trial interventions are
portrayed, and thus the manner in which consent is sought, will depend on whether the low
and high oxygen saturation arms are considered practice or research. How the study
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interventions are conceptualized will, in turn, depend on how infants (as the study
participants) come to receive treatment in the context of the SUPPORT trial. Specifically,
the physician’s fiduciary obligation to exercise their discretionary power on behalf of the
best medical interests of a premature infant under their care ought to be guided by joint
deliberation and dialogue with the parents or guardians (as proxies) of the infant patient.
This is what it means for the physician-fiduciary to be loyal to the medical interests of any
patient-beneficiary.
Applying this analysis to the SUPPORT trial, it becomes clear that very premature infants
come to receive treatment differently than they do in usual medical practice. Infants
enrolled in the study do not come to receive supplemental oxygen by means of the
discretionary judgment of their treating physician. Rather, infants are allocated randomly
to either of the low- or high-oxygen saturation arms of the trial. Indeed, one of the primary
purposes of randomization is to prevent a physician from exercising her discretionary
judgment—and thus fiduciary obligation—on behalf of the patient.336 Randomization is a
feature of the study protocol designed to prevent the bias that physician judgment
introduces, and thereby enhance the validity of the study. It therefore promotes the interests
of research—viz., the promotion of, or contribution to, generalizable knowledge—but at
the expense of individualized care for the patient afforded by physician discretion.
To illustrate, suppose that the SUPPORT trial was a non-randomized study, thereby
allowing neonatologists to exercise their discretionary judgment when assigning premature
infants to either low- or high-oxygen saturation arms of the trial. Neonatologists are (or
ought to be) aware of the body of research that suggests that a lower target range of oxygen
saturation may reduce incidences of retinopathy but may also be associated with increased
mortality.337 How then, on the basis of such knowledge, would a neonatologist make
treatment allocation decisions for her various infant patients? Faced with an infant with a
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substantial chance of mortality, it is likely that the clinician will assign this infant to the
high-oxygen saturation arm of the trial to maximize her chances of survival—again, based
on the best available evidence. Conversely, faced with an infant with a relatively good
prognosis, it is likely that the clinician will assign her to the low-oxygen saturation arm, in
an effort to reduce the risk of retinopathy. As this non-randomized trial progresses, it is
evident that the sickest infants will comprise a disproportionate number of the high-oxygen
saturation arm, and the healthier infants will comprise a disproportionate number of the
low-oxygen saturation arm. But what can be inferred about the low- and high-oxygen
saturation interventions at the conclusion of this non-randomized trial? The answer, of
course, is nothing. Physician judgment completely confounds the study interventions with
respect to the study outcome. Individual physician discretionary judgment compromises
the internal validity of the trial, and randomization is therefore necessary to allow valid
inferences to be drawn.
The SUPPORT study interventions therefore ought to be conceptualized as research
because the “dose” of oxygen therapy is determined by means of randomization, not by the
physician’s professional discretionary judgment, as required of her as a fiduciary to her
infant patient. Randomization is a feature of the trial employed to promote internal
scientific validity, and thus further the interests of research (i.e., to contribute to
generalizable knowledge). The introduction of this competing interest undermines the
physician’s duty to exercise her discretionary judgment in the interests of her patient; that
is, to remain loyal in the exercise of her fiduciary power to her patient’s best medical
interests.
The introduction of this competing interest in the pursuit of scientific knowledge
undermines physician judgement, the very knowledge, skill, or expertise that patientbeneficiary’s employ healthcare professionals to further their chosen medical ends. The
otherwise privileged relationship between physician and patient—indeed, whose very
privilege is afforded by the norms and duties of the fiduciary relationship—is undermined
by the pursuit of research related interests which aim promote generalizable knowledge
and ultimately the interests of future patients. Thus, the physician can no longer be trusted
or reliably depended upon to remain loyal to the best medical interests of their patient—to
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effectuate the patient’s will. Indeed, we saw above that it is precisely for this reason that
research, as a moral domain separate from that of medical practice, is governed by its own
norms and rules. When the physician, qua fiduciary, can no longer be entrusted to exercise
their discretionary judgment on behalf of the best medical interests of the patient,
“strangers at the bedside”—in the form of research ethics committees, data and safety
monitoring boards, and research regulations—are both warranted and necessary to protect
the autonomy and welfare interests of those patients participating in research.338
Accordingly, the SUPPORT study interventions must be considered research, rather than
practice.

3.7.3

The Second Reason: Masking in the SUPPORT Trial Impairs
the Ability of Physicians to Exercise Discretion on Behalf of
their Patients

The second reason, related to the first, that the SUPPORT trial interventions ought to be
conceptualized as research is because the physician’s ability to continuously monitor,
reassess, and adjust the prescribed oxygen therapy administered to a premature infant is
compromised by altered-pulse oximeters. Again, in the context of medical practice, the
fiduciary’s obligation to remain loyal to the beneficiary’s best interests protects against the
abuse, misuse, neglect, or exploitation of the beneficiary. Neglect, in particular, implicates
the discretionary element of fiduciary power. It demands, among other things, that the
fiduciary remain vigilant in the performance of their duties. Hence, in this section I suggest
that the use of altered-pulse oximeters in the SUPPORT trial undermines—or at the very
least, threatens—the physician’s ability to actively and continuously exercise discretion on
behalf of the best medical interests of the infant patients entrusted to their care.
In clinical practice, extremely premature infants are prescribed oxygen therapy by means
of the treating neonatologist’s exercise of their professional judgment (in consultation with
parents or guardians as proxy decision makers), which, as we saw above, takes into
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consideration a multitude of factors. However, the neonatologist is not thereby relieved of
her fiduciary obligations to the premature infant under her care simply through this onetime exercise of professional judgment. In other words, a neonatologist entrusted with the
care of a premature infant does not simply set the oxygen saturation at a certain level and
“forget it.” Rather, the neonatologist must continue to employ their discretion as they care
for a premature infant. In practice, the neonatologist will continuously and closely monitor
the medical condition of a premature infant under her care. For instance, an infant may
begin to have trouble breathing, or display other signs of respiratory distress, in which case
the neonatologist will likely increase the level of oxygen saturation. Conversely, aware of
the evidence that a higher range of oxygen therapy may be correlated with increased risk
of retinopathy, the neonatologist might decrease the level of the oxygen saturation for an
infant that appears to be doing particularly well. In fact, extremely premature infants will
often require weeks, or even months, of such discretionary monitoring on the part the
treating clinician.
The fiduciary obligation requires ongoing clinician judgment—or the exercise of
discretion—on behalf of the beneficiary’s best interests. Again, the discretionary element
of fiduciary power demands of the treating physician that she be vigilant in the pursuit of
the patient’s medical interests; this, in turn, requires of them to use discretion as they
continuously assess and reassess the patient’s condition. By entrusting the pursuit of their
medical ends to the physician, the patient is left vulnerable to the risk that the physician
will neglect their interests by simply failing to exercise her (the physician’s) professional
judgment, either in whole or in part. It is the patient’s vulnerability to neglect, abuse,
misuse, or exploitation of fiduciary power that gives rise to the uniquely demanding
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the patient’s medical interests.339 In other words, in carrying
out the patient’s autonomously chosen ends (in this case, as decided by a proxy parent or
guardian) the physician-fiduciary is obligated use their ongoing discretion in wielding their
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fiduciary power on behalf of—and in their role as relational capacity of—the patient. The
ongoing exercise of discretion, as demanded by the fiduciary obligation, prohibits the
physician from utterly neglecting the patient’s interests, delegating their discretionary
authority to another, or from otherwise fettering away their discretion in any way. In other
words, the fiduciary obligation requires of the physician that she actively and continually
exercise her discretionary powers.
In the SUPPORT trial, by contrast, the study interventions are administered to extremely
premature infants in a way that deprives them of the benefit and protection of the treating
physician’s ongoing discretion. Masking with altered-pulse oximeters was employed to
ensure that physicians were unaware of the actual oxygen saturation levels being
administered to premature infants in the SUPPORT trial. In other words, the pulse
oximeters were altered to impair the physician’s ability to accurately monitor, assess, and
reassess an infant’s medical condition. Importantly, this was—yet again—done to promote
the internal validity of the trial by seeking to ensure a clear separation between low- and
high-oxygen saturation interventions. Indeed, a clear separation between the study
interventions is crucial to any “good experiment.” Without masking it would have been
extremely difficult to achieve a separation between the treatment arms. Had masking not
been used, physicians may have tended to increase the dose of oxygen for infants in the
low-oxygen saturation arm, with the effect of making infants’ oxygen saturation levels
similar (Cortés-Puch et al. 2016).
In fact, the SUPPORT trial investigators encountered precisely this problem during the
early enrolment phases of the trial:
When 247 infants had been enrolled, enrollment was temporarily suspended on the
basis of the recommendation of the data and safety monitoring committee and the
decision of the director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development because of concern that readings of levels of oxygen saturation often
exceeded the target levels. (SUPPORT Study Group 2010, 1964)
Altered-pulse oximeters were employed to ensure that infants enrolled in the SUPPORT
trial received the treatment mandated by the study protocol, not physician discretion, by
hindering neonatologists from adjusting the oxygen infants received based on continuing
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assessments of their condition. Evidently, this feature of the SUPPORT trial serves the
interests of research. But it does so by depriving enrolled infants of the benefit and
protection of the clinician’s ongoing professional judgement and discretion, as she
continues to care for, and promote, the medical best interests of her patients. The use of
masking in the SUPPORT trial therefore also introduces a competing interest—namely,
the promotion of reliable generalizable knowledge—that undermines the physician’s duty
to exercise her discretion. Again, insofar as the fiduciary norms of clinical practice have
been violated in this way, there is strong justification for conceptualizing the SUPPORT
trial interventions as research.

3.7.4

The Third Reason: Low- and High-Oxygen Saturation
Interventions Are Not Usual Care

The third, and final, reason that the low- and high-oxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT
trial ought to be conceptualized as research, and not practice, is that one or both of the
study interventions are not in fact usual care. Recall that this reason is specific to a
particular type of pragmatic ceRCT involving one or more usual care interventions, of
which the SUPPORT trial is a token example: namely, in those cases where the usual care
treatment is characterized by a range, or continuum, the bifurcation and subsequent
randomization of research participants to protocolized subsets of that range, no longer
constitutes usual care. 340 Usual care for the administration of supplemental oxygen in
preterm infants is a range between 85% and 95%.341 However, the interventions in the
SUPPORT trial did not comprise this full range; rather, enrolled infants were delegated to
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subsets (i.e., 85% to 89% and 91% to 95%) of that range. The bifurcation of the range of
supplemental oxygen routinely used in neonatal intensive care units to low and high subsets
of that range constitutes a meaningful deviation from, or alteration to, medical practice for
the ends of research. Indeed, this is true even if a neonatal intensive care unit follows a
protocol that is equivalent to one of the SUPPORT trial interventions (e.g., 85% to 89%),
as the unit of randomization is the patient, not the centre. Consequently, even if a centre’s
protocolized range of oxygen therapy for preterm infants corresponds with one of the study
arms, the infants in that centre would be randomized to both ranges, and thus be exposed
to a range that is not usual care for that centre. In their Draft Guidance on Disclosing
Reasonably Foreseeable Risks in Research Evaluating Standards of Care (2014), the U.S.
Office for Human Research Protections makes a similar point.
When a research study assigns the specific version of the accepted standards of care to be
used, it is almost certain that at least some of the subjects will receive a different standard
of care than they would have received if not participating in the research. Indeed, in the
common study design where subjects are randomized equally between two treatments,
approximately half of the subjects will be assigned to a treatment different from what they
would have otherwise received. Insofar as these are alterations to clinical practice for the
sake of contributing to generalizable knowledge—a competing interest—third-party
review and regulatory oversight, separate from that of clinical practice, is both warranted
and required.
The bifurcation of the standard of care range of supplemental oxygen introduces potential
risks and benefits distinct from those inherent to routine clinical practice. In this case, the
risks and benefits of receiving the low-oxygen saturation arm are manifestly different from
the risks and benefits of receiving high-oxygen saturation—as over seven decades of
preliminary data portend (albeit evidence not strong enough to change clinical practice). In
their determination letter, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections pointed out that
concerns in the research and clinical community about the differential risks and benefits of
the low and high target ranges of supplemental oxygen on preterm infants was a “core
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reason why the study was conducted.”342 Moreover, they stated that it was clear that the
SUPPORT trial investigators were aware of such concerns, having “identified the
important need for a large randomized study with sufficient power to detect differences in
mortality rates of 5% or greater.”343 As previously mentioned, Charles Natanson provides
a similar argument.344 It is clear that the risks and benefits of both the low- and the highoxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial differ from the risks and benefits of the full
range, or the de facto usual care range. This is because in routine clinical practice
neonatologists are able to employ the full range (85% to 95%) of supplemental oxygen,
again, subject to their professional judgment and ongoing discretion in response to the
medical needs of each individual infant (as illustrated by Cortés-Puch and colleagues,
below).
To illustrate this important point, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protections provides
a salient example:
It is known that treatment using surgery and radiation has a high likelihood of
curing a particular form of childhood cancer, but that the radiation produces a
significant risk of other cancers developing later in the child’s life. Consequently,
some doctors treating children with this cancer use a smaller amount of
radiation. Both amounts of radiation are consistent with clinical care guidelines and
considered to be within the standard of care. There is little evidence available
comparing the outcomes of the two treatments in terms of their cure rates or the
development of later cancers. A randomized clinical trial is proposed with subjects
to be assigned to treatment with the higher or lower amount of radiation to compare
the effectiveness of the two treatments in curing the current cancer and how often
later cancers occur.345
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It is plain that the different ranges of treatment routinely used for childhood cancer in this
hypothetical example carry differential risks. Moreover, it is precisely the purpose of the
study to empirically validate those risks. In other words, participants are exposed to risks
that they may not otherwise have been exposed to outside of the study, precisely for the
sake of contributing to generalizable knowledge. The Office for Human Research
Protections agrees, stating that the “particular risks that the subjects will be exposed to
because of being assigned to a specific standard of care are risks the subjects will be
exposed to for the sake of the research.”346
Recall that Lantos claims “neonatologists always treat babies by protocol,” which is
assigned by each neonatal intensive care unit, “based on their assessment of the evidence
about the harms and benefits of oxygen levels that are too high or too low.”347 Accordingly,
Lantos claims a neonatologist does not in fact exercise her professional judgment over the
medical interests of the infant over whose care she is presiding. He thus concludes that the
risks and benefits of protocolization to either the low- or high-oxygen saturation arms in
the SUPPORT trial are not appreciably different from risks and benefits inherent to clinical
practice.
Firstly, Lantos’s argument is simply orthogonal to the concern that allocating infants to
low and high target ranges carries differential risks. While it may indeed be true that
neonatologists treat infants according to a predefined protocol, this does not alleviate the
concern that the bifurcation of the usual care range of supplemental oxygen into discrete
(low and high) subsets of that range carries differential risks to enrolled infants, when
compared to those infants not so enrolled. In other words, it may indeed be a fact that
neonatologists treat infants according to a defined protocol, but no particular neonatal
intensive care unit protocolizes infants to both low and high extremes of the usual care
range in order to achieve a quasi-random distribution.
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Secondly, and more importantly, it does not follow from the claim that neonatologists treat
infants in neonatal intensive care units according to protocol that they consequently do not
exercise their professional judgment, or that they therefore follow the protocol without
exception or mindlessly. On the contrary, even if neonatologists treat infants according to
predetermined parameters, this nonetheless does not exclude the exercise of professional
judgment and ongoing discretion. The neonatologist’s fiduciary obligation to exercise her
professional judgment on behalf of the medical interests of the premature infants under her
care obviously persists within the constraints of a predefined protocol. Moreover, where
the evidence base is weak, nonexistent, or even at odds with a centre’s standard of care,
physicians must consider whether they ought to observe the prescriptions of the protocol
at all. The physician’s fiduciary obligation to exercise her professional judgment on behalf
of her patient’s best interests demands that her discretion is informed by the domain of
“professional knowledge” and by virtue of which she is a fiduciary. Indeed, this specialized
knowledge, skill, or expertise is the very reason for which her services are sought, and
which help to define the scope of her fiduciary mandate.
To illustrate, suppose a neonatal intensive care unit has mandated that neonatologists
prescribe a range of oxygen therapy for extremely premature infants between 85% and
89%. Suppose, further, that a neonatologist finds herself entrusted with the care of a baby
with a particularly poor prognosis. Aware of the most recent evidence in the literature that
suggests an association between low-oxygen saturation treatment and mortality, the
neonatologist may reasonably judge that a higher range of oxygen saturation—outside of
the protocolized range mandated by his neonatal intensive care unit—is appropriate in this
case. The duty to provide individualized care—based on discretionary judgment—to her
patient not only permits the neonatologist to act on such a judgment, it obliges her to. This
is especially true when the state of evidence with respect to those ranges is one of
“equipoise,” or uncertainty. It is perhaps an unhappy reality of clinical practice that
physicians are required to make clinical decisions in the face of such uncertainty (albeit in
collaboration with, and with consent from, their patients). Fried recognized this feature of
medical practice, arguing that “the doctor must be given considerable latitude as he [sic]
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works in the presumed interests of his patient.”348 As we saw above, medical practice
requires physicians to exercise their professional discretionary judgment; this obligation
extends even to treatments that carry substantial risk, so long as the treatments in question
fall within the accepted standard of care, as well as the body of professional knowledge
that defines both the scope and content of a physician’s knowledge, skill, or expertise qua
professional. The claim that individualized physician judgment and discretion are
somehow obviated, or negated, by the protocolization of a treatment is clearly false.
Finally, a study by Cortés-Puch and colleagues found that the low target oxygen saturation
arm in the SUPPORT trial (85% to 89%) was not in fact consistent with usual care.349
Cortés-Puch and colleagues “sought to determine whether each oxygen target as studied in
SUPPORT and four similar randomized controlled trials (RCTs) was consistent with usual
care.”350 They conducted a literature review to establish the range that constituted usual
care concurrent to these five clinical trials. This review uncovered a prospective,
observational study, known as the AVIOx study. The AVIOx study collected robust data
on oxygen exposure in extremely premature infants, who, importantly, would have
satisfied the primary enrollment criteria for the SUPPORT trial (Hagadorn et al. 2006). The
study enrolled 84 infants across 14 neonatal intensive care units in the U.S., U.K., and New
Zealand; eligible infants included those who were born at less than 28 weeks gestation, and
for whom oxygen therapy was required.351
The comparison of low and high target ranges of supplemental oxygen in the SUPPORT
trial with those used in the AVIOx study revealed that while the high target range (91% to
95%) was consistent with usual care, the low target range (85% to 89%) was “lower and
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narrower than those applied during usual care” (Cortés-Puch et al. 2016, 4). The upper limit
of the low target range used in the SUPPORT trial was 89%, while the AVIOx study
showed that the upper limit of usual care was between 92% and 98%. Moreover, the low
target range in the SUPPORT trial was narrower than comparably low target ranges used
in clinical practice (e.g., 85%); this is because, in clinical practice low target ranges are
always coupled with higher target ranges (e.g., 98%) than the upper limit of the low-oxygen
saturation intervention in the SUPPORT trial allowed (i.e., 89%):
During usual care, similar lower limits (< 88%) were universally paired with higher
upper limits ( 92%) and providers skewed achieved oxygen saturations toward the
upper-end of these intended ranges.352
In other words, the wider range characteristic of usual care results in achieved (i.e., median)
values of supplemental oxygen that was higher than the upper limit of the low intervention
arm in the SUPPORT trial. The authors conclude that, “the low range (85 to 89%) was not
used outside of the SUPPORT trial,” and therefore was not consistent with usual care.353
The implication of this finding is that the SUPPORT trial was not, in fact, a comparison of
two usual care interventions, but rather it involved one (or more) novel interventions. We
argued above that the bifurcation of a usual care range no longer constitutes usual care, as
the benefits and harms associated with each subset of that range differ from the full range.
Indeed, the purpose of the SUPPORT trial was to evaluate the benefits and harms
associated with low and high ranges of supplemental oxygen. This challenges the very idea
that the SUPPORT trial involved the comparison of any usual care interventions: rather, it
compared two novel interventions. This analysis may apply to other pragmatic ceRCTs
that compare subsets of a usual care treatment, characterized by a range. Moreover,
regardless of whether one agrees with our contention that the bifurcation of a usual care
range no longer constitutes usual care, Cortés-Puch and colleagues make it clear that the
low-oxygen saturation arm was not, in fact, routine medical practice. We therefore
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conclude that the SUPPORT trial interventions ought to be conceptualized as research, not
practice.

3.7.5

Implications of Conceptualizing
Interventions as Research

the

SUPPORT

Trial

Several implications follow straightforwardly from the determination that low- and highoxygen saturation arms in the SUPPORT trial ought to be conceptualized as research. First,
both the low- and high-oxygen saturation interventions require third-party review and
regulatory oversight by research ethics committees. There is consensus among national and
international research ethics guidelines that human participants in research be submitted
to, and approved by, a research ethics committee. Research ethics committee review
safeguards the autonomy and welfare interests of research participants and ensures that
national and international ethics standards are upheld. As the SUPPORT study
interventions clearly fall within the domain of research, a research ethics committee ought
to review and approve them.
Second, the study interventions must undergo harm–benefit analysis. The need for harm–
benefit analysis is grounded in the ethical principal of beneficence, which requires that the
welfare interests of human research participants are protected, and, where possible,
promoted. Benefit–harm analysis requires that the low- and high-oxygen saturation
interventions satisfy clinical equipoise. Clinical equipoise is an ethical precondition for
enrolling patients in a randomized clinical trial;354 it states that there must exist “an honest,
professional disagreement among expert clinicians about the preferred treatment.”355 As
discussed above, the optimal oxygen saturation range for the treatment of extremely
premature infants is unknown, and a Cochrane review of the evidence base concluded that
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“further research should be undertaken to resolve this important question.”356 The
empirical evidence available before or at the start of the SUPPORT trial therefore suggests
that the study interventions fulfill the ethical requirement of clinical equipoise. In other
words, as far as the domain of professional knowledge is concerned—based in large part
on the availability and robustness of empirical evidence—physicians (as professionals)
would be uncertain as to the most effective treatment, thereby satisfying the ethical
precondition for soliciting enrollment of patients in a clinical trial.
Third, the details of the study interventions must be disclosed in the informed consent
process. The principle of respect for persons underlies the doctrine of informed consent,
and ensures that the autonomy rights of human research participants are respected: that is
to say, patients or their substitute decision makers must be afforded the opportunity to make
free and informed choices as to whether participation in a trial is consistent with their
chosen ends. Disclosure of the SUPPORT trial interventions therefore must include details
of the study procedures, any associated benefits and risks of harm, including retinopathy
of prematurity, neurological damage, lung toxicity, and mortality.
It is also clear from this analysis that questions concerning whether enrolled infants were
exposed to additional risk when compared with infants not so enrolled are not central to,
or determinative of, the substantive ethical issues to which the SUPPORT trial gives rise.
The answers to questions about risk, disclosure, and consent are secondary to—and flow
from—an antecedent determination as to whether the usual care interventions ought to be
conceptualized as practice or research. In turn, inquiring into whether the demands of the
fiduciary obligation can be upheld is the fulcrum upon which at determination is made as
to whether an intervention falls within the ethical domain of medical practice or clinical
research, and directs us toward systematically identifying and considering the various
downstream ethical implications of each.
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3.8

Conclusion

The debate surrounding the SUPPORT trial has focused on determining whether the lowand high-oxygen saturation interventions posed “reasonably foreseeable risks” to study
participants. This manifest preoccupation with U.S. regulation has not only made this
debate inapplicable to an international audience, it has also resulted in the failure to identify
and engage the SUPPORT trial’s central ethical issue.
The central ethical issue raised by the SUPPORT trial is the following: should the
SUPPORT trial interventions be conceptualized as practice, or research? To address this
question, we have attempted to provide a systematic analysis of the SUPPORT trial. In so
doing, we have reframed the debate about the SUPPORT trial in a way that is both
historically informed and ethically relevant. We have provided three reasons, largely
grounded in a fiduciary analysis, for conceptualizing the low- and high-oxygen saturation
arms in the SUPPORT trial as research, and not practice. First, the enrolled infants are
deprived of the benefit and protection of the individualized judgment of their physician.
Second, the physician’s ability to use her discretionary power to continuously monitor,
reassess, and adjust the prescribed oxygen therapy administered to a premature infant is
compromised by altered-pulse oximeters. Third, in those cases where a usual care treatment
is characterized by a range, or continuum, the bifurcation and ensuing randomization of
research participants to protocolized subsets of that range may no longer constitute usual
care. An important implication of the third argument is that while the SUPPORT trial is a
pragmatic ceRCT—as it compares two interventions, head-to-head, under real-world
conditions—it is not a ceRCT that compares two usual care interventions. We propose that
the first two reasons why the trial constitutes research are likely applicable to a broader
class of pragmatic ceRCTs involving one or more usual care interventions, whereas the
third reason is likely applicable to those ceRCTs where the treatment used routinely in
clinical practice is characterized by a range; however, we leave questions regarding the
applicability of our analysis for the broader class of pragmatic ceRCTs open for future
inquiry. Finally, we have demonstrated that how we conceptualize these interventions has
implications for which components of a study protocol fall within the purview of research
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ethics committees, undergo benefit–harm analysis, and are appropriately disclosed in
informed consent procedures.
Nevertheless, with Lantos, we “acknowledge the distinctiveness” of pragmatic ceRCTs
involving one or more usual care interventions, and thus recognize that important questions
remain regarding how these socially important and, broadly speaking, low-risk studies
ought to be regulated. For instance: should those pragmatic ceRCTs that are deemed low
risk undergo an expedited review process, proportionate to the risks and benefits involved?
With low-risk trials that seek to answer clinically important questions, yet would be
infeasible if standard research informed consent procedures were required, ought there to
be modifications to the informed consent process? Addressing these and other difficult
questions, and the ethical challenges they give rise to, requires further investigation.
Our fiduciary analysis makes it clear, however, that any proposed solution to these
important questions must proceed in a clear and systematic fashion. The aim of this chapter
was to provide insight into the ethical controversy on the SUPPORT trial and, in doing so,
illustrate how the fiduciary relationship can be used to offer conceptual clarity to a complex
bioethical issue. As a moral relationship, the norms and duties of the fiduciary relationship
ethically prescribe, or prohibit, certain behaviours within the context of that relationship.
The fiduciary obligation is what enables individuals to trust or depend on fiduciaries within
the context of that inherently vulnerable mode of interaction, and in the pursuit of their
autonomous ends. Specifically, the obligation that fiduciaries remain loyal to their
beneficiaries’ interests, who have vested in them the authority to act on their behalf, is what
protects against the exploitation of fiduciary power. As we saw in the previous chapters,
the integrity, or continued viability, of the fiduciary relationship requires that the norms,
values, and rules that make up its “irreducible core” are upheld. The relationship between
healthcare professionals and their patients is fiduciary. Therefore, it is paramount that the
fiduciary norms and obligations that define this socially and economically important
relationship are respected and maintained. Indeed, as we saw above, it is precisely the
presumption that fiduciary norms govern the physician-patient relationship that justifies its
privileged and largely self-regulated status. In those relationships where the fiduciary
obligation is threatened or undermined, the presumption that beneficiaries’ interests are
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protected by a duty of loyalty simply dissolves, along with the fiduciary relationship itself.
In the context of research, which introduces research-related interests that compete with
and potentially undermine the physician-fiduciary’s strict duty of loyalty to her patientbeneficiary’s interests, extra protections in the form of third-party oversight and research
regulations are warranted and required. As we saw above, the norms and duties of the
fiduciary relationship can therefore be used as the fulcrum against which research
interventions are demarcated from those of practice. Where features of a study protocol
function to potentially undermine the physician’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to her patient’s
medical interests, that aspect of the physician-patient interaction is no longer protected by
the norms and duties of the fiduciary relationship. Consequently, those aspects of the study
protocol are properly conceptualized as research interventions and must thereby be
afforded research protections.
The analysis provided in this chapter therefore helps to clear a critical conceptual hurdle
for pragmatic ceRCTs involving usual care interventions: namely, by asking how we ought
to conceptualize study interventions involving treatments used routinely in medical
practice and by using a fiduciary analysis to answer that question. Moreover, this analysis
illustrates the power and utility of the fiduciary relationship for thinking clearly and
systematically about the ethical issues that arise between healthcare professionals and their
patients. As mentioned, the SUPPORT trial presents a “hard case” for the fiduciary
framework developed in this dissertation. This is because, where the beneficiaries to a
fiduciary relationship lack autonomy (such as in the case of infants and children), it remains
to be shown how the fiduciary relationship functions to promote their autonomy. I have
argued that the fiduciary relationship promotes the autonomy of infants and children by
having their parents or guardians serve as proxies for their future autonomy interests (and
subject to their post hoc autonomous review). As part of the procedural-constitutive theory
of autonomy adopted in my fiduciary analysis, parents, guardians, and caregivers play an
essential role in fostering the development of various skills and capacities necessary for
autonomy. In the case of infant-beneficiaries, parent-fiduciary’s also function as proxies as
they make decisions for the infants under their care and protection in a way that keeps their
future open to their own future autonomous decision making. In this way, the argument
that the fiduciary relationship is essential to promoting autonomy may apply to at least
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some non-autonomous beneficiaries, such as children. To the extent that the analysis of the
SUPPORT trial presented in this chapter is successful, it ought to be considered a virtue of
the theory of fiduciary relationships developed throughout this dissertation that it can be
used to tackle hard cases, not just easy ones. Ultimately, however, I hope to have illustrated
how a fiduciary analysis can provide clear and systematic guidance to complex bioethical
issues.
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Conclusion
The fiduciary relationship is a powerful tool that holds much promise for conceptualizing
and offering clarity to the kinds of ethical issues that arise between healthcare professionals
and their patients. As we saw in Chapter 3, when we recognize that the physician-patient
relationship is fiduciary a number of things follow. The structure of the fiduciary
relationship between power and dependence renders the patient vulnerable to the
physician’s misuse, abuse, or neglect of her fiduciary power. From this vulnerability arises
fiduciary duties that function to protect not only the individual patient, but also the integrity
of the physician-patient relationship (qua fiduciary relationship) itself. As one of the most
important social and economic relationships, touching on all facets of human experience,
societies have an interest in maintaining the integrity, or continued viability, of this type of
interaction. From the vital importance of the fiduciary relationship, and its inherent
vulnerability to exploitation, we get the defining fiduciary obligation: namely, when one
undertakes to act on behalf of another’s significant practical interests, one must do so with
utmost loyalty to those same interests. In the case of physicians, they owe a duty of
undivided to loyalty to the best medical interests of their patients. The duty of loyalty
prohibits physicians from entering into conflicts of interest that could potentially
undermine their duty to remain loyal to their patients’ best medical interests. As we also
saw in Chapter 3, the fiduciary relationship can serve as an ethical framework that
prescribes certain conduct to ensure the continued viability of physician-patient
relationship, and to make possible the pursuit of interests or ends important for meaningful
self-governance.
I argued that the widespread application of the fiduciary relationship in bioethical analysis
is threatened by at least two conceptual problems: namely, equivocation and paternalism.
Worries about equivocation stem from the belief that the fiduciary relationship is a
construct of the law, and thus applying its normative prescriptions to the ethical domain
involves a specious kind of legal-moral equivocation. To address this problem, in Chapter
1, I traced the history of the fiduciary obligation, illustrating that it has been a constant
feature of human societies for the past 3000 years. The social and economic importance of
relationships of this type have given societies throughout history good reason to
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operationalize and enforce the normative demands of the fiduciary obligation, including
(variously) as a moral norm, religious edict, and legal rule. I suggested that the fiduciary
obligation responds to a specific problem “etched in human nature”: namely, how to trust
or reliably depend on others who undertake on our behalf. Accordingly, I argued that the
fiduciary obligation is a moral obligation that fosters social harmony by enabling
broadscale societal cooperation. I then described the context in which the fiduciary
obligation entered the English common law tradition, namely, as an equitable principle in
early Chancery, and from which we gain our contemporary understanding of the fiduciary
relationship as a legal relationship. I argued that, as a pre-existing moral principle, the
fiduciary obligation’s operationalization through English Equity is merely the latest
attempt by contemporary (Western) societies to protect and maintain the fiduciary
relationship. By arguing that the fiduciary relationship is first and foremost a moral
relationship, I therefore hope to have mitigated the problem of equivocation by pointing
out that there simply is no such equivocation: applying the fiduciary relationship, as a moral
principle, to the ethical issues of bioethics is sound.
In Chapter 2, I tackled the problem of paternalism. Worries about paternalism relate to the
concern that the fiduciary relationship is paternalistic and is therefore an inappropriate
model for the physician-patient relationship, given the healthcare ethics ethos of patientcentred care and the promotion of patient autonomy. I argued that the fiduciary relationship
is not only not paternalistic, it is essential to autonomy. The critical role the fiduciary
relationship plays in promoting autonomy also fleshes out the moral ground provided in
Chapter 1. I made this argument by first adopting and then going beyond Matthew
Harding’s account of Equity’s interest in governing institutions, or modes of human action.
Harding argues that Equity’s interest in maintaining institutions is normatively justified by
the law’s general facilitative project in promoting a liberal sense of autonomy. Harding
argued that Equity promotes a Razian sense of autonomy by maintaining various modes of
human interaction as distinct “options” from which individuals can choose in the pursuit
of their self-directed plans, projects, or causes. Drawing from the historical narrative of the
fiduciary relationship in Chapter 1, I argued that the fiduciary relationship is clearly one
such institution that Equity has taken an interest in governing and maintaining. In this way,
on Harding’s analysis, the fiduciary relationship plays a role in promoting autonomy in its
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role as an “option” of choice in the process of individual self-governance. However, I
argued that Harding’s professedly Razian theory of autonomy fails to account for the ways
in which autonomy is fundamentally relational. As a result, I argued the Harding’s account
of the way in which fiduciary relationship in particular promotes autonomy does not go far
enough. By adopting a relational theory of autonomy, I went beyond Harding’s account,
arguing that the fiduciary relationship is essentially autonomy promoting. I argued that on
a procedural-constitutive theory of relational autonomy, the fiduciary relationship is among
the most important modes of human action that together constitutes the very background
conditions that make the development and continued exercise of autonomy possible. I
adopted Paul Miller’s influential account of fiduciary power, arguing that the fiduciary
relationship functions as a “relational capacity” by which an individual can pursue their
autonomous will. Finally, I argued that the essential role the fiduciary relationship plays in
promoting autonomy simultaneously gives it a foundation in morality and mitigates
concerns about both equivocation and paternalism. When we understand autonomy
relationally it becomes clear that the ways in which the fiduciary relationship fosters social
harmony and promotes autonomy are coextensive: the fiduciary relationship enables
individuals to trust and depend on one another, making possible the pursuit of certain
autonomously chosen ends and leading to greater social cooperation.
In Chapter 3, I illustrated the utility of the fiduciary relationship for providing clarity to
complex ethical issues involving healthcare professionals and their patients. I showed how
a fiduciary analysis can offer conceptual clarity to the ethical issues that arise in pragmatic
comparative effectiveness randomized controlled trials (ceRCT)—an innovative research
methodology designed to be conducted under real-world clinical conditions, and often
comparing one or more “standard of care” interventions. The SUPPORT trial was a
controversial ceRCT that compared two concentrations (low and high) of supplemental
oxygen (both of which allegedly fell within the full “standard of care” range) on preterm
infants on outcomes of blindness and death. The results of the trial showed that for every
case of blindness prevented (for those infants in the low oxygen saturation arm) there were
two infant deaths. Controversy erupted following the conclusion of the trial when it was
discovered that blindness and death, the primary study outcomes, were not disclosed to
study participants. Debate about the SUPPORT was largely preoccupied with domestic
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research regulations, as opposed to ethical principles, which were not developed with
ceRCTs in mind. By applying a fiduciary analysis to the SUPPORT trial controversy, I
illustrated how the fiduciary relationship can be used to provide a systematic method of
both identifying and investigating the relevant ethical issues to which the SUPPORT trial
gives rise. I argued that ethical issue raised by SUPPORT is whether the (purportedly)
standard of care oxygen saturation interventions ought to be conceptualized as medical
practice or clinical research. The fiduciary relationship is critical to demarcating practice
from research, as each comprises an ethical domain with its own norms, rules, and
regulations. I argued that the various features of the study protocol—such as
randomization, masking with pulse oximeters, and the bifurcation of a usual care range into
two subsets of that range—serve to undermine the treating neonatologists fiduciary
obligation to exercise her professional judgment on behalf of the best medical interests of
the premature infants under her care. Accordingly, as the norms and principles of the
fiduciary relationship can no longer be relied upon, I argued that the SUPPORT trial
interventions ought to be conceptualized as research. Conceptualizing the interventions as
research has various “downstream” ethical implications, such as the requirement that they
be subject to research ethics committee review, undergo a systematic benefit-harm
analysis, and are disclosed during informed consent procedures. I thus hope to have
illustrated how a fiduciary analysis can provide systematic guidance and ethical clarity on
difficult bioethical issues, such those posed by innovative research methodologies, like the
SUPPORT trial. I hope also to have contributed to an important ethical issue in research
ethics concerning the ethical design and conduct of novel or innovative research
methodologies, such as pragmatic ceRCTs.
By offering a moral foundation for the fiduciary relationship in its essential role in
promoting a relational autonomy, I hope to have helped alleviate both the problems of
equivocation and paternalism. With these conceptual hurdles diminished, the path ought to
be slightly clearer for future work in both medical and research ethics to make use of a
fiduciary analysis when thinking about those ethical issues involving relationships where
one undertakes act on behalf of another’s best interests. To the extent that I have been
successful, this dissertation provides the beginnings of a moral philosophical foundation
upon which future ethical applications and analyses of the fiduciary relationship can draw.
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Of course, this is just a beginning. Future inquiries, aside from exploring alternatives to the
moral foundation I have provided here, might look at how (specifically) moral duties arise
in the context of the fiduciary relationship. Drawing from Miller and others, I have merely
assumed that fiduciary duties arise in response to the beneficiary’s vulnerability to
exploitation. But questions remain about how precisely these duties are generated and
specified in this way (or perhaps others) and what they actually demand of fiduciaries,
practically speaking. Questions also remain as to whether fiduciary duties are universal
across all fiduciary relationships, or whether there are certain vulnerabilities that are unique
to a specific type of fiduciary relationship, and thus generate unique duties. For instance,
perhaps there are a “core set” of fiduciary duties as well as a series of “bespoke” or tailored
duties that address vulnerabilities specific to certain relationships. Another important area
of inquiry concerns the nature of the duty of loyalty itself. Moral philosophical
investigations into the nature of loyalty are limited in number, and fiduciary loyalty in
particular appears under-theorized.357 For example, the fiduciary duty of loyalty is said to
prohibit fiduciaries from entering into or maintaining conflicting interests, or so-called
“divided loyalties.” But presumably some such conflicts are unavoidable, such as those
between a physician’s loyalty to her patients and her loyalty to the medical profession, the
institution in which she practices, her colleagues, her family, her own mental and physical
health and wellbeing, and to the public health at large. Future ethical inquiries into the
fiduciary relationship therefore ought to consider how much conflict or division between
loyalties is too much.
The fiduciary relationship is an important and exciting avenue for current and future
bioethical research, one that some bioethicists have recently taken.358 In this dissertation,
I hope to have contributed in some small way to this burgeoning new literature. More
importantly, however, I hope the conceptual tools provided here serve to further the justice,
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welfare, and autonomy interests of current and future patients and research participants. In
the diverse relationships that together constitute the web of human interactions that give
meaning to our lives, while enabling the satisfaction of our needs and desires—and through
which we aid in the fulfillment of the needs and desires of others—many of us are
simultaneously fiduciaries and beneficiaries. I therefore propose that thinking seriously
about the fiduciary obligations we owe to one another, including the role that such
relationships play in empowering each of us to be both authors of our own lives and critical
supports to the autonomy of others, will promote greater human flourishing and a more just
society.
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